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Almost a million people have been killed in combat in civil conflicts over the
last 30 years1. Despite the fact that over 300 rebel groups have been involved
in these conflicts, most of the deaths have come from just 11 of them. Most
civil conflicts are relatively small, with half causing less than 120 deaths per
year, while a small number of conflicts kill vast numbers of people, with the
top ten percent of conflicts killing over 3000 people per year. Why do we see
this vast disparity in the magnitude of fighting in different conflicts?
Many of the conflicts that people think of when discussing civil wars are
actually much smaller than commonly believed. The Irish Republican Army’s
struggle against the government of the United Kingdom only resulted in 36
deaths per year between 1989 and the end of the conflict in 1998. ETA (Eu-
skadi ta azkatasuna, or Basque Nation and Liberty), another well-known Euro-
1This figure is based on battle death data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program,
covering the years 1989-2016.
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pean rebel group, only produced a total of 211 battle deaths in their rebellion
against Spain over 18 active years between 1989 and 2011, averaging just 12
deaths per year.
Israel is often considered a country mired in civil conflict, however despite
being involved in eight different civil conflict dyads over the last 20 years, the
most deadly of those conflicts, with Hamas, has only averaged 286 deaths per
year, making it less deadly that 84 other contemporaneous conflicts. Fighting
with Fatah, the largest of the Palestinian rebel groups, has averaged only 40
deaths per year, and even Hezbollah and Israel, often seen as a major conflict,
have only averaged 139 deaths per year.
In contrast to the many small conflicts that occur throughout the world,
large civil wars also occur, although less frequently. In Ethiopia, major con-
flicts with both the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Ethiopian
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) both resulted in about
14,000 deaths per year. When the Cobra militia took power in Congo in 1997
the conflict killed approximately 10,000 people in less than one year of fighting.
Over 14 years the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan have averaged
over 5000 deaths per year, and when the Taliban was in power their conflict
with the Northern Alliance was only slightly smaller. Over two decades of
fighting in Sri Lanka, the conflict with the Tamil Tigers averaged more than
3000 deaths per year.
Despite the stark difference between these large conflicts, with annual death
tolls in the thousands, and the much larger group of conflicts that count only
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dozens or hundreds of annual deaths, there is little existing research explaining
why we see these differences across conflicts.
The cross-national variation discussed above also can be seen within coun-
tries. India has fought conflicts with 23 different rebel groups, however 17 of
those conflicts average less that 100 battle deaths per year, while the conflict in
Kashmir kills many hundreds per year, and in Punjab annual death tolls from
fighting with Sikh groups are commonly in the thousands. All of these dyads
are fighting the same national government, indicating that the differentiating
factor lies within the rebel groups.
Another case of variation in conflict size within a country can be seen
in Angola. UNITA and the Angolan government fought a conventional war
that killed 2,500 people per year. UNITA fought against the government of
Angola with a large army consisting of tens of thousands of soldiers, and
largely utilized conventional tactics. During the same time period the Front
for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda also fought against the Angolan
government, however they fought with only hundreds of soldiers and avoided
direct combat, resulting in only dozens of deaths each year.
The variation in conflict intensity has important implications for the field
of conflict research. Most dyad-year observations represent low intensity con-
flicts, while most of the violence and death caused by civil conflicts is contained
within a small percentage of observations. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program
(UCDP) data, when aggregated by dyad-year, contains 1137 observations that
result in less that 2500 deaths, and only 77 observations with more than 2500
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deaths. Those few large observations, however, account for more total deaths
than the much larger collection of low-intensity dyad-years. Research that fails
to address the difference between low and high intensity conflict risks applying
data on low-intensity conflicts to theories that are often motivated by much
larger conflicts.
Much of the current conflict literature seeks to explain conflict duration.
Theories of conflict duration which seek to explain why some pairs of conflict
actors are able to reach a peace agreement while others cannot, often focus on
qualities of the actors or the environment in which those actors exist. Although
these studies have identified important aspects of conflict which contribute to
the difficulty of ending civil wars, they have largely focused on the groups
involved in conflict rather than the fighting itself. I argue that in order to
understand how conflicts end, we must have a better understanding of how
they are fought. Conflict management efforts cannot be applied equally to
small civil conflicts which see only a few limited conflict events per year and to
large conflicts where armies engage in large-scale warfare. The interests and
expectations of the parties to these different types of conflict are extremely
different, and must be treated differently.
I argue that conflict intensity is determined by the capabilities of the rebels
and the government. Both sides in a conflict make decisions about how to fight
based on how large the forces on both sides are. The primary effect is that
strong rebels are able to exert a large amount of force against the govern-
ment in an attempt to seize power directly, while weak rebels cannot compete
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with the government army in direct combat, and must instead rely on low-
intensity conflict, which sees rebels engaging in only the most advantageous
situations and relying on concealment to avoid being destroyed by the much
more powerful government forces. Conversely, when the rebels are strong the
government will dedicate a large portion of their total capabilities to fighting
them, whereas governments often use a much smaller portion of their total
capabilities to fight against small rebel groups, as those small groups do not
pose a serious and immediate threat.
At a basic level, the higher the capabilities of both sides, the more casualties
we would expect to see in a conflict. Two large armies fighting each other are
capable of directing large amounts of force against the large number of soldiers
in the opposing army. This situation can create massive death tolls, while much
smaller forces have both less ability to wage war, and fewer combatants to kill.
This simple theory indicates that as long as both sides are equally large, an
increase in the size of the forces will increase conflict intensity. When one
side is larger than the other, there should be a similar effect, as long as the
only change is in the size of the forces, and not in the way that they behave.
Without accounting for behavior, giving more capabilities to conflict actors
leads to more violence.
The problem with that simply theory is that behavior does change based on
capabilities. In the vast majority of cases, rebel forces are much smaller than
the government army they are seeking to defeat. A small rebel group that
attempts to directly challenge the state army faces little chance of victory.
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Weak rebels will instead focus on growing their movement while suffering few
losses themselves, and imposing large losses on the government. In order to
achieve their goals, they will have to avoid defeat long enough that they are
able to grow their organization. Military engagements for these small groups
are politically important, but not militarily meaningful. Killing dozens of
government soldiers will not cripple the state army, but can generate publicity
which can lead to support from important constituencies. These small groups
seek to either continue to grow, until they become large enough to directly
confront the state, or they seek to impose high costs on the government while
suffering few losses themselves, in order to receive concessions in exchange for
ending the conflict. In either case, the rebels must choose to fight in a limited
manner, resulting in a low intensity conflict.
When a rebel group grows larger they are able to alter their tactics. They
can develop from conducting occasional surprise attacks against government
forces, to launching more frequent attacks against harder targets. Guerrilla
warfare tactics therefore develop, as the rebels grow, into conventional warfare.
When the rebels have sufficiently large forces they can begin to target the
government with large-scale offensives that aim to seize territory, or even take
control of the state. The increased capabilities of the rebels increases their
ability to fight, based purely on capabilities, but these capabilities also alter
their behavior, so that they use their large capabilities more often and more
directly. Where a small rebel group will wait for a particularly advantageous
target, and plan a single attack carefully, a large group will fight on a regular
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basis, and will not always have the luxury of waiting and planning, as they
become an increasingly large target for the government to attack.
As the rebels come out of the shadows, and rely less on concealment and
surprise, this allows the government to also adjust their tactics. Most states
have a variety of security threats that they have to dedicate portions of their
forces to. Militaries are usually oriented towards defending against foreign
threats. Internal conflict is almost always a secondary concern for government
armies, even when there is an ongoing civil conflict within a country. States
must therefore reserve most of their forces for international defense, with a
smaller portion dedicated to fighting against internal rebels. The case of India
serves as a useful illustration of this point. India has a very large army, as well
as several internal conflicts. Many of the rebel groups in India are very small,
many with only a few hundred active fighters. Each of these groups would be
relatively easy to defeat with the undivided attention of the Indian security
services. India however has to divide their resources not only among numer-
ous different rebel groups, but also dedicates most of their military resources
towards preparing for a potential war with Pakistan, as well as international
concerns they have with China and other neighboring states, as well as the
international peacekeeping forces that India often participates in. As a re-
sult, the government allocates their resources to the most pressing needs, and
dedicates relatively few resources to the least pressing rebellions. If one rebel
group begins to grow in power, they will begin to attract more attention from
the government, as they become more of a threat. As such, fighting will be-
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come more frequent as the government also begins to target them with more
resources, further increasing conflict intensity.
The size of a rebel group, and the capabilities that they possess, directly
contribute to conflict intensity, by increasing their ability to fight, and altering
their behavior such that they use those capabilities more frequently. Addition-
ally, the government will increase their efforts to defeat a rebel group as the
group grows. The capabilities of the government affect the rebel behavior as
well. If the government improves their military capabilities it serves to deter
the rebels, while a weakening government will embolden rebels and force the
government to spread their forces thinner.
In addition to troop size, another important determinant of actor capa-
bilities in a civil war is external support. In most civil conflicts an outside
actor provides assistance to either the rebels or the government. This sup-
port increases the capabilities of an actor. When rebels receive support it has
a direct and positive effect on conflict intensity, as the rebels use the newly
provided capabilities to increase the frequency and size of their operations.
Governments that receive assistance would be expected, based purely on the
change in capabilities, to have a deterrent effect on the rebels, and reduce
conflict intensity.
The effect of external support is not however as simple as just increasing
the capabilities of one side or the other. The foreign power that is intervening
in the conflict also has interests in how the conflict is fought, and the actor
receiving the support has an interest in meeting those expectations, in order
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to continue receiving support in the future. When external supporters give
assistance to rebel groups they are usually seeking to increase the cost of
conflict for the government that the rebel group is fighting, and potentially
see that government replaced. Foreign powers that support governments often
have their own interest in seeing the rebels defeated, possibly because the
violence within the state is flowing over the border into neighboring states, or
because that rebel group maintains ties with groups in other states that are
in turn fighting the external supporter. In these cases the external supporter
will want to see that the assistance they are providing in being translated into
increased effort to fight the rebels. Both governments and rebels will fight
harder, and increase conflict intensity in the process of appeasing the interests
of the external supporter.
The incentive to demonstrate effectiveness to an external supporter in-
creases conflict intensity when the support goes to rebels, in addition to the
normal increase that would be expected just from increasing the capabilities
of the rebels. The situation for governments is more complicated, since the
capabilities themselves are expected to deter rebels, and therefore reduce con-
flict, however the influence of the external supporter is expected to increase
the level of conflict intensity, as the foreign party encourages the state to fight
harder.
In addition to simply looking at whether there is support, I also examine
the type of support that is provided to the actors. When foreign governments
support governments in civil conflicts the only discernible effect is when the
9
foreign supporter adds their own troops to the conflict, or integrates the gov-
ernment military into the supporting state’s military and intelligence system.
This sort of strong support from one government to another increases the in-
tensity of the conflict, because the external supporter both provides substantial
capabilities, and by integrating their forces with the host state they are able to
play a large role in setting the agenda for the conflict. Rebels do not respond
in the same way to support, and rather than troops and joint operations,
rebels respond to financial assistance and the provision of intelligence. Both
forms of support improve the ability of guerrilla forces to wage war against
the government, while training from outside actors reduces conflict intensity.
An understanding of how actor capabilities and foreign intervention affect
conflict intensity allows for a better understanding of how conflict intensity
affects conflict duration. In the third paper of this dissertation I examine
conflict duration as a function of conflict intensity, while also examining the
effect of troop size and external support. Conflicts with intense fighting are
much harder to end, with high levels of fighting encouraging actors to continue
fighting in the hope of a military victory. Rebel groups that grow to the point
where they are able to engage the government in regular combat are unlikely
to suddenly end their efforts without good reason. Similarly, governments are
often unwilling to strike a deal with a powerful rebel group, since a negotiated
settlement with a powerful group often involves the rebels retaining some or
all of their capability to make war. The public often pushes the government to
defeat rebels and bring their leaders to justice, rather than compromise with
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groups that often seen as criminals.
In low intensity conflicts termination is more likely, as rebels who have
little chance of victory can cease fighting on their own, or can negotiate a
peace with the government without the political complications faced in larger
conflicts. Weak rebels in negotiations are faced with the option of accepting
relatively minor concessions, or continuing with an armed struggle which at
best promises victory only after years of continued struggle. Rebels who are
only able to fight at a low level of intensity are therefore more willing to accept
deals, or in the extreme will stop fighting without a deal, if they judge their
chances of victory to be too low to justify the cost of fighting.
In examining the effect of conflict intensity on duration, intensity is shown
to make conflicts longer, while troop size and external support are only marginally
significant. This indicates that although rebel troop size and external support
cause conflicts to be intense, it is the intensity itself which causes the con-
flicts to last longer, rather than the determinants of intensity also determining
the length of the conflict. This shows that the nature of the fighting itself
is affecting how conflicts end, supporting my argument that an improved un-
derstanding of the dynamics within conflicts is necessary in order to better
understand how to end conflicts.
The next three chapters consist of three papers, which together explain
both what causes some conflicts to have high levels of intensity while others
do not, and then shows the effect of intensity on conflict duration. The first
paper focuses on the effect of capabilities on conflict duration, and presents
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my theory of tactical interaction between actors. It shows that the size of
the rebel force is a strong predictor of conflict intensity. The second paper
adds to the understanding of intensity by examining the effects of foreign
actors who provide support to the parties fighting a civil conflict. External
support to rebels is shown to increase conflict intensity. The third paper
takes the results from the first two papers, which explain why some conflicts
are more intense than others, and uses that knowledge to test what effect
intensity has on conflict duration. More intense conflicts are shown to last
longer. Following the three papers, I conclude with a chapter that discusses








Some rebel groups use conventional military tactics, while many oth-
ers rely on guerrilla warfare. The primary factor determining the tactics
rebels use is the ratio of capabilities between the rebels and the govern-
ment forces. While relative capabilities determine tactics, the level of
capabilities also directly determines conflict intensity, as larger forces
are capable of killing more people. This paper presents a theory of how
relative capabilities determines tactical choices, and models the effects
of rebel and government troop levels on conflict intensity. The results
show that the size of a rebel army has a large effect on the intensity
of combat, as large rebel forces are both stronger, and better able to
use their strength. Because of rebel responses to government actions,
the strength of government forces has only a minor effect, with larger
government armies producing a minor deterrent effect, slightly reducing
conflict intensity.
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Civil wars vary greatly in their intensity. The Syrian civil war has killed
hundreds of thousands of people. During that same time the ongoing wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq claimed approximately 45,000 and 25,000 lives. In
addition to these large-scale conflicts, there were nine other ongoing conflicts
with between 10,000 and 1000 deaths, and a further 27 conflicts with fewer
than 1000 battle deaths1. What explains this variation in conflict intensity?
I theorize that the capability of the rebels and government affect their
choice of tactics, which in turn determines the conflict intensity of civil wars.
Conflicts in which heavily armed forces square off in conventional warfare
generate large numbers of casualties. Conversely, conflicts with weak rebel
forces that rely on guerrilla tactics see very low levels of violence. Strong rebels
are able to directly challenge the government, in order to secure their goal of
taking over the state. For instance, in Syria the government’s army engaged
in conventional combat against well organized and armed rebels. The intense
fighting across defined front lines, including aerial and artillery bombardments,
has resulted in tens of thousands of battle deaths per year. The unusually large
and capable rebel forces in Syria were able to openly confront the government
in ways that most other rebel groups cannot. For instance, the conflict between
Israel and Hamas, although highly publicized, has averaged only 152 battle
deaths per year over the last three decades, due to the large power differential
between the Israeli army and Hamas’s militant force. Hamas is forced to rely
1Calculations are from the UCDP GED battle death data for state based conflicts, and
only include conflicts that were active through the entire four year period from the beginning
of 2012 to the end of 2015. The 38 dyadic conflicts occurred in 20 countries.
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on concealment and insurgent tactics, as Israel would easily destroy Hamas if
they were able to locate all of their forces.
By explaining why some civil conflicts are far deadlier than others, and
investigating how the capabilities of the actors determines the level of intensity,
this paper will add to our understanding of conflict dynamics. Understanding
how actors make tactical choices within conflicts will improve future research
on conflict dynamics, and improving our knowledge of conflict dynamics will
in turn improve studies of conflict onset and duration.
I proceed to discuss the literature on civil war intensity. Then I develop a
theory of how the capabilities of governments and rebels determine the tactics
used by both sides in the conflict, and how this shapes conflict intensity. I
then discuss the data used and the results of the analysis. I conclude by
discussing the implications of this research, as well as the next steps in my
research agenda, which will build on this theoretical foundation.
2.1 Literature
The existing research on civil conflict has focused primarily on how wars start
and end, without paying sufficient attention to what happens during a conflict.
In particular, to understand how wars end, it is important to understand how
they are fought. One of the most important aspects of how a war is fought
is whether the rebels use conventional military tactics, or if they instead rely
on guerrilla tactics. Additionally, conflicts exhibit vastly different levels of
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conflict intensity. Studies of conflict duration which do not account for the
differences in conflict intensity risk comparing vastly different cases to each
other in order to determine the causes of duration. By better understanding
the relationship between tactics and intensity, this paper will improve the
understanding of conflict dynamics, improving the ability of future research to
better understand and explain variation in conflict duration.
Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) discuss the means by which wars are fought.
They define conflicts as conventional wars, irregular wars (or insurgencies), and
symmetrical non-conventional wars. In conventional wars, and symmetrical-
nonconventional wars, the rebels and the government have capabilities that
are roughly on par with each other, allowing the rebels to use military tactics
similar to the government they are fighting. The difference between these two
types of conflicts is in whether the government and rebels are advanced enough
to fight conventionally, or whether they are fighting in a symmetrical manner,
but with less sophisticated organization and tactics than what is normally
considered conventional warfare. They argue that the type of tactics used
are the result of the balance of power between the two actors, and find that
insurgency is more common than both other types of conflict.
This paper will build on the differentiation between symmetrical conflicts
and insurgencies, by examining the effect that the balance of power within a
conflict has on the intensity of the fighting between the two parties. Instead
of limiting the analysis to categories of conflict, such as conventional war and
insurgency, I improve on Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) by conceiving of tactics
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as a continuum of techniques that lie between insurgency and conventional
conflict.
The effects of various tactics are discussed in Balcells and Kalyvas (2014),
where they find that irregular conflicts tend to last longer than other conflicts,
and have lower levels of conflict intensity. This indicates that fighting between
weak rebels and a strong government will kill fewer people per year than if the
rebels were stronger, in which case it would be a more intense conventional
conflict. It also indicates that when both the rebels and the government are
weak, the intensity of the conflict will increase, as it becomes a symmetrical
nonconventional war. Balcells and Kalyvas (2014) make these findings by
observing the type of fighting in a conflict, and comparing that to the number
of people killed, and they infer that the capabilities of the two warring parties
are what cause the selection of the tactics that they observe. In this paper
I will add to this finding by examining the effect of the capabilities of both
actors on conflict intensity, rather than just examining the observed tactics.
The causes of conflict intensity have received much less attention that the
causes of conflict onset and duration. The existing research has followed Lacina
and Gleditsch (2005), who produced the first reliable dataset on battle deaths
that was comparable across countries and over time. Research on regime type
and the nature of the conflict demonstrates that governments make strategic
decisions regarding how much effort to put into a conflict, while research on
external support and other determinants of capabilities produces conflicting
expectations and results.
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Research on regime type provides some insight into how governments decide
how much effort to use to counter a rebellion. Civil wars in democratic coun-
tries have fewer battle deaths than wars in autocracies (Lacina, 2006; Heger
and Salehyan, 2007). Autocracies are also more likely to engage in one-sided
violence than democracies (Eck and Hultman, 2007). These findings demon-
strate that governments make choices about the amount and type of force to
use when threatened by a rebellion, and that the choices are systematically
tied to regime type. Governments and rebels also alter their level of effort
depending on the type of conflict. Rebellions seeking to take over the govern-
ment result in more intense conflicts than rebellions over territory, indicating
that governments fight harder when their control on power is threatened, and
apply less effort when the threat is only to a portion of the state’s territory
(Heger and Salehyan, 2007; Eck and Hultman, 2007).
Research on external support, foreign intervention, and lootable resources
provides insights into the effect of a shift in capabilities on conflict intensity.
Increased capabilities in some cases increases intensity, however under other
conditions it can decrease intensity. These mixed findings suggest that capa-
bilities alone do not fully explain intensity. External support has been argued
to increase the death toll in civil conflict (Lacina, 2006; Lacina, Gleditsch
and Russett, 2006), however it has also been argued that external support
encourages rebels to adopt insurgent tactics, resulting in decreased intensity
(Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010; Balcells and Kalyvas, 2014). Governments that
receive support from private military companies gain increased capabilities, re-
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sulting in an increase in conflict intensity, as well as shorter conflict duration
(Petersohn, 2015; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski, 2012). The different predic-
tions of how external support will affect conflict intensity result from focusing
on different aspects of conflict dynamics. Lacina (2006) argues that increased
capabilities allow for more intense combat, while Kalyvas and Balcells (2010)
argue that external support alters the tactics adopted by the actors, leading to
lower intensities. A new theory is necessary to link the concepts of capabilities
and tactics.
In addition to support, actors also respond to efforts to end conflicts. Arms
embargoes and the introduction of peacekeepers have been shown to reduce
conflict intensity, by reducing capabilities and providing disincentives to the
use of violence (Hultman and Peksen, 2015; Hultman, Kathman and Shan-
non, 2014). Economic sanctions have, however, been shown to increase con-
flict intensity, as they increase the cost of conflict and thereby incentivize the
government to apply more effort to fighting, in order to end the war quickly
(Hultman and Peksen, 2015). The ability of actors to alter their behavior in
response to incentives demonstrates the ability of states and rebels to make
choices about how they fight.
Another line of research looks at the resources available to rebel groups,
with mixed predictions and findings. Access to lootable resources is vari-
ously expected to make rebels more violent (Weinstein, 2007), and less violent
(Wood, 2010). Empirically it has been found that access to gems and oil
increases intensity, while drug cultivation decreases intensity (Lujala, 2009).
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These differences point toward a more complex relationship between capabil-
ities and violence, with access to resources affecting not just capabilities, but
also effort.
2.1.1 Contest Success Functions
Theoretical attempts to explain the level of effort actors exert in a conflict have
taken the form of contest success functions (CSF). Contest success functions
model each player’s probability of winning as a function of all other players’
efforts (Skaperdas, 1996). They have been used to understand disputes be-
tween groups, where all the actors have to make trade-offs between applying
resources to economic production, or to conflict. This can take the form of
political disputes between the rich and the poor over income redistribution,
and struggles between labor and management (Hirshleifer, 1991). In these
situations there is a symbiotic relationship between actors who are all produc-
ing into a single economy, and conflict is over the distribution of the benefits
among the participants. Contest success functions have also been applied
to more direct forms of conflict, such as organized crime (Skaperdas, 2001),
conflict between farmers and nomads (Hirshleifer, 1991) or among groups of
herders (Butler and Gates, 2012), and to civil wars dominated by warlords and
bandits (Skaperdas, 2008), as well as more traditional civil conflicts (Butler,
Cunningham and Gates, 2015).
The theory of contest success functions rests on the assumption that all
actors have a set of resources, which can be used both to produce income that
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flows into a common income pool, and to fight over the share of the common
income that they will receive. Actors that dedicate resources to conflict will
therefore receive a greater share of the total income, however by dedicating re-
sources to conflict they reduce the amount of production they are contributing
to the income pool. This results in an equilibrium with actors dividing their
resources between production and conflict. In some cases individual actors
may dedicate all of their resources to conflict, or to production, or they may
divide their efforts between the two.
Contest success functions generate steady-state estimates of how much ef-
fort actors will put into fighting, in a situation of repeated interaction. This
has been applied to theories of civil war, however it is only applicable to
cases of low-level conflict, where the actors fight over the income being pro-
duced, but are unable to seize the resources used to produce that income
(Hirshleifer, 1991). Resources are considered to be exogenous to the CSF, and
to be invulnerable to seizure. The contest is over the income derived from
these productive resources, not the resources themselves. Hirshleifer (1991)
discusses nomads and farmers as one such situation, where the nomads di-
vide their efforts between herding and raiding agricultural settlements, and
the farmers divide their efforts between farming and defending themselves. In
this situation the nomads can steal crops from the farmers, but they never
steal the farms themselves. He argues that his model applies to protracted
cold wars, or to low-level conflicts between bandits and warlords, but not to
conflicts that include irreversible victories. This limits their ability to model
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behavior within civil wars where the benefits from winning the war eclipse the
income that can be captured by actors during the war.
Contest success functions cannot fully capture the logic of civil wars in
which a victorious party is relieved of the need to fight in the future and is
guaranteed access to all, or a portion, of the future income of the state. They
do however provide an important example of a decision process that actors
have to make during an ongoing conflict. Instead of focusing on the decision
between producing income and attempting to control a larger share of that
income, the theory in this paper will focus on the decision actors make as to
how best to win a war, in order to cease fighting altogether, and receive the
benefits of that victory in the future, without paying the cost of fighting.
2.2 Theory
Some conflicts kill hundreds of thousands of people, while others only manage
to kill dozens. Some start out small and increase over years, while others begin
with major combat and gradually fade away over time. What are the causes
of these differences? I argue that the military capabilities of the government
and the rebels determine conflict intensity, both by directly determining the
amount of fighting potential, as well as by altering the means by which the two
groups fight. More capable forces will kill more people, all else being equal.
However, both governments and rebels make strategic decisions regarding how
they should fight. States rarely put all of their resources into fighting rebels,
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and rebel groups often decide to only select into battles they think they can
win. I argue that the intensity of fighting is not only a function of the strength
of the actors, but is also dependent on the balance of power between them,
which determines how their capabilities are put to use. How capabilities are
put to use is based on the tactical decisions of rebels, and the response of the
government. The methods that rebels use falls on a continuum from guerrilla
warfare to conventional warfare, with implications for how effectively they use
their capabilities, as well as how the government responds to their actions.
Rebels use violence to achieve their goal of political change. The goals
of different groups vary, with many seeking to overthrow the government and
seize power, while others have more limited goals, such as secession, achieving
regional autonomy, or forcing the government to make other policy concessions.
Violence allows the rebels to achieve these goals either directly, by defeating
the government militarily, or through negotiations, whereby rebels seek to
impose high costs of conflict on the government, so that the government will
be willing to give in to the rebels demands rather than continue to pay the cost
of fighting. An additional way that rebels use violence is to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the rebel group to third parties, such as domestic constituencies
or potential foreign sponsors. All three of these uses of violence are furthered
by the rebels killing large numbers of government soldiers. When rebels are
able to fight effectively and defeat government forces they move themselves
one step closer to defeating the government or coercing the government into
agreeing to their political demands. Rebels who illustrate their effectiveness
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are also able to publicize their cause and attract more support and recruits.
Rebels therefore seek to fight in the most intense manner possible, without
opening themselves up to unsustainable losses.
An increase in the capabilities of one actor will allow them to fight better,
directly contributing to an increase in conflict intensity. However, increased
capabilities also alter the strategies of the actors. When the rebels increase
in capabilities they will be able to take bolder action against the government,
and the government will be forced to direct more of its efforts at the rebels
to counter their increased strength. This increases the amount of direct com-
bat between the two sides, and greatly increases total intensity. Conversely,
when the government increases in strength the rebels withdraw and become
more selective about entering combat, reducing the number of engagements
between the rebels and the state. Rebels that face difficulty directly attacking
government forces will be forced to reduce the number of attacks they conduct
against military targets. They may redirect some of their resources toward
soft targets, and will be much more careful about engaging directly with the
government. Hence, increasing capabilities of governments will slightly reduce
intensity, while increased capabilities for rebels will greatly increase intensity.
Absolute and relative power affect conflict intensity. Strong rebels can
launch frequent attacks on government forces, and strong governments are able
to actively and successfully locate and attack rebels. Increasing the absolute
strength of either actor will increase the amount of force that they are capable
of deploying in a conflict. However, simply possessing capabilities does not
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lead to increased intensity, as actors choose strategically how they will use the
resources at their disposal. Strategic decisions of how much effort to put forth
are explained by the relative power of the actors. When rebels are at, or near,
parity with the government the conflict will be more intense. When they are
at parity either side can launch an attack at any time, stripping the rebels
of the initiative and increasing the intensity of conflict. When the rebels are
weaker they will rely on concealment to avoid the government forces, and only
launch occasional attacks, and the government will face less urgency in dealing
with the relatively low threat posed by the rebels. As the rebels become larger
they cannot rely on concealment and it is no longer possible to fight as small
guerrilla forces.
Below I will first describe a simple model of military capabilities affecting
conflict intensity, in which conflict intensity is a simple function of the capa-
bilities of both sides. I will then add to that theory a logic of tactical choice,
creating a more complete model that explains conflict intensity as a function
of both relative and absolute capabilities. This tactical model provides a bet-
ter understanding of how capabilities affect intensity than the standard model
based purely on capabilities.
2.2.1 Capabilities Model
The intensity of civil wars is based on the capabilities of the actors, as civil
war actors who are attempting to defeat their enemies will use higher levels
of capabilities to kill more enemy soldiers. Conflict intensity measures the
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number of battle deaths within a period of time. The larger the ability of the
actors in a civil war to generate military force, the higher the intensity of a
conflict will be. The capability of a fighting force is based on many factors,
including training, organization, and material factors such as armaments and
equipment. The fundamental factor of capabilities, however, is the number of
fighters an organization possesses. The number of fighters provides a baseline
level of capability, which can be increased or decreased by other qualities of
an organization. Large armies are capable of applying large amounts of force
against each other. In wars where such armies engage directly with each other
the level of intensity will be high. When both sides are relatively weak the level
of intensity will necessarily be lower, as small groups have fewer combatants
and therefore can inflict less damage on the enemy.
In cases where one actor is much larger than the other, the more powerful
actor will be limited in their ability to use force by the small size of the
opponent. This creates an interactive relationship, as even a very large force
is limited in how much force it can bring to bear against a much smaller
enemy. The interactive nature of the relationship is important for modeling
asymmetric conflict, as a large army fighting a small rebel force will be unable
to create a large body count, even if they are very successful, since the number
of rebels present for them to kill is very small, while in that context the rebels
would be expected to produce little deadly force, and therefore they would
kill few government soldiers. Intensity will therefore be proportional to the
product of the capabilities of the government, cg, and the capabilities of the
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rebels, cr.
Intensity = cg × cr (2.1)
This equation produces the relationship shown on the left side of Figure
2.1, for a realistic range of rebel and government capabilities, represented by
number of troops. Red corresponds to higher levels of intensity, while white
represents low intensity. The graph of the capabilities model illustrates the
prediction that an increase in capabilities for either side will increase conflict
intensity. If both actors are very weak intensity will be very low, while if both
are strong intensity will be very high. As the government becomes stronger
their ability to react to the rebels increases, and for a fixed size rebel force
the stronger the government is the more intense the conflict will be. As gov-
ernment strength increases, the gradient of intensity increases, with the level
of intensity depending largely on the strength of the rebels. For instance, a
strong government in a conflict with an exceptionally weak rebel group will
only produce a small amount of intensity, however if that same government
was fighting a larger rebel group the predicted intensity would be much higher.
The same effect holds true for the rebels, as the capabilities model does not
predict a different effect for rebel capabilities or government capabilities. An
increase in rebel strength will cause an increase in conflict intensity.
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2.2.2 Tactical Model
The capabilities model, described above, assumes both actors are fighting using
fixed tactics. The actors are assumed to use their capabilities against the
enemy in a fixed manner, with the only variable being number of troops. The
capabilities model is therefore a model of absolute capabilities, and ignores
the effect of relative capabilities. In fact, both governments and rebels adjust
their tactics to account for the balance of power in the conflict. There are a
wide range of strategic and tactical decisions made by military forces in a civil
war. Taking the capabilities model and building on it to include an element
of tactics creates a new model, which I call the tactical model.
The primary tactical choice that rebel forces must make is between guerrilla
warfare and conventional warfare. Although these two technologies of conflict
are often conceived of as distinct methods, I view the choice of tactics as a
continuum, on which rebels can place themselves anywhere between guerrilla
and conventional. This incorporates both mixed strategies, where rebels can
sometimes launch large operations and at other times rely on hit and run
tactics, as well as hybrid style of conflict where the methods employed by the
rebel force resemble large-scale guerrilla warfare, or small-scale conventional
conflict.
Rebels can choose where to place themselves along this continuum of tac-
tics. I propose that they choose their tactics based on their relative strength.
Rebels that are weak relative to the state will rely heavily on guerrilla tactics.
Small rebel groups will avoid defeat by using concealment to prevent the much
29
more powerful government forces from destroying them, while launching hit
and run guerrilla attacks from their hidden sanctuaries. These groups cannot
jump directly to conventional warfare, but instead must focus on building up
their forces, often utilizing sanctuaries or protected bases where they can de-
velop their fighting force without being directly targeted by the government.
They will avoid the many potential combat situations in which they would be
at a disadvantage, and only engage in combat when a particularly advanta-
geous situation presents itself. This sort of group, which is much weaker than
the state, will therefore avoid many combat situations. The government will
be unable to kill the rebels due to their concealment, and the rebels will only
attack state targets occasionally.
Figure 2.1: Predicted Conflict Intensity by Government and Rebel Capabilities
Stronger rebels will adopt more conventional tactics, organizing their fight-
ers into regular forces. When the relative strength of the rebels, in comparison
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to the government, is higher, they will be able to fight the government on
more equal terms. A rebel group with capabilities equal to those of the state
would not need to occupy itself with avoiding government attacks, and would
be presented with many potential targets of which they could take advantage.
Instead of being careful about what battles they select into, they would be able
to launch many attacks against the state forces. Rebels who are approaching
parity with the government, or who are more powerful than the government,
will use their strength to full advantage to try to seize control of the state from
the government.
States face a similar decision, although their calculations follow a somewhat
different logic. Governments face a large number of threats, and although re-
bellions are always of concern to the state, they are not always the primary
concern. When deciding how to distribute security force resources the govern-
ment must weigh numerous priorities. All states face potential external and
internal threats. Interstate wars, rebellions, and enforcing general law and
order are all rival demands for resources. States with significant external mil-
itary threats will position a large portion of their forces in preparation for an
interstate war. Conversely, states facing a threat from a large rebel group will
dedicate more of their resources to fighting that internal threat. At the same
time, there is always a threat from still unknown sources, requiring states to
maintain some forces in reserve, often distributed throughout the country, in
case they are needed.
Because of the competition for resources, the proportion of government
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forces that are dedicated to an internal rebellion will be proportional to the
threat they perceive from the rebels. When the rebels have a high level of
relative strength, and pose an imminent threat to the government, the state
will dedicate a large proportion of their forces to fighting the rebels. When the
rebels have a low level of relative strength, such that they pose little threat to
the stability of the government, the state will balance the small threat from
the rebels against the other threats facing the government. The decision facing
the state is, in its full calculation, one of weighing several priorities, however
without knowing all of the security threats facing a state, it is reasonable
to assume that as the relative strength of the rebels increases, the degree of
resources the government dedicates to fighting them will increase.
Incorporating tactics into the theory of how capabilities affect intensity
requires adding a scaling factor for both rebel and government capabilities.
For the rebels, the scaling factor indicates how their choice of tactics affects the
frequency and lethality of their attacks, while for the government the scaling
factor represents the proportion of total resources that they dedicate to the
conflict. Building on the capabilities model, described above and summarized
in equation 1, the tactical model adds a scaling factor to both cg and cr.
This means that conflict intensity is still proportional to the product of the
capabilities of the two sides, however their raw capabilities are altered by their
tactical decisions of how to employ those capabilities. Their capabilities are
modified by the tactics they use, indicated by tg and tr. Building on equation
1, and adding a scaling factor for tactics, which is multiplied by the capabilities
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of the actors, produces equation 2.
Intensity = (tgcg)(trcr) (2.2)
The tactical decisions of both the government and the rebels are different,
with rebels choosing between guerrilla and conventional methods, while the
government decides on a proportion of resources. There is, however, a similar
effect for both. As the rebels increase in relative strength, they move toward
conventional tactics, and their attacks become more frequent, increasing their
effectiveness at generating battle deaths. A similar effect happens on the
government side. As the rebels increase in relative strength the government
dedicates more of their resources to the conflict with the rebels, increasing the
number of battle deaths they can inflict on the rebels. Despite the different
reasoning for how tactics affect the use of raw capabilities, in the case of both
the government and the rebels, an increase in relative capabilities results in the
absolute capabilities having a larger effect. The scaling factors representing
tactics introduced in equation 2, tg and tr, are therefore both proportional to
the ratio of rebel to government capabilities, such that t = cr/cg. Substituting















The ratio of rebel to government forces, cr/cg, represents the relative
strength of the actors, which are multiplied by the absolute strength of the
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actors, cg and cr. Because relative capabilities is a ratio of the absolute capa-
bilities of the two actors, the equation reduces to a function of government and
rebel capabilities. The result shows that, after accounting for tactical factors
affecting how the government and rebels use their capabilities, an increase in
rebel forces results in conflict intensity being increased, at a cubic rate, while
an increase in government strength moves to the denominator, indicating that
stronger government forces will result in lower levels of intensity.
The logic of the tactical model is based on the combined effect of absolute
and relative capabilities. Larger amounts of absolute capabilities have a direct
effect on conflict, as described in the capabilities model. Essentially, the more
capable a fighting force is, the more people it will be able to kill. When tacti-
cal decisions are added to that model we find that as rebels get stronger, not
only are they better able to kill due to their size, but they adjust their tactics
to make the forces they already possess more deadly, by engaging in conven-
tional warfare. On top of that, the government also increases the amount of
resources they are dedicating to conflict, meaning that the increased number
and lethality of the rebel forces interacts with a larger state force, creating
more opportunities for both sides to kill enemy soldiers and generate more
battle deaths. The prediction of a cubic effect for the level of rebel capabilities
results from the triple effect that raw capabilities has on the rebels, the effect
that rebel strength has on rebel tactics, and the effect that rebel strength has
on government tactics. Government strength moves to the denominator, and
is linear, because the effect of increased government capabilities will have a
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positive effect on the raw capability of the government to fight, however that
will be countered by a reduction in the relative strength of the rebels, which
alters both rebel and government tactics.
The predictions of the tactical model can be seen on the right side of
Figure 2.1. The graph represents the predicted level of conflict intensity as a
function of rebel and government capabilities, for realistic values of capabilities.
Because the tactical model predicts a larger effect for rebel capabilities than
for government capabilities, the gradient from low rebel troop sizes to high
levels of rebel troops is much larger than for different levels of government
troops. At any particular number of government troops, as the number of
rebel troops increases the conflict intensity is predicted to increase at a very
fast rate. Conversely, if rebel troop size is held constant, and government
troop size is increased, conflict intensity will decrease, albeit at a slow rate.
This results in a prediction of high conflict intensity when the rebels are very
strong, and the government is weak, while intensity will be at its lowest when
the government is very strong and the rebels are weak. These predictions
represent the theory that strong rebels will be bolder in their own actions, and
will provoke strong responses from the government, resulting in high intensity,
while strong governments will have a deterrent effect that will discourage the
rebels from engaging in potentially disastrous combat against the state.
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2.2.3 Evaluation of models
The capabilities model presents a relatively simplistic view of how actors in-
teract in a civil conflict, and predicts a symmetrical relationship, where an
increase in capabilities will cause an increase in intensity. The tactical model
presents an improved understanding of how actors make choices about how
to fight within a conflict. This improved view takes into account that rebels
and governments are not equal actors, not only because the government is
usually more powerful than the rebels, but also because in a civil conflict the
government already possesses the political power which the rebels are seeking
to gain. The capabilities model would apply to an interstate conflict, where
two sovereign states compete in a symmetrical manner, but fails to capture
the complexity of a civil conflict in which the rebels have, at least initially, no
political or legal authority, as well as being militarily weaker than the govern-
ment.
The predictions for the capabilities model and the tactical model, both
shown in Figure 2.1, differ in two important ways. First, the capabilities model
predicts that an increase in capabilities for either actor will increase conflict
intensity, while the tactical model predicts that increased rebel capability will
increase intensity, while increased government capability will decrease inten-
sity. Second, in the capabilities model the effect of an increase in capabilities
for either actor will have an effect of the same magnitude. In the tactical model
the size of the effect is much larger for the rebels than it is for the government.
The direction of effect of capabilities on intensity is different across models.
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The symmetry of the capabilities model results in positive predictions for effect
of both government capabilities and rebel capabilities. It also predicts that
the size of the effect will be the same. The lowest intensity conflict will be
one with small forces on both sides, and the highest intensity conflict will be
one with large forces on both sides. This stands in stark comparison to the
prediction from the tactical model, where the highest intensity conflict would
involve a large rebel force fighting a smaller government army. The logic
behind this being that in that case the rebels would direct all of their forces
against the enemy in conventional warfare, and the state would use every asset
they possessed to resist, resulting in a high intensity conflict2. Conversely, the
lowest intensity conflict would be one in which a small rebel force opposes
a very large state army. Highly outmatched rebels will be deterred by the
strength of the government and will launch very few attacks against state
forces, while relying on concealment to avoid being wiped out.
Hypothesis 1 Increases in rebel capabilities increase conflict intensity.
Hypothesis 2 Increases in government capabilities decrease conflict inten-
sity.
The magnitude of the effect of capabilities on intensity also varies between
the models. The capabilities model is straightforward in the prediction that
2In a situation where the rebels are much stronger than the government it should be
noted that although intensity may be high, the conflict will also likely be short, as the
rebels will have a high probability of defeating their weaker government opponents quickly.
Hence, although intensity, defined as deaths over time, may be high, the total number of
battle deaths in the conflict may be low.
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an extra soldier on either side will increase the capabilities of that side, and an
increase in capabilities will result in an increase in intensity. It does not matter
which side the extra soldier joins. However, the tactical model incorporates
dynamics which alter not only the direction, but also the magnitude of the
effect. An extra rebel soldier increases the power of the rebels, as well as how
both the rebels and the government use their capabilities. All three of those
factors have positive effects, resulting in a large increase in intensity for an
increase in capabilities for the rebels. On the government side an increase
in capabilities is offset by tactical dynamics that cause the rebels to become
increasingly cautious, while the government may dedicate those extra resources
to other threats because the rebels no longer seem to be a major threat. The
asymmetric effect is such that the effect of rebel capabilities on intensity will
be much larger than the effect of government capabilities.
Hypothesis 3 The effect of rebel capabilities on conflict intensity will have a
larger magnitude than the effect of government capabilities.
2.3 Data
Conflict intensity represents the degree of fighting between two armed actors.
Empirically, this concept is best represented by the number of battle deaths
that result from combat between these two actors, within a given period of
time. Battle deaths include all deaths resulting from traditional battlefield
fighting, as well as guerrilla warfare, and other military tactics which aim to
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target the other warring party (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2001). Although a
measure of battle deaths only captures lethal combat, and omits small military
engagements that do not result in fatalities, it does distinguish between small
conflict events that result in few deaths, and major engagements that kill
many. This produces a more useful variable to distinguish between small-scale
guerrilla warfare and major conventional war, which allows for the testing of
the concept of conflict intensity, as defined as the amount of fighting that is
taking place between the warring parties.
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) measure of battle deaths
includes all deaths that result from fighting between the two warring parties.
This includes both combatants who die in fighting, as well as civilians who
die as an indirect result of the attempts of the two warring parties to fight
each other. It does not include civilian deaths resulting from the deliberate
targeting of civilians. This paper seeks to understand the choices that armed
groups make in fighting against other armed groups. The tactics that they
choose to adopt in terms of how to fight the enemy are reflected in the number
of deaths resulting from combat more than in the direct targeting of civilians.
Previous work has shown that the targeting of civilians is most common
when rebels adopt guerrilla tactics, and the government is forced to target
the civilian support base of the rebels in place of engaging in combat with
the rebels directly (Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay, 2004). Additionally,
weaker rebels have been shown to use more violence against civilians, in order
to coerce cooperation from the local population (Wood, 2010). Both of these
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papers point towards an inverse relationship between battle deaths and civilian
deaths, where conflicts that involve weak rebels who use guerrilla tactics have
high levels of civilian deaths as a result of the fact that these conflicts have
low levels of direct combat between the actors. Essentially, targeting civilians
is a substitute for the targeting of enemy forces, and both governments and
rebels resort to killing civilians when they are unable to find and kill their
opponents.
An analysis of the relationship between battle deaths and civilian deaths
that result from purposeful killing of civilians is included in the appendix,
and shows that civilian deaths constitute a substantially larger percentage of
total deaths in small conflicts than in larger conflicts. If a measure of the
total deaths in a conflict were used in place of battle deaths, the ability to
distinguish between conflicts with intense combat and those with low levels of
combat would be limited, as the amount of combat in low levels conflicts would
be obscured by the increased number of deaths resulting from the purposeful
killing of civilians. For the purpose of explaining why some conflicts exhibit
intense combat while others do not, it is important to analyze deaths resulting
from combat, and not from the deliberate targeting of civilians. Including
civilian deaths would alter the analysis, and while answering important ques-
tions about the welfare of civilians in combat zones, it would interfere with
understanding how the capabilities of the warring parties affect their choices
of how to fight.
The data on battle deaths has drastically increased in quality over the
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last few years, allowing for more detailed research into conflict intensity. The
most commonly used data in the existing literature on conflict intensity is
the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset, which contains conflict-level battle death
data from 1946-2008. (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005; Lacina, Gleditsch and
Russett, 2006). That dataset consists of annual observations, at the conflict
level, with deaths from multiple dyadic conflicts often being aggregated into a
single conflict. The sources of the data are primarily secondary sources, which
often provide aggregate estimates for deaths over the entire conflict. This
results in many conflicts having the same estimated number of battle deaths
for several years in a row, illustrating the imprecision of the data.
Newer data, from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Georefer-
enced Event Data (GED) (Sundberg and Melander, 2013) records conflicts at
the level of individual conflict events. It includes dates and locations for indi-
vidual conflict events with global coverage, except for Syria, providing much
more detailed and reliable information about the number of deaths resulting
from combat, including the source of the information on each individual con-
flict event. UCDP GED covers the years 1989 through 2016. The data is
recorded at the dyadic level, with distinctions between state-based, one-sided,
and non-state violence, as well as estimates of the number of battle deaths
resulting from each event. The battle death estimates include a low estimate,
a high estimate, and a best estimate, which is judged by the coders to be the
most likely number of deaths. GED data has not been used extensively in the
conflict intensity literature, however it is the only source of dyad-level intensity
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data.
There is limited existing research in the dynamics of intensity largely be-
cause yearly data does not provide the necessary resolution. There is only one
study that models autoregressive trends in conflict intensity data (Chaudoin,
Peskowitz and Stanton, 2015), and researchers have just begun to use monthly
intensity data (Hultman and Peksen, 2015; Hultman, Kathman and Shan-
non, 2014). The GED data records most conflict events by the day on which
they occur, although some cases are given a range of time, either because they
span multiple days, or the exact time of the even is unknown. Although this
presents the potential for analysis of intensity over time with much more ac-
curacy than is possible using yearly data, for this analysis the dyadic battle
deaths have been aggregated to the year, as all of the independent variables
are coded annually.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Battle Deaths 942 551.253 1,750.485 0 30,633
Gov Troops 942 535,210.200 761,354.300 2,000 3,047,000
ln(Gov Troops) 942 12.157 1.624 7.601 14.930
Rebel Troops 942 6,151.275 10,391.680 30 97,000
ln(Rebel Troops) 942 7.844 1.366 3.401 11.482
Polity 942 1.387 6.054 −9 9
Population 942 189,199,792.000 362,241,300.000 606,844 1,324,655,000
GDP/capita 942 3,193.813 6,198.305 161.834 32,954.230
Capabilities are measured using data compiled by Aronson and Huth (2017).
The data consists of dyad-year observations, with the number of soldiers in
42
Figure 2.2: Distribution of Battle Deaths and Troops
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each rebel group, as well as the total number of soldiers in the state army.
Troop size data is available from 1975 to 2015 for rebel groups, however gov-
ernment troop numbers are only available from 1989 to 2014. The distribution
of troop sizes is heavily skewed, as shown in Figure 2.2. Rebel groups have a
mean of 6,151 troops and a maximum of 97,000, while governments on aver-
age have 535,000, and a maximum value of 3,000,000. For this reason troop
numbers, as well as battle deaths, are logged in the analysis.
There are 213 rebel groups in the data. Most rebel groups have very low
numbers of troops, while others have tens of thousands. For instance, the
Nigerien rebel group Coordination de Résistance Armée (CRA), was active
only in 1994, and had only 40 fighters. Conversely, the Eritrean People’s
Liberation Front (EPLF) averaged 56,250 fighters. The number of troops for
groups also varies significantly over time. UNITA operated for 12 years within
the time frame of this analysis, with troops levels starting at 45,500, growing
to a peak of 61,250, and then falling to 15,000 in 2002.
For government troops, there is also extensive variation. The median state
army had 184,000 soldiers, and the mean was 535,210. At the low end Lesotho
had only 2000 soldiers in 1998, and Djibouti and Tajikistan both had only
3000 in the early 1990s. There are ten other states that also had armies with
less that 10,000 troops for at least one year. At the upper end of the spectrum
is India, with a high of over 3 million soldiers in 20053, followed by China,
Russia, and Iraq, which all possessed more than 1 million soldiers for at least
3India’s military increases in size from 1.26 million in 1989 to 3.05 million in 2005, and
then declines in size to 2.75 million in 2014.
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one year in the dataset.
Control variables for population and GDP per capita come from the World
Bank. Regime type data is from the Polity IV Project. There is some miss-
ing data for control variables. Polity data is missing for some dyad-years in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, which Polity codes as cases of foreign inter-
ruption of government. World Bank GDP data is unavailable for some years
in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Libya, and Somalia
2.4 Analysis
The effect of capabilities on conflict intensity can be tested in a dyad-year anal-
ysis of battle deaths on the number of government and rebel troops. Because
battle deaths are counts this analysis can be done using a negative binomial
model. It can also be tested by using an ordinary least squares regression with
logged battle deaths as the dependent variable. Existing studies of conflict
severity have used both negative binomial estimation (Schutte, 2014; Hultman,
Kathman and Shannon, 2014; Hultman and Peksen, 2015; Eck and Hultman,
2007; Beardsley, Cunningham and White, 2016) and ordinary least squares
with a logged dependent variable (Petersohn, 2015; Lujala, 2009; Lacina, Gled-
itsch and Russett, 2006; Lacina, 2006; Butler, Cunningham and Gates, 2015).
Studies which have used both negative binomial and ordinary least squares
regression of a logged count of battle deaths report similar results (Heger and
Salehyan, 2007; Balcells and Kalyvas, 2014). All analyses reported here are
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done with negative binomial models. Regressions using ordinary least squares
produced similar results, and are shown in the appendix.
Negative binomial regressions of battle deaths on logged rebel and govern-
ment troops are shown in Table 2.3. To correct for correlation within dyads,
all reported regressions include random intercepts by dyad. Negative binomial
regressions without random intercepts are shown in the appendix, in Table
2.3. Table 2.3 shows that government forces do not have a significant effect on
battle deaths, while the number of rebel troops has a highly significant posi-
tive effect. This result provides support for hypotheses 1, as rebel troops are
significant, and in the predicted direction. Although government troop levels
are not significant, they do have a negative sign in all models, indicating that
more troops could decrease the expected number of battle deaths, while rebel
troop levels increase battle deaths.
These results also support hypothesis 3, since the effect of rebel forces is
much larger than that for government forces. The difference between the effect
of rebel troops and government troops is statistically significant, based on an
asymptotic Chi-squared statistic using Wald-tests of restricted models. This
supports the theory of the tactical model, that not only will the direction of
effect be positive for rebels and negative for the government, but that changes
in rebel troops have a much larger effect than they do for the number of
government troops.
To control for possible confounding factors, I included variables for regime
type, population, and GDP per capita. All three variables could potentially
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ln(Reb Troops) 0.570∗∗∗ −1.303 −1.383
(0.042) (3.211) (1.622)
ln(Reb Troops)2 0.196 0.201
(0.434) (0.215)
ln(Reb Troops)3 −0.006 −0.006
(0.019) (0.009)
Polity −0.014 −0.015 −0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
ln(Population) −0.050 −0.048 −0.011
(0.091) (0.089) (0.087)
ln(GDP/capita) −0.159∗∗ −0.156∗∗ −0.147∗∗
(0.074) (0.073) (0.068)
Constant 2.933∗∗ 8.379 10.716
(1.225) (7.684) (14.170)
Observations 942 942 942
Log Likelihood −6,117.016 −6,113.746 −6,113.523
Akaike Inf. Crit. 12,250.030 12,247.490 12,251.050
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 12,288.820 12,295.970 12,309.220
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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affect both the size of rebel groups, as well as the number of battle deaths
in a conflict. Population directly affects the ability of rebel groups to recruit
fighters, and the size of state armies correlates with population. The ability
of rebel groups to recruit members could be increased in authoritarian states,
and the number of battle deaths could also be increased by authoritarian
governments using more force in their attempts to defeat a rebellion. GDP
per capita has the potential to have a similar effect, with rebel groups in
poorer countries recruiting more fighters due to lower opportunity costs for
young men to join rebel groups. The military in poorer states may also resort
to using excessive violence in place of using more expensive and complicated
methods.
All three controls appear to have little effect on conflict intensity. In an
unreported regression of the three control variables on conflict deaths, without
including the rebel and government troop variables, regime type is significant,
while GDP per capita and population are only significant at the 0.1 level.
When including government and rebel capabilities regime type and popula-
tion fall out of significance, indicating that these controls have little effect on
intensity after accounting for capabilities. GDP per capita remain significant.
The theory of tactical interactions argues that the effect of rebel troops
on conflict intensity should not only be larger than the effect of government
troops, but also that additional rebel troops should have an exponential effect
on intensity. To test this theory squared and cubed terms are included for
rebel troops in model 2. In model 3 polynomial terms are also included for
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government capabilities, to test whether the effect is linear, as predicted by
the model.
Model 2 reports the results of regression with a polynomial term for rebel
forces. Because polynomial terms are all based on the same base term, it is not
possible to determine the significance of a variable from the significance level
of one of the polynomial terms included in the regression. The coefficients for
the linear, squared, and cubed terms must be tested for joint significance. In
model 2, although the individual coefficients for the three rebel troop variables
are each individually insignificant, those three polynomial variables for rebel
capabilities are jointly significant4. In model 3 the polynomial for rebel troops
remains highly significant, while the polynomial for government troops does
not reach significance. A likelihood ratio test comparing model 2 to model 3 is
insignificant, indicating that allowing government troops to take a non-linear
form does not improve model fit significantly.
Predictions of the effect of rebel and government troops on battle deaths
can be seen in Figure 2.3. At low levels of rebel troops the predicted effect
of an increase in troop levels is relatively small, and as the number of rebel
troops increases, the effect of an increase in troops has a larger effect on the
number of battle deaths. For government troops, the predicted number of
battle deaths is largely constant across different levels of government forces,
with a slight decrease for particularly large government armies. The effect
4Joint significance was determined using a likelihood ratio test comparing the model
to an otherwise identical model that omits all three terms. Significance can also be seen
visually from the predicted counts in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Predicted Battle Deaths
of government capabilities on battle deaths is, however, not large enough to
reach significance. Hypothesis 3 predicts that the effect of rebel strength on
intensity will be much stronger than the effect of government strength, and
that proposition is strongly supported by the comparison shown in Figure 2.3.
2.4.1 Comparison of Formal and Empirical Models
In addition to the hypothesis tests described above, the empirical results can be
directly compared to the predictions of the theoretical models. The graphs of
predicted conflict intensity as a function of government and rebel capabilities,
which were presented in the theory section, are repeated in the first two graphs
in Figure 2.4. Darker areas on the graphs indicate higher levels of predicted
intensity. The circles on the graphs show all of the observations in the dataset,
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with the size of the circle corresponding to the number of battle deaths in that
dyad-year. The third graph shows the predicted count of battle deaths from
empirical model 3. The empirical model has a very strong vertical gradient
from light to dark, as rebel troops increase, combined with a much less drastic
horizontal effect, with government strength decreasing intensity slightly. This
pattern resembles the predictions from the tactics model much more closely
than it does the capabilities model, which predicted increasing deaths resulting
from increasing government capabilities.
Figure 2.4: Predicted Intensity, by Rebel and Government Capability.
In order to control for the possibility of an endogenous relationship be-
tween capabilities and battle deaths, I control for the number of battle deaths
experienced by a dyad in the previous year. The appendix includes results
from replications of models 1, 2, and 3, with lagged battle deaths added as
a control variable. Including lagged deaths corrects for the effect of deaths
in the previous year reducing capabilities, and in turn deaths, in the present
year. Lagged deaths are highly significant, and including the lagged dependent
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variable increases the significance level of all other variables, indicating that
the primary result is not a result of endogeneity. When controlling for lagged
battle deaths the effect of government troops becomes highly significant, with
a negative effect that is largest when government troops are between 100,000
and 300,000.
2.5 Example: The Kurdistan Workers Party
To illustrate the effect that the capabilities of rebel groups and governments
have on the intensity of conflict, an illustration is presented here, of one case
of conflict intensity increasing and then decreasing as a result of changes in
the capabilities of the actors. This example provides a detailed view of a single
case, to complement the cross-case statistical analysis described in the analysis
section, and combines description of the data used in the main analysis with
a discussion of the events specific to this case which caused changes in the
capabilities of the rebels, and in turn affected conflict intensity.
The conflict between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeran Kur-
distan, or PKK) and the government of Turkey illustrates the relationship be-
tween rebel capability and conflict intensity. The PKK was formed in 1978 by
Abdullah Öcalan, who was active in socialist student organizations. As a so-
cialist organization the PKK stood out from other Kurdish nationalist groups,
which were primarily conservative tribal organizations.
In 1979 the PKK began what was known as the Urban War, originally not
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targeting the government itself, but instead focusing on groups that supported
the government, as well as rival Kurdish organizations. As the Urban War
began, Öcalan left Turkey, and led the PKK from the Bekaa Valley, in Lebanon,
where he received support from Fatah and the Syrian Government. At this
stage the PKK was a small organization that launched occasional attacks
against soft targets, as they were not yet strong enough to conduct larger
operations.
In the first two years of the conflict the PKK was relatively small, compared
to its highest levels, which were reached in the 1990s. The UCDP data begins
in 1989, however court records from trials following the 1980 assassination of
the Turkish Prime Minister by leftist organization Dev Sol, and a subsequent
military coup, provide some information. A series of military tribunals sought
to attribute 5,388 political killings to the organizations responsible. Their
records show that the PKK had killed 240 people, while 1,100 PKK members
had been killed. This puts their level of violence in the 1979-1980 period well
below the high point within the data available for this paper. The conflict
between the Government and PKK produced only 1340 battle deaths in 1979-
1980, which is far below the peak of 4,337 deaths in 1997.
Following the 1980 trials, much of the membership of the PKK was in
prison, with most of the remainder fleeing to Lebanon. The organization fo-
cused on rebuilding itself in Lebanon, with support from Syria, Palestinian
groups, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, as well as
reported support from the Soviet Union. Additionally, the beginning of the
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Iran-Iraq war allowed the PKK to operate in northern Iraq, where they coop-
erated with the KDP. Following the Gulf War, the Iraqi government supported
the PKK, as retribution to Turkey for supporting the US in that war.
In 1984, as the PKK grew in size, they declared a Kurdish uprising. The
PKK began to use increasingly aggressive tactics, and launched paramilitary
actions in Turkey, largely focusing on government personnel located in the
Kurdish region of southeastern Turkey. They created the Kurdish National
Liberation Front (ERNK), as well as the Kurdistan Popular Liberation Army
(ARGK), as armed wings of the PKK. In 1986 and 1987 Turkey crossed the
border on multiple occasions to target PKK targets within Iraq. This interac-
tion, with the PKK launching numerous small attacks in southeastern Turkey,
with occasional large retaliatory strikes by the Turkish military at PKK tar-
gets in Iraq, continued through the 1990s, and to some degree to the present,
with Turkey remaining involved in northern Iraq for many years, as well as
operating in Kurdish areas of Syria.
UCDP data on the number of battle deaths is available starting in 1989.
Figure 2.5 shows both the size of the PKK and the government forces, as well
as the number of battle deaths that were inflicted on both sides for each year
of the conflict. In 1989 the PKK had reached a level of 5000 fighters. They
had been steadily recovering from the losses suffered in 1980, and troop levels
continued to increase over the next several years, to a peak of 13,500 in 1998.
At the beginning of the period, in 1989, there were only 227 battle deaths
attributed to fighting between the government and the PKK. This level in-
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Figure 2.5: Troops Levels and Battle Deaths for the PKK and the Government
of Turkey
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Figure 2.6: All PKK-Turkey Conflict Events by Time and Size
Figure 2.7: Histogram of Conflict Event Size
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creased slowly over the next two years, with 245 and 304 battle deaths in 1990
and 1991. This gradual increase goes along with the steady increase in the
size of the PKK.
Beginning in 1992 the intensity of the conflict began to increase dramati-
cally. The increased size of the PKK had allowed them to launch increasingly
large attacks against government targets. Figure 2.6 shows the magnitude of
all conflict events, as well as when they occurred. It shows that in 1992 both
the density of events over time increases, along with the size of the events,
with many events killing more that 10 people and one over 100. The increase
in intensity over the previous years drove the Turkish government to launch in-
creasingly large operations to disrupt the PKK’s growing capabilities. Turkey
launched attacks against PKK targets along the border with Iraq, and crossed
over into Iraq, for the first time since 1987.
Figure 2.5 shows that the increased battle deaths were primarily dealt to
the PKK. In previous years the losses from conflict had been more evenly
distributed, however the period of increased conflict intensity that began in
1992 and lasted until 1999 sees the PKK taking much larger losses than the
government, due to the increased government effort to target PKK bases and
degrade their capabilities. Despite the increased number of deaths sustained
by the PKK, averaging about 3000 per year from 1994 to 1997, the group
continued to grow, with a net increase of about 1000 troops per year, until
reaching their peak size in 1998, at 13,500 fighters.
During this period, when the government was increasingly targeting the
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PKK, and threatening their ability to continue large-scale operations, the PKK
altered their tactics. Originally the PKK primarily targeted government se-
curity forces, as well as local officials and individuals who opposed their goal
of an independent Kurdish state. In the 1990’s they broadened their tar-
gets to include tourist locations, in an attempt to harm the tourism economy.
These targets were limited to Turkey, with the exception of when, in 1993 and
again in 1995, the PKK launched attacks on Turkish targets in 11 countries in
Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Spreading their attention from purely
governmental targets to softer targets coincides with the government degrad-
ing the capability of the PKK to organize sophisticated attacks against hard
targets.
In 1995 Turkey launched Operation Steel, which saw 35,000 Turkish troops
enter Iraq to destroy PKK bases there. The Turkish government claimed
to kill 555 Kurdish militants while losing 61 of their own soldiers. Turkey
estimated that after their operation there were still about 10,000 PKK soldiers
in northern Iraq.
Following Operation Steel, when many PKK fighters were killed by the
Turkish government, the PKK launched its first suicide attack, in 1996. This
marked another change in their tactics, as a result of the dynamic relationship
between the rebels forces and the government. On June 30th a PKK suicide
bomber detonated a suicide bomb at a military parade in a Kurdish-populated
city in eastern Turkey, killing 10 people. This marked the first of 11 suicide
attacks between 1996 and 1999. The PKK did not use suicide bombs again
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until 2007, and then not again until 2012. Since 2012 there have been eight
further suicide attacks. All of the PKK suicide bombings have targeted mili-
tary forces, and the total number of deaths from suicide bombings is only 77,
which is a small percentage of the 26,649 battle deaths recorded since 1989.
The introduction of suicide tactics corresponds to the maximum of the
PKK’s size, and to the peak level of conflict intensity. As the government
was launching large-scale attacks on PKK bases in Iraq, in order to degrade
the PKK’s capabilities, the PKK began adding suicide attacks to their reper-
toire. This is an indication that the size of the PKK, which had been growing
steadily for years, drew increased attention from the government, which in
turn increased the conflict intensity. The increased intensity put pressure on
the PKK to find alternative methods of confronting the government.
In 1997 Turkey launched Operation Hammer in May, followed by Opera-
tion Dawn in September. Both of these operations were Turkish attempts to
destroy PKK forces within northern Iraq. Although Turkey claimed to kill
thousands of PKK fighters in these operations, while losing hundreds of their
own soldiers, it is most likely that in total 3,160 PKK fighters were killed in
1997, while 1,177 government soldiers died. Almost half of those deaths oc-
curred in northern Iraq, with the remainder scattered throughout southeastern
Turkey.
Most of the conflict events between the PKK and the Government of Turkey
are relatively small. Figure 2.7 shows the distribution of conflict events by
number of battle deaths. Half of all conflict events caused 3 or fewer battle
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deaths, and the mean event resulted in 6.6 deaths. 98% of these events oc-
curred in Turkey, with the remainder in Iraq. The PKK was using northern
Iraq as a safe haven from which to launch attacks in Turkey. These attacks
were numerous, but each individual event was relatively small. The events in
Iraq were the result of the Turkish Government crossing the border to launch
large operations against PKK bases, with the goal of wiping the organization
out with overwhelming and concentrated force. The average conflict event in
Iraq was considerably larger than those in Turkey, with a mean of 53.6 deaths,
and includes most of the conflict events that killed more than 100 people. The
largest single events in the data are in northern Iraq, in May and September
of 1997, and killed 791 and 897 people respectively. These events correspond
to the Turkish operations Dawn and Hammer.
A major turning point in the conflict occurred in October of 1998, when
Turkey succeeded in pressuring Syria to expel Abdullah Öcalan. The increased
violence over the previous four years caused Turkey to decided that capturing
Öcalan was important enough to threaten war with Syria, and the Turkish
government went as far as mobilizing troops in preparation for an invasion of
Syria in order to coerce the Syrians into ending their protection of Öcalan.
Syria forced Öcalan to leave, and after failing to receive asylum in Greece,
Russia, and Italy, he eventually ended up in Nairobi, Kenya, where he was
abducted by the Turkish intelligence service, and returned to Turkey for trial.
In early 1999 he was tried and sentenced to death, which was commuted to
life in prison. Later that year Öcalan announced a peace initiative, and told
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Figure 2.8: Location and Size of Conflict Events Between the PKK and the
Government of Turkey from 1989 Through 2015
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the PKK to refrain from using violence. In January, 2000, the PKK accepted
Öcalan’s initiative and announce they will only use political means to achieve
their goals.
The combination of intensive Turkish military operations against PKK
forces and the capture of Öcalan caused a drastic decline in both the capabil-
ities of the PKK, and in the intensity of the conflict. 1997 marked the highest
intensity year of the conflict, with 4,337 battle deaths. Many of these deaths
were related to government operations to destroy PKK bases in Iraq, and the
government decision to increase their use of force appears to have worked, as
following Operation Dawn, the level of violence dropped precipitously. The
next year, 1998, saw only 1,952 deaths, followed by 1,390 the next year. By
2000 the fighting had reached its lowest level since the 1980s, with only 174
battle deaths. This drop in intensity corresponds to a dramatic decline in the
number of fighters the PKK commanded. Troop size reached its maximum, of
13,500, in 1998, and then dropped to 9,000 in 1999, and further fell to 5,250
fighters in 2000. This decline began the year after conflict intensity reached its
peak, and at approximately the same time that Öcalan was captured. In turn,
the decline in the number of PKK fighters caused an even steeper decline in
the number of battle deaths.
Following their decline from 1998 to 2000, and the ceasefire that was an-
nounced that year, the PKK renamed themselves the Kurdistan Freedom and
Democracy Congress (Kongreya Azadi u Demokrasiya Kurdistan, or KADEK).
In late 2003 they renamed themselves again, as the Peoples Congress of Kur-
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distan (Kongra-Gel, or KGK). They reasserted their refutation of violence, al-
though they continued to fight while claiming their actions were in self-defense.
In June 2004 the militant wing, the People’s Defense Force (HPG) renounced
the self-imposed cease-fire that had been in place, at least nominally, for four
years. In 2005 the organization reverted to their original name.
During the 2000-2004 ceasefire, battle deaths remained at a very low level,
averaging about 100 deaths per year. The number of PKK soldiers also contin-
ued to decline, falling to a minimum of 3000 in 2003. Following the resumption
of fighting, the number of fighters in the PKK began to grow, as did the num-
ber of battle deaths. Over the next four years the number of soldiers in the
PKK doubled, and the number of battle deaths increased to 5 times their 2003
level.
Fighting between the PKK and the Turkish Government continued for
several more years at similar levels, despite peace talks between the two sides
from 2009 and 2011. The PKK declared another ceasefire in 2013, which
reduced the level of fighting, but only until that ceasefire ended in 2015. It
was followed by a new spike in conflict, with 903 battle deaths in 2015.
The PKK serves as an illustration of how variation in the size of a rebel
group determines the tactics they use, which in turn affects the response of
the government, and how these effects combine to determine the overall in-
tensity of the conflict. The PKK began as a small organization that limited
its actions to small attacks on soft targets. In the 1990s they grew into a
large force that fought a high intensity war which killed thousands of people
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per year. A strong government response weakened the PKK, forcing them to
reduce, and occasionally suspend, their activities, resulting in a drastic decline
in intensity since 1999. This illustration demonstrates how the theory of the
tactical interactions between rebels and governments determines conflict in-
tensity, and serves as a more detailed example to compliment the cross-case
statistical analysis.
2.6 Conclusion
The strategic interactions between rebels and governments produce an asym-
metric result on conflict intensity. Increased rebel capabilities greatly increase
conflict intensity, while higher levels of government capabilities have a slight
negative effect on intensity. Capabilities themselves allow actors to kill more
of their opponents, however capabilities in turn affect the tactics that actors
choose to employ. Powerful rebels are not only able to generate more force, but
are also able to come out of the shadows of insurgency and put their strength
to use in more direct attacks against government forces. Governments must
respond to increased rebel activity by increasing their own efforts to counter
the rebels. I argue that the combination of increased capabilities and increas-
ingly direct combat by both actors drastically increases the number of combat
deaths generated in a conflict. Conversely, when the government increases in
power the increased lethality of the army is tempered by an increase in rebel
reliance on concealment and guerrilla tactics, resulting in a small deterrent
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effect on intensity.
Conflict intensity is a fundamental aspect of conflict, and requires more at-
tention from academic researchers. Conflict onset and termination are defined
by the number of deaths that occur in the first and last year of a conflict, and
duration is defined as the number of years between these two points. Using
intensity to only indicate when a conflict begins and ends, and ignoring the
level of intensity between these two events, risks missing important elements
of conflict. Many studies do not differentiate between small and large con-
flicts, despite the fact that conflicts with 25 annual battle deaths bear little
resemblance to those that kill tens of thousands. Existing research on conflict
duration and conflict termination do not account for the effect of intensity,
despite the fact that duration is defined as the amount of time that inten-
sity remains above the battle death threshold, and termination occurs at the
point in time when intensity drops sufficiently to fall below that threshold.
In order to fully understand how wars drop from high levels of intensity to
zero, it is necessary to have a better understanding of why intensity varies
during conflicts. A full explanation of how wars end must explain how they
are fought.
The focus on conflict onset, duration, and termination is justified by the
interest in crafting policies that will prevent future wars and end current ones,
however without a full understanding of how actors behave within wars it
is difficult to fully understand how to end them. This paper adds to the
understanding of how the balance of power within a conflict affects the strategic
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decisions of actors within wars. Rebels and government forces respond to
their military advantages and disadvantages by altering how they wage war.
Understanding how actors make strategic decisions about how to fight will aid
in understanding how actors decide to stop fighting as well.
The results demonstrate that the capabilities of rebel groups and govern-
ments have a dramatic effect on the number of battle deaths, and that the
number of battle deaths in conflicts varies considerably. The amount of vari-
ation in conflict intensity is an important consideration for future academic
studies of civil conflict. Much of the research on civil war does not address
the intensity of conflicts, or the capabilities of the actors, missing important
differences between very intense wars and small insurgencies. The improved
understanding of the relationship between capabilities and intensity demon-
strated in this paper provides insights that will improve future work on conflict
duration and other studies of conflict dynamics.
Understanding how the balance of capabilities affects the intensity of con-
flict has important policy implications. Questions of conflict management
must incorporate an understanding of the determinants of conflict intensity
before they can attempt to alleviate the harm war inflicts on society. Intense
conflicts kill many combatants, as well as civilians, and can devastate the econ-
omy and larger society of a country. Improving policymakers’ understanding
of the effect of capabilities on tactics and intensity will, hopefully, help them
to make better decisions. The findings of this paper indicate that efforts to
reduce the amount of violence in civil wars should focus on the capabilities
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of the rebels. Interventions which restrict the capabilities of the rebels while
increasing the capabilities of the government should have the largest effect on
reducing intensity.
The theory and findings from this paper provide the baseline for research,
described in the following two papers, examining the effect of external support
on actor capabilities and conflict intensity, and the effect of conflict intensity
on conflict duration. These papers improve on the understanding of the effect
of capabilities on intensity shown here, and connect the dynamics within a con-
flict to the important policy issues relating to the effects of foreign intervention
into civil conflicts as well as addressing how managing conflict intensity can
shorten ongoing civil wars.
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2.7 Appendix
This section presents information on robustness checks including non-hierarchical
models replicating the models presented in the main analysis, as well as mod-
els including lagged battle deaths, and models using ordinary least squares
instead of negative binomial regressions. Additionally, there is a discussion
and empirical analysis of the relationship between battle deaths and civilian
deaths, and additional maps of the conflict between the PKK and the govern-
ment of Turkey, displaying the location and size of conflict events on a yearly
basis.
2.7.1 Non-Hierarchical Model
Table 2.3 repeats the results discussed in Table 2.2, without including random
intercepts by dyad. The results are largely consistent with the results in the
main analysis, although when not allowing the intercepts to vary, the effect of
government troops increases in significance, reaching the 0.1 level. Although
still marginally significant, this provides increased confidence that large gov-
ernment armies may have a slight negative effect on conflict intensity, as larger
armies can deter rebels.
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ln(Reb Troops) 0.701∗∗∗ −0.972 −1.059
(0.032) (1.480) (1.484)
ln(Reb Troops)2 0.187 0.201
(0.192) (0.193)
ln(Reb Troops)3 −0.007 −0.007
(0.008) (0.008)
Polity −0.002 −0.005 −0.003
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
ln(Population) −0.027 −0.011 0.014
(0.063) (0.063) (0.066)
ln(GDP/capita) 0.060 0.074 0.074
(0.047) (0.047) (0.049)
Constant 1.654∗ 6.180∗ −2.651
(0.844) (3.733) (12.018)
Observations 942 942 942
Log Likelihood −6,342.687 −6,339.879 −6,338.955
θ 0.604∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.607∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.607∗∗∗ (0.024)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 12,697.370 12,695.760 12,697.910
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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2.7.2 Lagged Battle Deaths
The number of soldiers in the rebel and government armies are affected by the
number of battle deaths in a conflict, introducing the possibility of endogeneity.
To control for the possibility that deaths in combat one year are determining
the number of troops available to fight in the next year, I reran all models with
a lagged variable for the number of battle deaths in the conflict. The results
for non-hierarchical models are shown in Table 2.4, and hierarchical models
are shown in Table 2.5. The number of deaths in the previous year is a strong
indicator of the amount of deaths to be expected in the current year. The
results for the remaining variables are similar to those in the main analysis,
indicating that the effect of battle deaths on troops levels are not driving the
results.
Figure 2.9 graphs the predicted counts of battle deaths for conflicts at all
levels of rebel and government troops, for models with and without lagged
battle deaths, as reported in the tables below. All three graphs showing the
effect of rebel troops on battle deaths look very similar to the results shown in
Figure 2.3, in the main text. For government forces the only noticeable differ-
ence is an increased significant for the lagged battle deaths, without random
intercepts. The effect of government troops on battle deaths is not significant
for the other models.
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ln(Reb Troops) 0.493∗∗∗ −1.716 −1.824
(0.031) (1.392) (1.394)
ln(Reb Troops)2 0.295 0.308∗
(0.181) (0.182)
ln(Reb Troops)3 −0.013 −0.013∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Polity −0.028∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
ln(Population) 0.106∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.109∗
(0.058) (0.059) (0.061)
ln(GDP/capita) 0.107∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045)
Lagged Deaths 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Constant 1.723∗∗ 6.903∗∗ −19.970∗
(0.783) (3.493) (11.136)
Observations 942 942 942
Log Likelihood −6,248.053 −6,246.644 −6,243.799
θ 0.703∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.705∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.708∗∗∗ (0.029)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 12,510.110 12,511.290 12,509.600
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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ln(Reb Troops) 0.518∗∗∗ −2.296 −2.352∗∗∗
(0.041) (1.730) (0.588)
ln(Reb Troops)2 0.345 0.357∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.074)
ln(Reb Troops)3 −0.014 −0.014∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.003)
Polity −0.016 −0.018 −0.011
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
ln(Population) −0.033 −0.031 0.0001
(0.085) (0.085) (0.090)
ln(GDP/capita) −0.110 −0.118∗ −0.119∗
(0.069) (0.069) (0.068)
Lagged Deaths 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004)
Constant 3.075∗∗∗ 10.392∗∗ 9.028∗
(1.140) (4.359) (4.799)
Observations 942 942 942
Log Likelihood −6,104.541 −6,102.142 −6,101.655
Akaike Inf. Crit. 12,227.080 12,226.280 12,229.310
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 12,270.710 12,279.610 12,292.330
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 2.9: Predicted Battle Deaths for Alternative Models
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2.7.3 Ordinary Least Squares Analysis
Table 2.6 repeats the analysis shown in Table 2.2, using ordinary least squares
regression on a logged dependent variable instead of the negative binomial
regression shown in the body of the paper. The regression results are largely
similar, with all polynomial terms being significant. The primary difference
between the negative binomial and OLS models is that the polynomial for
government troops is significant in the OLS results shown in Table 6. Figure
2.10 shows the predicted battle deaths for all levels of government troops,
and the significant result appears to stem from moderately high government
armies, around 200,000 troops, having lower estimates than smaller armies.
Figure 2.10: Predicted Battle Deaths Using Ordinary Least Squares
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ln(Reb Troops) 0.547∗∗∗ 0.854 0.658
(0.037) (1.727) (1.727)
ln(Reb Troops)2 −0.114 −0.090
(0.224) (0.224)
ln(Reb Troops)3 0.008 0.007
(0.010) (0.010)
Polity 0.021∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.016
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
ln(Population) 0.021 0.002 −0.043
(0.074) (0.074) (0.077)
ln(GDP/capita) 0.063 0.049 0.084
(0.055) (0.055) (0.057)
Constant 1.403 2.189 −21.196
(0.990) (4.353) (14.019)
Observations 942 942 942
R2 0.195 0.205 0.211
Adjusted R2 0.191 0.199 0.204
Residual Std. Error 1.512 (df = 936) 1.504 (df = 934) 1.499 (df = 932)
F Statistic 45.310∗∗∗ (df = 5; 936) 34.370∗∗∗ (df = 7; 934) 27.719∗∗∗ (df = 9; 932)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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2.7.4 Relationship Between Battle Deaths and Civilian
Deaths
This paper focuses on the dyadic relationship between governments and rebels
groups, using battle deaths as the primary metric for conflict intensity. To
relate battle deaths to deaths of civilians who are purposefully targeted by
actors in a civil conflict, it is necessary to expand the analysis to the country
level, as massacres of civilians are recorded by UCDP based on the actor who
carries out the killing, but not the dyad that that actor is part of. In cases
where there are multiple dyads within a single country it would be impossible,
based on the existing data, to attribute civilians killed by the government to a
particular dyadic conflict. To evaluate the relationship between battle deaths
and deaths of civilians I aggregate all deaths within each country, and analyze
them at the country-year level.
A linear regression of civilian deaths on battle deaths shows that for every
one percentage point increase in logged battle deaths there is an increase of
0.39 percentage points for logged civilian deaths. This indicates that although
there is a positive and significant relationship between these two variables, as
conflicts become more intense, in the sense of increased fighting between the
fighters on both sides of the conflict, there is a lower tendency for civilians to
be targeted directly. Figure 2.11 shows the predictions from this regression.
Small conflicts have, on average, roughly similar levels of deaths from targeted
civilian killings and from battle deaths. Larger conflicts have more civilian
deaths, but they make up a much smaller percentage, with conflicts that ex-
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Table 2.7: OLS Regression of Civilian Deaths on Battle Deaths
Dependent variable:
Logged Civilian Deaths







Residual Std. Error 2.133 (df = 1126)
F Statistic 316.753∗∗∗ (df = 1; 1126)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
perience 10,000 battle deaths having on average about 100 civilian deaths.
If a total death toll that included both deaths of targeted civilians as well as
deaths resulting from armed combat between rebel groups and governments,
the increased number would not differentiate intense conflicts, in which the
two armed groups are targeting each other, from low-intensity conflicts in
which the government is targeting civilians because they cannot find the rebels,
or the rebels are targeting civilians because they are too weak to target the
government directly. Although this joint measure would be a better measure
of human loss and suffering, it would be a poorer measure of the intensity of
conflict between armed groups, which this paper is seeking to explain.
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Figure 2.11: Relationship Between Battle Deaths and Intentional Killing of
Civilians
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2.7.5 Maps of Turkey-PKK Conflict Events
Figures 2.12 and 2.13 show the location and size of all conflict events involving
the Government of Turkey and the PKK between 1989 and 2013. These maps
provide a more detailed look at the dynamics of this conflict than the two
maps in Figure 2.8. Over the first three years there is a gradual increase in the
number of conflict events, which started in concentrated area of the southeast,
near the Iraqi border. By 1993 the number of events had grown in number,
and were covering all of southeastern Turkey. This high level of concentrated
conflict continued for several years. In 1997 there are several very large events
in northern Iraq, which represent major military operations by the Turkish
military against PKK forces in Iraq. In 1998 and 1999 the number of conflict
events can be seen to be smaller, and 1999 sees three more large conflict events
in northern Iraq.
From 2000 onward the number of conflict events can be seen to be far
smaller, and the individual events are of smaller magnitude. There are no
conflict events in Iraq from 2001 to 2006. In 2010 and 2011 a few relatively
large events can be seen in Iraq, after which the intensity drops, with no events
in 2012, and only 8 small events in 2013.
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Figure 2.12: Location and Size of Conflict Events Between the PKK and the
Government of Turkey from 1989 to 2003
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Figure 2.13: Location and Size of Conflict Events Between the PKK and the
Government of Turkey from 2004 to 2013
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Chapter 3
The Strategy of International
Intervention:




This paper explores the dynamics of how foreign intervention af-
fects conflict behavior. When foreign states intervene in civil conflicts
by supporting one side or the other, they alter the behavior of the ac-
tors. The support given by external actors increases the capabilities
of rebel groups and governments, and provides incentives for them to
alter their behavior. Rebel groups in particular respond greatly to ex-
ternal support. Certain types of support, such as providing intelligence
to rebel groups, can triple the number of battle deaths produced in a
conflict. When the rebels are very capable, relative to the government,
they will use conventional military tactics, leading to higher intensity.
When external supporters give aid to rebels this both increases the abil-
ity of the rebels to fight and also alters the incentive the rebels have to
demonstrate their effectiveness to their benefactor.
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Civil wars often consist of a small band of poorly armed rebels fighting
against a much stronger state military. The weakness of rebel forces encourages
them to seek out foreign benefactors, who can drastically strengthen a rebel
movement with an infusion of cash, weapons, and other assistance. External
actors see these rebels as useful proxies, through which they can achieve their
aims, without taking direct action. The support these foreign states provide
allows rebels to confront the state more forcefully and frequently, increasing the
intensity of combat. Additionally, rebel forces that receive external support are
incentivized to demonstrate their effectiveness to their supporters by increasing
the lethality of their attacks, resulting in a behavioral change.
Weak rebels engage the state using guerrilla tactics, while strong rebels
form conventional armies. The choice of tactics is determined by the capa-
bilities of the rebels, which is partially shaped by the assistance they receive
from external actors. In Syria the government’s army engages in conventional
combat against rebel armies that are supplied by the United States and other
outside states, resulting in tens of thousands of battle deaths per year. Con-
versely, the Patani insurgents in southern Thailand have received no foreign
support in their decade long struggle, and their conflict only kills hundreds
per year.
External support can alter the capabilities of the actors in a war. When
foreign supporters help government forces the rebels are forced to retreat and
avoid combat, reducing conflict intensity. When foreign forces support rebel
armies the result is a sharp increase in conflict intensity, due to an increase in
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both the capabilities of the rebels, as well as a change in their behavior. As
the rebels gain strength they will be more powerful, and they will use their
new strength more frequently, launching bolder attacks on government forces.
This theory is supported by empirical evidence. Civil conflicts from 1989
and 2009 have averaged 577 battle deaths per year. There is a high degree
of variation however, which is partly explained by external support. In wars
with no external support to either party the average death toll is 323 battle
deaths per year. When the government receives support and the rebels do not
the average drops to 271, however conflicts with support to the rebels and not
to the government average 656 deaths per year. In cases with support to both
the rebels and the government the average death toll rises to 1221 per year.
The effect of external support has been examined in the literature on con-
flict duration, with findings that foreign intervention usually increases the
duration of conflicts. However, the existing research on the effect of support
on conflict intensity is very limited. This paper, by improving the understand-
ing of how outside actors can influence conflict dynamics, will add to both the
conflict intensity literature, as well as providing a better understanding of how
it is that external support affects conflict duration.
I proceed to discuss the literature on civil war intensity and external sup-
port. Then I develop a theory of how foreign support shapes the behavior
of governments and rebel groups, which in turn determines conflict intensity.




The existing literature on the effect of external support on conflict intensity
contains conflicting theoretical expectations and few empirical results. There
is much more existing research on external support in the conflict duration
literature, however without a good understanding of how support effects con-
flict dynamics, the understanding of its effect on duration is limited. This
paper will improve on the understanding of how support affects conflict actors
decisions, and therefore how a war is fought. This will provide an understand-
ing that will then improve the study of how support affects other elements of
conflict.
Foreign intervention into civil wars has been assumed to affect conflict
intensity since the first quantitative studies of conflict intensity (Lacina and
Gleditsch, 2005). However, it has not only been theorized that external sup-
port can increase conflict intensity, but also that it could reduce it, by changing
the way rebels behave. Theories supporting an increase in intensity when for-
eign forces intervene in a civil conflict are based on the idea that the support
will increase the capabilities of the actors, and the government and rebels
will use their new capabilities to fight harder, resulting in more battle deaths
(Lacina, 2006; Lacina, Gleditsch and Russett, 2006). A different line of rea-
soning states that in Cold War conflicts rebels who received external support
adopted insurgent tactics, and that this change in tactics led to fewer battle
deaths, as well as increased conflict duration (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010; Bal-
cells and Kalyvas, 2014). Due to data availability, these studies used the Cold
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War as a proxy for external support, assuming that wars occurring during that
time period would have more foreign intervention. In this paper I will improve
on this literature by both providing a more detailed theoretical understanding
of the effect of external support on conflict intensity, as well as testing the
effect of support much more precisely, using detailed data on the type of sup-
port, and the actor receiving it, rather than simply the period of history in
which a war took place.
A different sort of external support comes in the form of governments
which hire private military companies to assist them in internal conflicts. Pri-
vate military companies allow governments to quickly gain increased military
capabilities, for a fee. Hiring these companies has been shown to increase
conflict intensity, and reduce conflict duration (Petersohn, 2015; Akcinaroglu
and Radziszewski, 2012). This scenario differs somewhat from regular exter-
nal support, as the government in this case has a clear desire to increase their
capabilities, and to use them against the rebels. This supports the theory that
increased capabilities allow for the potential for increase intensity, but not that
governments will necessarily use their capabilities.
Lootable resources provide another means by which rebels, and sometimes
governments, can increase the funds available to them to make war. The litera-
ture on lootable resources results in mixed predictions. Lootable resources are
sometimes expected to increase violence (Weinstein, 2007), and are also some-
times predicted to reduce violence (Wood, 2010). Rebel groups with access to
valuable resources should have more resources available to them, which can
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be converted into war fighting potential, however drug cultivation is thought
to be a long term business that requires an absence of government, reduc-
ing the incentive for the rebels to end the war. Existing work supports this
argument by finding that diamonds and oil increase intensity, however drug
cultivation reduces intensity (Lujala, 2009). Income from lootable resources
should increase capabilities, however it differs from external support in that
local resources are controlled by the conflict actors themselves, whereas ex-
ternal support comes from a powerful actor who presumably wants to see the
support they provide going to good use.
Different types of external support have been shown to have different ef-
fects on conflict. Types of support that increase uncertainty about the future
capabilities of rebel groups, such as money and weapons which can be saved
for future use, make it harder to end conflicts, and increase conflict duration
(Sawyer, Cunningham and Reed, 2017). Although this study looked at conflict
duration, it is likely that different types of support will have different effects
on conflict intensity as well.
The effect of foreign intervention into civil conflicts has been studied largely
as a function of its effect on conflict duration. Existing findings show that
while interventions overall increase conflict duration, biased interventions are
more effective at ending conflicts than neutral interventions (Regan, 2002).
Other studies have found that support to rebels shortens conflicts, while
support to governments make conflicts longer (Collier, Hoeffler and Soder-
bom, 2004; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000). In addition to the side that
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is supported, the type of intervention has been addressed, with diplomatic
interventions helping to end conflicts, while other forms of intervention make
them longer (Regan and Aydin, 2006). In addition to the type of intervention,
the intentions of the supporter also affect conflict duration. When foreign
states intervene with an interest separate from that of the domestic actors,
conflicts are made longer (Cunningham, 2010). In addition to direct support,
the characteristics of neighboring states, such as the presence of refugees and
the availability of bases in a neighboring state, also affect conflict duration
(Salehyan, 2007).
In addition to the length of the fighting, research has also addressed the
length of the peace after a conflict. It has been argued that outside interven-
tions are useful to encourage actors to commit to the terms of a conflict settle-
ment, increasing the amount of time between spells of conflict (Walter, 1997).
Impartial UN peacekeeping operations have also been shown to increase the
duration of peace (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000).
Separate from the effect of external support on duration, it has also been
shown to affect other forms of behavior within conflict. When rebels receive
support from foreign states their behavior is influenced by the interests of that
state. In particular, when rebels receive support from democracies, and from
states with strong human rights lobbies, those rebels have been shown to be
less likely to abuse civilians, due to pressure from their sponsor (Salehyan,
Siroky and Wood, 2014). This paper will build on this finding to show that
when civil war actors receive support they change their behavior in order to
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demonstrate that they are putting that support to good use, which increases
conflict intensity.
3.2 Theory
Some rebel groups launch occasional attacks while hiding out of sight and
avoiding capture, while other groups attempt to directly confront the state
army in hopes of defeating them in combat. The strategic choice of how to
fight is determined by the relative capabilities of the rebels and the government,
as well as the intervention of outside actors. Foreign states that support actors
in civil conflicts seek to change the outcome of the conflict, and in order to do
so they provide incentives to actors to change their behavior.
When foreign states intervene in a conflict they are searching for actors
whose interests overlap with their own. By supporting an actor with similar
goals, they can increase that actor’s capabilities and help them achieve those
goals. Overlapping interests are not, however, identical interests, and in most
cases the supporter will also want to alter the behavior of their chosen actor.
This creates a principal-agent problem. The outside actor providing the sup-
port and the party to the conflict which is receiving it have similar interests,
however the conflict actor has to bear the costs of fighting more directly than
the external supporter. The principal will push their agent to fight harder,
even if it means increasing intensity to a point where the agent begins taking
casualties higher than what they would be willing to tolerate on their own.
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The agent, however, also has an interest in meeting the expectations of their
benefactor, in order to continue to receiving support in the future.
The capabilities of rebel groups has been shown to affect conflict intensity
in Chapter 2. The tactical model of conflict intensity argues that rebels have
a choice of how to fight in a civil war, and that their choice is based on
the capabilities available to them. Weak rebel groups will choose to adopt
guerrilla tactics that involve relatively few, and limited, military engagements
with government forces. Stronger rebels will adopt conventional tactics, and
fight against the government more frequently. Instead of carefully choosing
the time and place to launch occasional attacks, they will instead fight on a
regular basis and fight in a manner similar to that of the government army
they are opposing.
In addition to the size of the rebel force, the size of the government forces
also affects conflict intensity. As government forces grow in size, rebels will be
more reluctant to engage in combat, and intensity will decrease. When large
government armies seek to find and destroy small rebel groups the size of the
government forces limits their effectiveness, as the military capabilities of the
government cannot be brought to bear on a small rebel force that seeks to
avoid direct combat. As such, large government forces combined with small
rebels are expected to have very low levels of conflict intensity. As the rebel
force grows, the level of intensity grows quickly, as the rebels become more
bold, and the government has an increased ability to find and fight the rebels.
In the extreme, when rebel armies approach the same size and capabilities of
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the government we see the highest levels of intensity, as the rebels directly
confront the government and attempt to seize control, while the government
dedicates all the resources they have available to stopping the rebellion.
In addition to the effect of military capabilities on conflict intensity, as
discussed in Chapter 2, the tactical choices of governments and rebels are
further altered when outside groups become involved in a conflict. Both states
and rebels make decisions regarding how they employ the capabilities they
possess. In the absence of foreign intervention, conflict intensity is a function
of the strength of the actors. When external groups support actors in a civil
conflict they alter the strength of the actors, as well as changing the incentives
the actors have to choose among tactical alternatives.
The changes in capabilities of actors within a civil conflict that result from
external support fit easily into the tactical model of conflict intensity, with
more rebel capabilities increasing conflict intensity. When external support
increases the capabilities of one actor, they are then able to fight better, which
directly contributes to conflict intensity. When the support increases rebel
capabilities it allows those rebels to fight more effectively, and the increased
frequency increases the visibility of the rebels, allowing increased government
targeting of the rebel group.
External support is not however, as simple as just increasing the capabil-
ities of the supported group. The group providing the external support has
their own interests in a conflict, and therefore provides support in the hope
that their efforts will lead to their preferred outcome. As such, the support
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alters the capabilities of rebel groups and governments, but also affects their
behavior through conditions imposed by the supporter, who wants to see the
assistance and resources they provide going to activities that they see as pro-
ductive. The dynamics of conflict are therefore determined by a combination
of rebel strategy and government strategy, which is also influenced by the
preferences and desires of the external supporter.
3.2.1 Rebel Strategy
Rebels want to use their limited forces in the most efficient way possible. They
also want to increase the size and capabilities of their forces. When rebels are
weak, using their forces efficiently means launching occasional attacks, when
the circumstances are in their favor. When they grow in power they are able
to challenge the government more frequently, increasing intensity.
Receiving external support can increase the capabilities of a rebel army.
The support can help fill critical gaps in the rebels’ fighting abilities by pro-
viding them with important supplies, training, or information. When rebels
receive this aid, they are able to use it to increase the size and frequency of
attacks. They are also incentivized to demonstrate to the supporter that the
support is being put to good use.
An increase in rebel capabilities results in conflict intensity being increased,
at an exponential rate. This represents the theory that strong rebels will




Governments facing rebellions have an interest in crushing the rebels, however
they also have an interest in expending as few resources as possible in the
process. Strong governments facing weak rebels experience less urgency in
dealing with the relatively weak threat posed by the rebellion, and will not
dedicate all of their resources to fighting. When the rebels are relatively strong
compared to the government, the state will increase the amount of resources
dedicated to the conflict.
Governments facing rebellions have an interest in destroying the rebels, but
also face other internal and external security threats which demand a share
of the governments resources. Governments also must balance their resources
between military and non-military goals.
Strong governments possess the capacity to kill large numbers of people,
however this effect is mitigated because their strength deters the rebels from
engaging in direct fighting. The increase in government capabilities results
in the rebels avoiding combat, and therefore in fewer engagements between
strong states and weak rebels.
3.2.3 Interests of Interveners
The needs of rebels and governments are different, as are their strategies.
This means that external states will intervene in different ways depending on
whether they are supporting the government or the rebels. Support from one
state to another is viewed with a higher degree of legitimacy than governments
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supporting rebels, and therefore support going to governments is more likely
to be formal and overt. States that support rebel groups often attempt to keep
their involvement covert, or at least maintain plausible deniability. This is an
additional reason that the type of support states give is different depending
on which side of the conflict they are supporting.
External supporters intervene in conflicts because they have an interest in
the conduct or outcome of the conflict. When a conflict within one state has
an effect on other states it can draw attention from outside actors. This could
be due to violence spilling over the border, such as international terrorism
associated with rebel groups such as ISIS, or it could be illegal trade, such
as FARC’s involvement in the cocaine industry. In other cases ideological
issues are prominent, such as Cold War support from the US or USSR for
governments and rebel groups that espoused the correct ideology relative to
the supporting state. When outside governments intervene in support of rebel
groups it is usually in an effort to hurt the state that those rebels are fighting.
States will look at internal rebellions in another state as an opportunity to
inflict harm on their rival without paying the costs of direct conflict.
When an outside state has decided to intervene in a conflict in support of
one side or the other, they seek to alter the way that the conflict is fought.
Support for rebels seeks to either inflict costs on the government, or overthrow
the government altogether. In both cases the supporting state would want to
see an increase in conflict intensity following the provision of support. When
they support a state they will want to see the government defeat the rebels.
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Usually this will entail increased levels of violence, as this is a sign of a more
capable government that is also actively pursuing a rebel force in an effort to
defeat them. However, there may also be cases where support to a government
could reduce battle deaths, as states have an interest in minimizing the level of
conflict inside their borders. The effect of support to governments is therefore
likely to be contingent on the context in which it is given.
The foreign supporter provides aid to actors in order to help that actor
achieve victory, or to inflict harm on that actor’s opponent. In either case, the
supporter has an interest in seeing the actors increase the pace of combat, in
order to defeat the enemy, or at least increase the cost of conflict for them.
Because of this interest in seeing conflict intensity increase, the actor that
receives the support will change their behavior, in order to increase the number
of engagements with the enemy.
3.2.4 Actors’ Responses to Support
From the point of view of the actor receiving the support, their are two ef-
fects. The first effect is on capabilities. The support itself should increase the
capabilities of the actor. This should make rebels bolder, and allow them to
increase the pace and scale of attacks. The second effect of external support
on actors is behavioral. When an outside actor intervenes to support a party
to a conflict their support comes with strings attached. The foreign state has
an interest, and they will only provide support, and continue to provide it
into the future, if the actor receiving the support acts to further that inter-
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est. Rebels and governments that accept support from an outside party will
therefore have to alter their behavior accordingly.
Governments and rebel groups respond to incentives from external sup-
porters to fight against their enemies. Weak rebels are normally inclined to
avoid direct combat, and instead rely on carefully planned guerrilla attacks.
Because of their infrequent and limited nature, these attacks cause relatively
few deaths. When an external actor decides to intervene in support of a rebel
group they seek to increase the effectiveness of that group, and want to see
results in the form of increased numbers of battle deaths.
Conflict actors, when undisturbed by outside pressure, will find an ideal
level of conflict intensity based on the level of capabilities of the two sides.
When a rebel group is given support from an outside actor, that actor will
press them to fight harder than they would otherwise choose to, since the
foreign supporter does not have to bear the cost of that fighting, but does
benefit from the results of it. Rebels who wish to continue receiving support
into the future will partially comply with the pressure they receive to increase
their operations, in order to signal to their supporter that they are putting
the resources they are being given to good use. In cases where foreign states
cooperate with government forces, the foreign forces have an even larger role
in determining the intensity of conflict, as they will have troops and advisors
in the country, planning and executing operations along with the host state.
For example, a rebel group that receives financial support from a foreign
government will be expected to put that money to use. If they were to save it
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for the future, or if the money found its way into private bank accounts held
by the group’s leaders, the state providing the funds would likely not continue
to support them. If however that rebel group used the money to increase their
capabilities and to launch more attacks, they will be able to demonstrate their
effectiveness to their foreign benefactor, and secure continuing support. This
incentive to demonstrate effectiveness will drive groups to adopt increasingly
aggressive tactics.
Hypothesis 4 External support increases conflict intensity.
External support has a larger effect on rebels than on governments. States
have standing armies and an existing tax base with which to support their
forces, reducing the importance of external support. External support is often
crucial for rebels, who usually do not possess the resource generating capability
of states. External support increases the resources available to a rebel group,
increasing their capabilities.
Hypothesis 5 External support to rebels increases conflict intensity more
than external support to governments.
The type of support provided is usually meant to improve the weakest
aspect of the actor’s war effort, such as providing cash to a poor group, or
providing weapons to a poorly-armed actor. Support in the form of troops,
cooperation, access to territory, weapons, materiel, money, training, and intel-
ligence increases the capabilities of the supported actor, and thereby changes
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the intensity of the conflict. These different types of support will, however,
have different effects on different actors.
For governments that are receiving support, the largest effect results from
large scale cooperation between the state and a foreign military. When an out-
side state intervenes on behalf of a government with their own troops, or by
cooperating in such a way that the government being supported is integrated
into the military or intelligence infrastructure of the external supporter, the
government will increase their capabilities drastically. They will also be work-
ing with an outside actor that is motivated to prosecute the war aggressively,
increasing the tempo of operations.
Other types of support, when given to governments, will have less effect.
In general, states are already better armed, equipped, and funded than their
rebel adversaries, so additional resources will have a limited effect. Govern-
ments also have their own bases, training facilities, and intelligence agencies.
While external help can always improve the existing capabilities of the state,
it is unlikely that the effect will be as drastic as when the external supporter
becomes directly involved in cooperating with the state being supported.
Hypothesis 6 Support in the form of troops and the integration of the host
state into the military infrastructure of the supporting state, when given to
governments, will increase conflict intensity.
For rebels, the dynamics are very different. Because rebels are usually much
weaker than the governments they are fighting, increasing their capabilities in
a number of areas will greatly improve their ability to fight, and therefore
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increase the intensity of the conflict. Rebels deal with their material weakness
by adopting guerrilla tactics, which reduces the number of troops and weapons
necessary, but puts an increased demand on intelligence and training. When a
small numbers of fighters seek to efficiently exploit the weaknesses of a larger
and stronger adversary, having well trained fighters and detailed intelligence
about the enemy provides a large advantage. For this reason, rebels that
receive intelligence and training support will fight more efficiently and increase
conflict intensity the most. Financial support will increase the ability of a rebel
group to recruit soldiers and build an effective organization, and will therefore
also increase their ability to fight and increase intensity.
Hypothesis 7 Support in the form of funding, training, and intelligence given
to rebels will increase conflict intensity.
In addition to the effect of external support on conflict intensity generally,
the support given to actors should have a more direct effect on the number of
deaths a supported actor will inflict on their opponents. An increase in capa-
bilities of one actor should increase their ability to kill the enemy, increasing
not only the overall level of intensity, but also the level of deaths suffered by
the opposing side. Additionally, conflict is inherently interactive, and an in-
crease in fighting initiated by one side should also lead to an increase in the
response from their opponent. When actors receive external support, and as
a result of pressure from their sponsor begin to fight increasingly aggressively,
the number of battle deaths the supported actor suffers should increase faster
than the number of battle deaths inflicted on the other side. This is the result
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of the supported actor selecting into less desirable conflict events than they
would otherwise choose to be involved in. Their increased efforts will increase
the number of enemy soldiers they are able to kill, but will also reduce the
effectiveness of their actions in terms of the ratio of their own losses to those
of their enemy. Hence, as they fight harder and suffer more casualties, the
number of casualties their enemy suffers will increase at a slower rate, increas-
ing the ratio of own deaths to enemy deaths, and reducing the efficiency of
conflict for that actor.
Hypothesis 8 An increase in battle deaths for one actor will increase the
ratio of their battle deaths to those of their opponent
3.3 Data
The effect of external support on conflict intensity can be analyzed using data
from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). UCDP defines armed con-
flict as the use of armed force, resulting in at least 25 battle deaths in a
calendar year, involving the government of a state and an organized oppo-
sition group fighting over an incompatibility regarding government or terri-
tory (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2001). For this research the cases will be
restricted to civil wars, and will exclude interstate wars as well as conflict
between non-state groups.
The UCDP Georeferenced Event Data (GED) contains dates and loca-
tions for individual conflict events with global coverage, from 1989 through
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2016 (Sundberg and Melander, 2013). The data is recorded at the dyadic
level, with each observation representing an armed conflict between a state
and a rebel group. For each conflict event GED estimates the number of bat-
tle deaths resulting from the event. The maximum temporal resolution of the
GED data is the day, although many cases are coded less precisely. Because
all independent variables are coded as yearly observations, the GED data is
aggregated to the year. The number of deaths per year is highly skewed, with
values ranging from 0 to 30,6331. Battle deaths are used as the dependent vari-
able, and because it is highly skewed count data negative binomial regressions
are used.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Battle Deaths 861 576.692 1,736.376 0 30,633
Gov Support 861 0.555 0.497 0 1
Reb Support 861 0.410 0.492 0 1
Gov Troops 861 508,737.900 747,084.600 2,000 3,047,000
ln(Gov Troops) 861 12.084 1.608 7.601 14.930
Rebel Troops 861 6,266.979 10,305.580 30 68,333
ln(Rebel Troops) 861 7.887 1.361 3.401 11.132
Polity 861 1.433 6.220 −9 10
Population 861 179,913,214.000 353,267,284.000 606,844 1,324,655,000
GDP/capita 861 2,982.548 5,607.837 161.834 33,126.300
1The UCDP Dyadic Battle-Related Deaths Dataset only includes years where the total
number of deaths is greater than 25. By aggregating events found in the GED data, I
include years with fewer than 25 deaths, as long as at least one year in the conflict crossed
the 25 battle death threshold. Two observations are recorded as 0 battle deaths, for years
when there was at least one conflict event, even though no battle deaths resulted. Including
periods of very low intensity improves the data, and avoids censoring cases where the actors
chose to avoid conflict, and conflating them with periods where the actors were not active.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of Key Variables
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3.3.1 Types of External Support
The UCDP External Support Dataset provides information on external sup-
port to actors in civil wars, for the years 1975-2009. The data includes details
on the type of support given, distinguishing between troops, access to territory,
access to joint infrastructure, weapons, materiel/logistics, training/expertise,
funding, intelligence, and other or unknown support (Høgbladh, Pettersson
and Themnér, 2011). I use this data to create two summary variables, one
indicating whether the government received external support, and another in-
dicating support to the rebels, as well as to create a series of indicator variables
for the nine types of support, for both the government and the rebels. There is
external support to the rebels in 41% of the observations, and external support
to the government in 55%.
Troops as a secondary warring party refers specifically to combat troops
from a foreign state military who are sent to fight alongside the troops of a
government or rebel group involved in a civil conflict. Foreign soldiers who are
provided for non-combat support fall under the appropriate category for the
type of support they are providing.
Access to military or intelligence infrastructure indicates that the external
supporter allows the party receiving support to use their military bases, intel-
ligence gathering stations, or other facilities, as though the supported party
were a part of the supporting state’s forces. This category also includes al-
liances between rebel groups and coordinated efforts of two states who are both
involved in a conflict with the same non-state actor. Examples of cooperation
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of this sort include the United States supporting the government of the Philip-
pines against the Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) and against the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF), where the US provided the Philippines with access to US military
facilities and resources, however they did not cooperate to the point of the US
providing combat troops to fight alongside Philippine troops. An example of
cooperation between rebel groups is the close relationship between the Kur-
distan Worker’s Party (PKK) and the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). The
UCDP external support dataset considers both groups to be providing access
to military and intelligence infrastructure to each other since the founding of
PJAK in 2004. PJAK and the PKK share members of their leadership, and
both claim allegiance to the imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan. The groups
share the goal of increasing autonomy and self-government for the Kurdish
people. They differ in that the PKK fights against the Turkish government
and PJAK fights against the Iranian government.
Access to territory includes allowing the supported group to set bases on the
territory of the supporter, or permitting the supported actor to use territory
for sanctuary or cross-border raids. Both Syria and Iran are coded as having
provided access to territory to Hezbollah from 1990 to 1995. The United States
provided access to territory to two rebel groups, Jondollah and UNITA, and
to a number of states, including Afghanistan, Colombia, Egypt, Iraq, and the
Philippines.
Weapons support includes the provision of weapons and ammunition, in-
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cluding donations and loans of weapons. Sales of weapons from one side to
the other are only included if the terms of the sale are clearly preferential to
the party receiving the arms, and this variable does not include commercial
arms transactions between states.
Materiel or logistics support includes the provision of material goods that
are directly applicable to military purposes, but do not include weapons and
ammunition. This includes supplies such as vehicles, uniforms, tents, medical
supplies, radars, and other equipment. It also includes assistance with logistics,
such as transporting troops, and assistance with the repair and support of
advanced weaponry, such as aircraft and tanks.
Training includes all training and instruction provided by an external sup-
porter to an actor in a civil conflict. This training can occur within the country
where the conflict is taking place, or in the territory of the country providing
the support. Additionally, this variable includes expertise provided by the
supporter in the form of advisers and other experts, as long as they are not
involved in direct combat operations.
Funding support includes any type of economic aid that is provided to an
actor that is engaged in an armed conflict. This includes loans and grants
that are meant to improve the capabilities of the military. Support from the
external supporter for the provision of loans from multilateral lenders such as
the IMF and World Bank is also included. This variable does not, however,
include humanitarian or development assistance, or balance of payments aid
or loans.
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Intelligence support includes the provision of intelligence materials, such
as maps of enemy positions, cryptographic codes, satellite imagery, signals
intelligence, information on troop capabilities, and information on the location
of enemy leaders. Intelligence support only includes the provision of specific
information, rather than the provision of intelligence capabilities. Cases where
an external supporter provides an actor with access to intelligence gathering
capabilities would be coded as access to military or intelligence infrastructure.
When external support is broken into its various subcomponents, there
are many cases where support from an actor falls into multiple categories.
Out of the observations in which rebels receive support, 65% of the cases
involve multiple types of support. The most strongly related combination of
support types is weapons and materiel. Additionally, weapons and materiel
support are also correlated somewhat with training. Rebels who receive access
to territory from an external supporter almost never receive troops or direct
cooperation from other states, but are very likely to also receive a range of
other types of support, such as training, funding, weapons, and intelligence
support. The remaining combinations of support types have some correlation
with each other, but at relatively low levels.
For support given to governments there is also a high degree of correlations
between weapons and materiel, and those two types of support are also both
highly correlated with training and funding. The combination of weapons,
supplies, money, and the training to use all of them, appears to represent the
typical type of support given from one state to another. Governments are very
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rarely given access to territory in another state, and troops, direct cooperation,
and intelligence are only loosely correlated with the other types of support.
Using ten types of support, and further dividing those variables by whether
the support goes to the rebels or the government creates 20 variables, some of
which have few observations. To simplify the situation, I also created dummy
variables that grouped the ten variables into three categories. Three of the
types of support represent cooperation between the supporter and the actor
being supported. These categories are troops as a secondary warring party,
access to territory, and access to military or intelligence infrastructure. In all
three of these cases the supporter is cooperating with the actor they are sup-
porting, rather than just providing them with assistance. The next grouping
is material assistance given to an actor. This consists of a combination of
the original variables for both weapons and materiel. Both of these variables
represent goods provided to actors, and in 83% of the observations when one
type of material support was given, the other was also provided. The third
grouping is assistance given to the actor that is neither material, nor full co-
operation. This includes financial assistance, training, intelligence, as well as
the categories for other and unknown.
3.3.2 Actor Capabilities
The capabilities of armies are determined by a number of factors, however the
most fundamental measure of the capability of an organization is the number of
people fighting for that group. The capabilities of both governments and rebels
108
are measured using data compiled by Aronson and Huth (2017). This data
includes the number of soldiers in government armies, as well as the number of
fighters active in each rebel group, on a yearly basis. The distribution of the
variables for rebel and government troop levels is shown in Figure 3.1. Because
these variables are highly skewed, troop numbers are logged in the analysis.
The analysis covers the years 1989, when UCDP GED data starts, through
2009, which is the last year for which external support data is available. There
are 208 unique dyads in the data, in 63 countries. Most dyads in the dataset
consist of short conflicts. There are 83 dyads that only include a single year,
and 147 dyads last less than 5 years. However, because of their short duration,
these short conflicts only account for 263 of the 861 dyad-years in the dataset.
Conversely, there are 13 dyads that last at least 15 years, accounting for 232
dyad-years. There is also a high degree of variation in intensity across dyads.
There are 59 dyads that total less than 100 deaths over their entire duration,
and 150 dyads have less than 1000. At the upper end there are several long,
high intensity dyads. There are 11 dyads that total over 10,000 deaths, with
the highest value being Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers, which totals 60,674
battle deaths over 19 years. The highest number of deaths in a single dyad-year
is from the Government of Ethiopia fighting the Eritrean People’s Liberation
Front in 1990, with 30,633 battle deaths.
To control for cross-national effects which may influence both the number
of battle deaths and the presence or absence of external support, control vari-
ables are included for regime type, population, and GDP per capita. Regime
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type is included to address the possibility that autocratic regimes may kill
more people in combat, and rebel groups in autocratic states may be more
likely to attract external support from foreign states seeking regime change.
Population has the potential to affect the number of people killed in combat,
as larger countries provide the potential for larger rebel groups fighting over
larger areas. Additionally, large states have a greater potential for multiple
simultaneous conflicts, as well as attracting more international attention, and
therefore intervention, due to their larger geopolitical importance. Per capita
GDP indicates the standard of living of a country, as well as providing a mea-
sure of the resources available to the government. Rebellions in poorer states
are likely to attract more fighters, who have fewer other options, and exter-
nal support to these groups is likely to have a larger effect, as rebel groups
in poorer states are likely to have fewer resources available to them without
receiving foreign support.
Table 3.2: Average Battle Deaths by External Support Type
Support to Rebels
Support to
Government No Yes Total
No 323.1 655.7 452.5
(234) (149) (383)
Yes 270.7 1220.8 676.2
(274) (204) (478)
Total 294.8 982.3 576.7
(508) (353) (861)
A simple summary of the relationship between external support and conflict
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intensity can be seen in Table 3.2, which shows the average number of battle
deaths for all four combinations of external support. In cases where neither the
government nor rebels receive external support the average number of battle
deaths is 323.1 per year. When only the rebels receive external support that
number more than doubles, to 655.7. Conversely, when only the government
receives support the figure drops, to 270.7 battle deaths per year. The highest
level of violence is observed when both sides receive foreign support, increasing
intensity to 1220.8 battle deaths per year, nearly four times the level of conflicts
without external support. These simple calculations will be elaborated upon
below, however they illustrate that there is a high degree of variation between
the types of conflict that include external support, and those that do not.
3.4 Analysis
This section tests my main theoretical claim that external support increases
conflict intensity, with external support to rebels having a particularly large
effect. Additionally, it investigates the combined effect of external support
with existing capabilities of actors. First, a set of negative binomial regressions
tests the effect of the presence of support to either the rebels or the government,
as well as the effect of actor capabilities. Then the analysis continues to
examine the effect of different types of support. Finally, the section ends with
a series of robustness checks to ensure that the results are valid.
Table 3.3 presents four regression models using the indicator variables for
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Table 3.3: Negative Binomial Regressions of Support on Battle Deaths
Dependent variable:
Battle Deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gov Support 0.135 0.131 0.054 1.148
(0.094) (0.097) (0.085) (0.632)
Reb Support 1.173∗∗∗ 1.150∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ −1.787∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.096) (0.085) (0.496)
ln(Gov Troops) −0.102 −0.075
(0.059) (0.067)
ln(Reb Troops) 0.633∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.041)
Gov Support*Gov Troops −0.093
(0.052)
Reb Support*Reb Troops 0.291∗∗∗
(0.061)
Polity −0.033∗∗∗ −0.012 −0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
ln(Population) 0.062 0.032 0.046
(0.033) (0.061) (0.061)
ln(GDP/capita) 0.053 0.090∗ 0.112∗
(0.042) (0.044) (0.044)
Constant 5.622∗∗∗ 4.209∗∗∗ 0.680 0.835
(0.079) (0.716) (0.799) (0.846)
Observations 861 861 861 861
Log Likelihood −6,036.670 −6,031.173 −5,868.898 −5,857.098
θ 0.534 (0.021) 0.539 (0.022) 0.706 (0.029) 0.720 (0.030)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 12,079.340 12,074.350 11,753.800 11,734.200
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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government support and rebel support. Model 1 shows the effect of these
two variables without controls, while model 2 includes control variables for
regime type, population, and GDP per capita. The results are very similar
across models, with external support to governments being insignificant, while
external support to rebels is highly significant. The effect of external support
can be found by exponentiating the negative binomial coefficient, yielding the
result that the rate of deaths per year is more than 3 times higher for dyad-
years where rebels receive external support, according to model 2.
Because external support is expected to alter the capabilities of actors
in a civil conflict, it is important to also control for the capabilities of the
actors. This accounts for the fact that external support may be more likely
among large or small actors, such that the effect of support without controlling
for capabilities is detecting a spurious relationship of capabilities and inten-
sity. Model 3 shows the results of support while controlling for the number
of troops available to both the government and the rebels. The number of
troops themselves is marginally significant and negative for the government,
while it is highly significant and positive for the rebels. More importantly, the
effect of external support to rebel groups continues to be highly significant af-
ter controlling for capabilities, increasing the number of battle deaths per year
by 68%. These results indicate that although government capabilities, and
external support to governments, has little, if any, effect on conflict intensity,
the same factors for rebel groups are highly influential. A linear hypothesis
test shows that the difference between the effect of support to rebels and the
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effect of support to governments is statistically significant.
Figure 3.2: Predicted Counts for Interaction Terms
One concern regarding the effect of external support on conflict intensity
is that there may be an endogeneity problem, where larger conflicts attract
more attention, and therefore more external support. In order to address this
issue I have taken several steps. First, I test the effect of external support on
intensity, conditional on the size of the rebel force. I then go on to evaluate
hierarchical models, with random intercepts by dyad. By allowing every dyad
to have a different baseline level of intensity, the variation within groups is
shown to be sufficient to find results consistent with what has already been
presented.
To evaluate the effect that external support has on actors given different
levels of capabilities, model 4, in Table 3.3, interacts the variables for support
and capabilities, for both governments and rebels. The regression coefficients
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for the base terms and interaction are all significant for the rebels, however
the government terms are only marginally significant. Figure 3.2 shows the
predicted counts of battle deaths for different levels of capabilities, both with
and without external support. The graph on the left shows the effect of rebel
capabilities and support, holding support for the other side at 0, and all other
variables at their means2. It shows that the number of battle deaths in dyads
where the rebels receive external support is significantly higher than dyads
without support for the rebels, but only when the rebel group is relatively
large. The effect becomes significant for rebel groups with more than 1339
troops, which accounts for more that 69% of all dyad-years. This finding helps
address the endogeneity problem by showing that dyads with rebel groups
that receive external support experience an increase in conflict intensity after
accounting for the effect of rebel capabilities as well as the differential effect
of support on groups with different levels of capabilities.
3.4.1 Random Intercepts by Dyad
To account for correlation within dyads, Table 3.4 shows the same set of re-
gressions from Table 3.3, but in hierarchical models with random intercepts by
dyad. By including random intercepts each dyad is allowed to have a different
intercept, and therefore a different baseline level of conflict. This accounts for
any unobserved variables that may cause conflicts in one dyad to have a higher
2The results are very similar if support for the other side is set to 1. Including support for
government forces reduces the standard errors for the prediction for rebel forces, and shifts
the results upwards slightly. The effect for government troops shifts upwards somewhat if
rebel support is included, however the slope and confidence intervals are unaffected
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or lower overall level of violence. Because variation across dyads is accounted
for by the random intercepts, the coefficients are based primarily on variation
within dyads.
The results show that external support to rebel groups remains significant
and positive in the first three models, and external support to governments
is now also significant and positive in those models. To evaluate model 4 the
results have to be graphed. Figure 3.3 shows that after accounting for random
intercepts by dyad, and an interaction between troops levels and external
support, the effect of external support is no longer significant. In this model
rebel troop levels are highly significant, while government troop levels are
not, and external support is insignificant for both rebels and governments.
Figure 3.3 also shows the difference in predicted counts for dyads with different
random intercepts. Primary results are shown for the median case, however
the minimum and maximum values for the random intercepts are also shown.
The wide range in intercepts is clearly illustrated.
This finding indicates that the effect of the interaction of the size of rebel
groups and the support provided to them is instead a result of dyad-specific
factors, which are explained by the large variance in the random intercepts.
Although there is variation in the number of rebel troops within a dyad, and
in whether the rebels receive support, much of the total variation is across
dyads, and when the intercepts are allowed to vary the interaction of the two
variables is no longer significant.
116
Table 3.4: Multilevel Model with Random Intercepts by Dyad
Dependent variable:
Battle Deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gov Support 0.532∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.188∗ 0.675
(0.130) (0.129) (0.093) (0.635)
Reb Support 0.699∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗ −0.703
(0.112) (0.112) (0.099) (0.514)
ln(Gov Troops) −0.141 −0.115
(0.076) (0.083)
ln(Reb Troops) 0.539∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.048)
Gov Support*Gov Troops −0.042
(0.052)
Reb Support*Reb Troops 0.125
(0.064)
Polity −0.026 −0.007 −0.008
(0.016) (0.012) (0.012)
ln(Population) 0.078 0.078 0.072
(0.092) (0.082) (0.082)
ln(GDP/capita) −0.223∗ −0.044 −0.038
(0.096) (0.065) (0.065)
Constant 5.033∗∗∗ 5.336∗∗∗ 1.383 1.459
(0.162) (1.563) (1.111) (1.134)
Observations 861 861 861 861
Log Likelihood −5,927.831 −5,921.929 −5,649.047 −5,646.905
Akaike Inf. Crit. 11,865.660 11,859.860 11,318.090 11,317.810
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 11,889.450 11,897.920 11,365.670 11,374.910
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Figure 3.3: Predicted Counts for Interaction Terms, Hierarchical Model
3.4.2 Robustness Checks
To check whether the effect of external support to rebels is having a direct effect
on their behavior, or whether it is affecting conflict intensity by increasing the
size of rebel forces, I conducted a mediation analysis. This analysis tested the
effect of external support, and other covariates, on the number of troops in
a rebel group, and then evaluated the mediated effect of both support and
rebel troop levels on the number of conflict deaths. Rebel external support is
a significant and positive predictor of the size of the rebel force, however the
average causal mediation effect (ACME) is not significant, meaning that there
is no significant change in the number of battle deaths when the number of
rebel troops is changed as though there was support given to the rebels, while
the support variable is held at zero. This is likely because the number of rebel
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fighters is also significantly predicted by all the other variables in the model,
except for GDP per capita. The average direct effect (ADE), which represents
the direct effect of external support on battle deaths when the effect of support
on the number of troops is ignored, is however significant, and indicates that
the primary effect of external support does not operate through the effect of
support on troop size.
All regressions were repeated with lagged dependent variables. By includ-
ing the previous year’s battle deaths I correct for possible endogeneity, in the
form of conflicts with high battle deaths attracting external support in the
next year, which could in turn cause high numbers of battle deaths. Tables
showing the results are shown in the appendix, and are very similar to the
results without a lagged dependent variable. This indicates that the intensity
of conflict in previous periods is not causing changes in the independent vari-
ables, which in turn affects the dependent variable in the year being observed.
As an additional robustness check, the results from Table 3.3 were repeated
after matching cases with and without external support for the rebels. These
results are included in the appendix, in Table 3.8.
Additionally, I used covariate balancing propensity scores to ensure that
the covariates included in the regressions are not causing both rebel support
and large numbers of battle deaths. The results are reported in the appendix,
in Table 3.9.
As another robustness check, I control for unobserved country-level vari-
ables, by repeating the above analysis with random intercepts by country.
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The results are shown in Table 3.7, in the appendix, and show largely similar
results.
3.4.3 Disaggregated Support
To further investigate the effect of external support on conflict intensity, I test
the effects of different types of support on battle deaths. Table 3.5 repeats
models 1-3, but with three different support variables for both the govern-
ment and the rebels. Support has been disaggregated into three categories,
representing cooperation, material support, and assistance from the support-
ing entity. In all three models governments that cooperate with an outside
supporting actor result in increased levels of intensity. For rebel groups the
results are different, as cooperation is not significant, however assistance is.
It is interesting that material support is not significant in any of the models.
Weapons, munitions, other supplies, and money are all key elements that
determine an actor’s ability to wage war, and as such one could expect that an
increase in the implements of war would lead to an increase in battle deaths
resulting from war. The finding that material supplies are not significant
indicates that actors are not using all of their capabilities, as giving them
more weapons does not cause a simple increase in fighting.
Instead, the findings show that states that cooperate with an outside state
cause increased battle deaths, and rebels who receive assistance from an out-
side actor also fight in such a way that intensity increases. The effect of
outside actors is to both increase the capabilities of the actors, and also to
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alter their behavior. When governments receive outside assistance from other
governments in the form of troops or integration of the two states’ military
resources, they are able to directly increase their capabilities, however the re-
ceiving state’s behavior is also altered by the interests of the state they are
receiving assistance from. The external state wants to see the receiving state
use their increased capabilities, and an increase in the intensity of the conflict
illustrates that they are putting their capabilities to use.
Rebels respond differently to the various types of support. The assistance
category, which includes training, intelligence, and financial assistance is the
only category that has statistically significant effects for rebels. For a rebel
group that is waging a guerrilla war against a government, training and intel-
ligence are high priority needs, which can greatly increase the capabilities of
such a group. The other categories, cooperation and material assistance, are
likely to only be useful to larger organizations. Cooperation with a foreign
state requires a large force, and the large civil wars that are likely to attract
the direct involvement of foreign troops in support of rebels are likely to al-
ready have a high level of intensity. Material assistance seems as though it
should have a positive effect, however the effect may be mitigated for small
groups, as there is a limit to the size and quantity of military hardware that
can be utilized by a small organization.
To understand the effect of different types of support at a lower level, I also
ran the above analysis with support disaggregated to the lowest level possible
given the UCDP data. The results are shown in the appendix, in Table 3.10,
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Gov Cooperation 0.790∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.140) (0.140)
Gov Material −0.053 −0.140 −0.151
(0.145) (0.130) (0.130)
Gov Assistance −0.126 −0.079 −0.095
(0.143) (0.130) (0.132)
Reb Cooperation 0.239∗ −0.149 −0.159
(0.110) (0.098) (0.098)
Reb Material 0.160 0.081 0.090
(0.126) (0.114) (0.117)
Reb Assistance 1.191∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.103) (0.105)
ln(Gov Forces) −0.087∗∗∗ −0.084
(0.026) (0.059)








Constant 5.592∗∗∗ 1.946∗∗∗ 1.393
(0.070) (0.400) (0.785)
Observations 861 861 861
Log Likelihood −5,990.346 −5,848.752 −5,846.741
θ 0.576∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.731∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.733∗∗∗ (0.030)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 11,994.690 11,715.500 11,717.480
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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and indicate that both of the constituent variables that were combined to
indicate cooperation above are individually significant for governments, while
for rebels only two of the three constituent variables for assistance, namely
intelligence and financial assistance, are positive and significant, while the
training appears to have a small negative effect on intensity. For example,
the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) received consistent training
support from Eritrea from 1999 to 2007, during which period conflict intensity
remained below 50 deaths per year. In 2007 the ONLF received intelligence
support, as well as integration into the intelligence network of the Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF), causing intensity to increase to 152 deaths in 2007,
and to further climb to 473 by 2009. In this case the training may have
increased future intensity, as the ONLF prepared for conflict for several years,
followed by an active period where their past training combined with useful
intelligence allowed them to act effectively.
3.4.4 Hierarchical Model of Support by Actor Type
To test the effect of support on the behavior of both actors in a dyad, I estimate
an actor based model of the effect of support to an actor on the number of bat-
tle deaths that actor inflicts on their opponent, with simultaneous estimation
of effects for rebels and governments.
I transformed the dyad-year dataset to an actor-year dataset, so that for
every dyad-year there is one observation for the rebel group, as well as for the
government. This allows a hierarchical model to calculate separate estimates
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for the effect of external support on rebels and governments. By modeling
the effect of support on both actors simultaneously, while also including terms
modeling the strategic relationship between the actors, this model provides
a better estimate of the effect of external support on behavior, while still
accounting for the strategic interaction between actors.
This model includes variables for all ten types of external support, as well as
including variables for the size of the actor’s forces, the size of their opponent’s
forces, and the number of deaths that the actor suffered in that year. The
dependent variable is the number of deaths their opponent suffers.
The support variables and the troop size and own deaths variables are al-
lowed to vary by actor type, meaning that different coefficients are calculated
for rebels and governments. The control variables for regime type, popula-
tion, and per capita GDP are pooled estimates across all observations. By
estimating the effect of support on both rebels and governments simultane-
ously the strategic interaction between them can be modeled. This estimation
technique allows for the effect of support to one actor to directly affect that
actor, while also accounting for the effect that actors have on each other. By
including variables for the number of troops that the opposing side has, as
well as the number of deaths inflicted on the actor, the strategic relationship
between actors is maintained, while primarily examining the effect of support
on effectiveness.
The results show differential effects across types of support, as well as
between rebel groups and governments. The number of enemy soldiers an
124
Figure 3.4: Coefficients of Effect on Deaths Inflicted on Opponent, by Actor
Type.
Note: Rebel estimates are red circles, and governments are blue triangles.
Pooled estimates are black dots.
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actor is able to kill is increased when an external actor supplies troops as a
secondary warring party. This is true for both governments and rebels. When
rebels receive this direct support it increases the effective number of soldiers
they have at their disposal, and allows them to increase their attacks upon
government targets. When governments receive foreign troops to assist them,
the increased capabilities could be expected to produce a deterrent effect,
and drive the rebels into hiding, however the country providing the external
support is likely to be highly motivated to actively pursue the rebel forces,
increasing the motivation from the government side to actively search out the
rebels.
Access to the military and intelligence infrastructure of an external actor
has a positive effect on governments, and a negative effect on rebels. This is
possibly because the governments are usually receiving assistance from other
states, with large and effective infrastructures, while for rebel groups this vari-
able often indicates that they are cooperating with rebel groups in neighboring
states. These two form of cooperation are significantly different in substance,
explaining the differential effect.
Access to territory in a foreign state has a significant negative effect on
conflict intensity for governments. It is however also relatively rare for gov-
ernments to receive this type of support, and it is usually in cases where the
government is relatively weak, as strong states do not require external territory
to wage civil wars within their own borders. On the other hand, rebel groups
that receive foreign basing do not have a significantly higher or lower degree
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of efficiency in fighting their enemy. Territorial support for rebels does not
by itself give the rebels any added capability, but instead provides them with
a safe haven to retreat to and train at. This could provide a mixed effect of
increasing their effectiveness when they are in combat, but also remove them
from combat when they are taking advantage of this foreign territory.
The provision of weaponry to rebels has a positive effect on their effec-
tiveness, whereas it reduces the number of rebels killed by the government.
Giving an actor weapons is one of the most direct ways to increase an actor’s
capability to fight and to kill their enemy. The fact that weapons increase
the ability of the rebels to kill government soldiers is therefore not surprising.
The negative effect for the government may at first seem incongruous, however
it makes sense in the context of a strategic relationship between the govern-
ment and the rebels. Increasing the armaments available to the government
will change the behavior of the rebels. In the face of an increasingly deadly
government army, the rebels will avoid direct confrontation, and instead rely
on guerrilla tactics. The government, now more secure militarily, will not con-
sider the rebels as threatening, and therefore will not pursue them as intensely,
decreasing the number of rebel deaths.
Materiel support, consisting of equipment other than weapons and am-
munition, has a small positive effect on rebels and a small negative effect on
governments. The different directions of support are consistent with the the-
ory of strategic decision-making regarding tactics, and the small size is likely
the result of the support consisting of non-lethal equipment. The marginal
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increase in effectiveness for rebels will allow them to fight more effectively,
while the increase in effectiveness for the government will improve government
capabilities and therefore deter rebel attacks.
Training has a negative effect on the number of battle deaths actors cause.
The effect is larger for governments, and expected, as a well trained government
military will deter rebels. The negative effect for training support given to
rebels could indicate that the rebel forces that are receiving the training are
not well trained in the first place, and therefore not effective. This anomalous
finding could therefore be the result of a selection effect.
Financial support has a positive effect for both actor types. The effect
is especially large for governments. This may indicate that governments are
responding to the need to demonstrate effectiveness to their external supporter.
Financial support is highly desirable to actors, and governments are likely to
seek out large economic contributions. A government which wants to continue
to receive financial assistance may be under pressure to demonstrate that the
money is being put to good use on the battlefield.
Intelligence support has the largest effect of all support types, but only
for rebels. Rebel groups are almost always at a disadvantage in numbers
and capabilities, and intelligence provided from an external actor can greatly
increase their ability to fight the stronger government forces. In an asymmetric
conflict the added information given by an outside supporter could greatly
improve the ability of the rebels to identify targets where their forces can be
put to good use.
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The results for the number of troops an actor controls, as well as the number
of troops on the opposing side, controls for the baseline level of capabilities
that the actors have. This allows the effect of the external support variables
to be interpreted while also accounting for the size of the two forces involved.
The results of these variables show that large rebel armies kill large numbers
of government soldiers, while large government armies kill fewer rebels than
smaller government armies. The variable for the size of the opposing troops
indicates the size of the enemy forces that the actor is trying to kill. The
coefficient for the government indicates that when the government is facing a
larger rebel army they inflict more battle deaths on them. On the other hand,
rebels fighting large government armies kill fewer soldiers.
The number of deaths an actor suffers in a year is significant and positive
for both actors. This term controls for the strategy of an actor’s opponent, as
the number of deaths an actor suffers is largely the result of decisions made
by their opponent. When an opponent chooses an aggressive strategy that
results in a larger number of deaths for an actor, we would also expect that
actor to kill large numbers of their opponent’s soldiers. By controlling for this
interaction between actors it addresses the possibility that when one actor
receives support could alter the behavior of their opponent.
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3.5 Conclusion
The strategic interactions between rebels and governments result in an asym-
metric result of external support. Support to rebel groups greatly increases
conflict intensity, while most support to governments appears to have little ef-
fect on intensity. Foreign support directly affects capabilities, however it also
affects the strategic decisions of actors. When rebels are the beneficiaries of
support from a foreign government they not only are able to generate more
force, but they are able to come out of the shadows of insurgency and put their
strength to use in more direct attacks against government forces. They have
an incentive to use their new capabilities to demonstrate their effectiveness to
their foreign supporter.
The effect of different types of support differs for governments and rebels.
This is because of the different needs of the two types of actors, as well as the
political situation surrounding them. Foreign states that assist a government
can provide troops and cooperation between the two militaries in an open
manner that is rare when supporting rebel groups. This open, and large scale
support allows for governments to fight much more intensely, and gives the
external supporter a large influence in how the war is conducted. Outside
actors that want to see a rebel group defeated are able to increase the intensity
of fighting by becoming deeply involved in the conflict.
Rebels have very different needs, given their weaker military position in
most conflicts. Intelligence assistance can be easily given in a covert manner,
and allows rebels to drastically improve their attacks against state forces.
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Financial assistance also improves rebels ability to fight, and provides them
with an incentive to demonstrate their value to their benefactor. By increasing
the rate and intensity of attacks, rebel groups can make a strong argument to
their supporter that the financial assistance they are receiving is being put to
good use, and should continue.
The academic literature on civil conflict has largely focused on conflict
onset, duration, and termination, with little attention paid to the dynamics
within a war. The focus on these factors is justified by the policy interest in
preventing future wars and ending current ones, however without a full under-
standing of how actors behave within wars, it is difficult to fully understand
how to end them. This paper adds to the understanding of how foreign states
affect the strategic decisions of actors within wars. Rebels and government
forces respond to support by altering how they wage war. Understanding how
actors make strategic decisions about how to fight will aid in understanding
how actors decide to end wars.
The findings in this paper point to the effect of capabilities and incentives
on intensity. External support increases conflict intensity, even when control-
ling for the size of the forces on both sides of the conflict. This indicates that
the effect is not purely based on the capabilities of the forces, but that support
also affects the way those forces are used, and the incentives the actors have
to engage in conflict behavior that results in large numbers of battle deaths.
Foreign intervention into civil conflicts is a political decision, and this re-
search helps understand the impact of these decisions. With the exception
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of training rebels, all other forms of support either have no effect or increase
conflict intensity. There are a number of justifications given by states when
they decide to intervene in a civil conflict. One of those justifications is a de-
sire to reduce violence, either by supporting a government so they can end the
rebellion, or by strengthening the rebels so that they can force a peace. The
findings of this paper show that the support will actually increase the number
of people dying in conflict, rather than reducing the number of deaths.
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3.6 Appendix
This appendix contains a series of robustness checks, to verify the results
reported in the main analysis. The first section repeats the main analysis of the
effect of external support on battle deaths, while controlling for battle deaths
in the previous year. The Next two sections use matching, and weighting based
on the covariate balancing propensity score, to ensure that the results are not
the results of outliers, or unlikely cases of external support. The following
three sections provide extra detail on the effect of different types of external
support, and on the different effects support has to rebels and governments.
3.6.1 Lagged Dependent Variable
To control for the possibility that large conflicts, with many battle deaths, are
more likely to attract external support than less violent conflicts, I ran models
that include a variable for the number of battle deaths in the previous year.
These models show that although battle deaths in the previous year are a very
good predictor of battle deaths in the current year, rebel support and rebel
troops remain highly significant as well, showing that the effect of external
support to rebels increasing the number of battle deaths is not a result of
large conflicts attracting the interest of foreign states.
The random intercepts by country from the multilevel model with lagged
battle deaths are shown in Figure 3.5. The intercepts have been exponentiated,
to represent the baseline number of battle deaths represented by the intercept
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Table 3.6: Negative Binomial Controlling for Previous Year’s Battle Deaths
Dependent variable:
Battle Deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gov Support 0.197∗ 0.158 0.080 1.549∗∗
(0.086) (0.088) (0.081) (0.601)
Reb Support 0.716∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ −0.882
(0.088) (0.088) (0.081) (0.481)
ln(Gov Troops) −0.189∗∗∗ −0.121
(0.056) (0.064)
ln(Reb Troops) 0.502∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.039)
Gov Support*Gov Troops −0.123∗
(0.049)
Reb Support*Reb Troops 0.151∗
(0.060)
Polity −0.033∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗ −0.020∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
ln(Population) −0.004 0.104 0.089
(0.030) (0.058) (0.058)
ln(GDP/capita) 0.035 0.108∗∗ 0.107∗
(0.038) (0.042) (0.042)
lagged deaths 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00003)
Constant 5.258∗∗∗ 5.155∗∗∗ 1.145 1.041
(0.072) (0.650) (0.757) (0.804)
Observations 861 861 861 861
Log Likelihood −5,921.841 −5,912.714 −5,802.745 −5,796.825
θ 0.646∗∗∗ (0.026) 0.655∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.791∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.799∗∗∗ (0.033)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 11,851.680 11,839.430 11,623.490 11,615.650
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Gov Support 0.333∗∗∗ 0.175 0.714
(0.097) (0.092) (0.626)
Reb Support 0.387∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗ −0.537
(0.104) (0.098) (0.510)
ln(Gov Troops) −0.150∗ −0.120
(0.074) (0.081)
ln(Reb Troops) 0.512∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.047)
Gov Support*Gov Troops −0.046
(0.051)








lagged deaths 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004)
Constant 4.704∗∗∗ 1.574 1.577
(0.107) (1.081) (1.090)
Observations 861 861 861
Log Likelihood −5,711.300 −5,640.287 −5,638.613
Akaike Inf. Crit. 11,434.600 11,302.580 11,303.230
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 11,463.150 11,354.910 11,365.080
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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of the regression equation. This number is not meaningful in itself, since
there are no cases with zeros for all of the independent variables, however it
provides an indication of the unexplained variance by country. Many of the
countries have large confidence intervals around their intercepts, indicating
that the difference between most pairs of countries is not significant, however
comparisons of countries with the lowest and highest intercepts does appear to
be statistically significant. This indicates that there are statistically significant
country-level factors that affect conflict intensity that are not included in the
analysis.
Most of the countries with large intercepts have experienced large conflicts,
such as Sri Lanka and Angola, although Russia has the largest intercept, de-
spite having an average intensity only slightly above the above the median.
This is probably a result of the large government army in Russia. Government
troops have a negative effect on predicted intensity, and the large number of
Russian troops would, without a random intercept, indicate that they should
have a smaller number of battle deaths than is observed.
All of the countries with small intercepts have experienced low intensity
conflicts. Civil conflicts in Iran have averaged only 51 deaths per year, and
Bangladesh and Egypt average 36 and 103 deaths per year. Myanmar has the
second highest number of dyad-year observations, however most of them are
very low intensity, producing an average of only 133 battle deaths per year,
which is just slightly above their intercept of 80.
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Figure 3.5: Conflict Baseline by Country (Exponentiated Random Intercepts)
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3.6.2 Matching
As a robustness check, the regressions from Table 3.3, showing negative bi-
nomial regressions of external support on battle deaths for governments and
rebels, are repeated here, after matching cases of support and no support for
rebels. Matching reprocesses the data so that the treatment group is as sim-
ilar as possible to the control group (Ho, Imai, King and Stuart, 2007). By
matching cases without rebel support to the cases with rebel support that have
the most similar values on other variables, the results of rebel support are less
likely to be driven by outliers of covariates. There are more dyad-year obser-
vations with rebel support than there are without it, so the matching process
drops 157 cases with support, and keeps all 355 cases without support, as well
as the most similar 355 cases with support.
Having balanced the dataset, I then reran the previously reported regres-
sions. The results of the repeated regressions using the matched data are
shown in Table 3.8. The results are largely unchanged after matching. Rebel
support remains significant in all models, as does the number of rebel troops.
The interaction term for rebel troops and rebel support is also highly signif-
icant after matching. The government variables are not significant in any of
the models.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gov Support 0.196 0.186 0.102 0.812
(0.106) (0.109) (0.097) (0.738)
Reb Support 1.044∗∗∗ 1.016∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗ −1.957∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.104) (0.092) (0.575)
ln(Gov Troops) −0.096 −0.094
(0.065) (0.075)
ln(Reb Troops) 0.652∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.052)
Gov Support*Gov Troops −0.062
(0.061)
Reb Support*Reb Troops 0.316∗∗∗
(0.070)
Polity −0.038∗∗∗ −0.010 −0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
ln(Population) 0.052 0.004 0.037
(0.038) (0.067) (0.067)
ln(GDP/capita) 0.062 0.099∗ 0.128∗∗
(0.046) (0.049) (0.049)
Constant 5.709∗∗∗ 4.417∗∗∗ 0.774 1.269
(0.096) (0.804) (0.888) (0.962)
Observations 710 710 710 710
Log Likelihood −5,079.330 −5,073.134 −4,945.453 −4,935.510
θ 0.515∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.521∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.673∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.686∗∗∗ (0.031)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 10,164.660 10,158.270 9,906.906 9,891.020
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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3.6.3 Covariate Balancing Propensity Score
As an additional robustness check, I also reestimated Table 3.3, weighted by
the covariate balancing propensity score. This method models treatment as-
signment, while also correcting for the balance of covariates in an observational
sample. This corrects for both the likelihood that a particular observation
would be exposed to the treatment, which in this case is external support to
rebels, while also accounting for the balance of values of other covariates. Bal-
ancing the covariates and estimating the propensity score for rebel support are
calculated simultaneously. This methodology has been shown to improve on
propensity score matching and weighting methods (Imai and Ratkovic, 2014).
Table 3.9 shows the results of the negative binomial regressions using the
covariate balancing propensity score. The results show that, after weighting
observations the results remain consistent with the results shown in the main
analysis and the results from the analysis using matching. The effect of support
to rebel groups is significant in all models, including when interacted with the
number of rebels troops. The coefficients for rebel support increase slightly.
Government support remains insignificant in all models.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gov Support 0.091 0.107 0.072 1.097
(0.148) (0.150) (0.136) (1.032)
Reb Support 1.277∗∗∗ 1.288∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ −1.805∗
(0.146) (0.147) (0.136) (0.845)
ln(Gov Troops) −0.120 −0.092
(0.090) (0.105)
ln(Reb Troops) 0.596∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.070)
Gov Support*Gov Troops −0.089
(0.086)
Reb Support*Reb Troops 0.304∗∗
(0.101)
Polity −0.032∗ −0.010 −0.006
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
ln(Population) 0.154∗∗ 0.104 0.114
(0.053) (0.093) (0.093)
ln(GDP/capita) 0.018 0.073 0.095
(0.064) (0.069) (0.069)
Constant 5.757∗∗∗ 2.978∗∗ −0.025 0.353
(0.129) (1.095) (1.230) (1.344)
Observations 867 867 867 867
Log Likelihood −2,565.717 −2,561.321 −2,509.792 −2,505.151
θ 0.533∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.543∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.667∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.680∗∗∗ (0.044)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 5,137.434 5,134.643 5,035.584 5,030.303
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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3.6.4 Disaggregated Support
As a robustness check for the hierarchical model of support by actor type,
Table 3.10 includes all types of support at the lowest level possible given the
UCDP external support data, at the dyad level. This shows that support to
governments in the form of troops from an external supporter that fight as a
secondary warring party increase intensity, as does cooperation in the form of
the government being integrated into the military and intelligence system of
the external supporter. This cooperation variable indicates not just assistance,
such as the supporter providing intelligence or logistics, but integration of the
civil war actor into the military and intelligence system of the supporting state.
In both of these cases the effect of external support is positive, as external
actors who cooperate with state militaries are interested in increasing the
tempo of conflict, in order to bring a conflict to a resolution. The behavior of
governments that might otherwise be inclined to contain conflicts and minimize
fighting is changed by the actions of foreign states. An outside actor that
offers cooperation to a government will likely be interested in defeating a rebel
threat that somehow also affects the supporting state. In this case the change
in intensity is due to a political agreement between the state fighting the war,
and the outside state that is supporting it.
It is also interesting to note that materiel support to governments appears
to be significant when analyzed without controlling for capabilities, however
when the level of government troops is included the effect of materiel support
falls out of significance. This indicates that while the fighting capacity of state
142
Table 3.10: Support Disaggregated to Lowest Level Groups
Battle Deaths
Gov Troops 0.485 0.969∗∗∗ 0.895∗∗
(0.306) (0.279) (0.279)
Gov Cooperation 0.446∗ 0.359∗ 0.362∗
(0.187) (0.166) (0.166)
Gov Territory 0.601 0.318 0.382
(0.458) (0.407) (0.407)
Gov Weapons 0.299 −0.227 −0.210
(0.204) (0.186) (0.189)
Gov Materiel −0.552∗∗ −0.171 −0.197
(0.204) (0.183) (0.184)
Gov Training 0.166 0.129 0.169
(0.121) (0.109) (0.115)
Gov Funding −0.063 0.030 −0.035
(0.141) (0.128) (0.140)
Gov Intelligence 0.054 −0.089 −0.134
(0.191) (0.171) (0.172)
Gov Other −0.104 −0.185 −0.160
(0.927) (0.824) (0.825)
Gov Unknown −5.487∗∗∗ −4.859∗∗∗ −4.804∗∗∗
(1.423) (1.266) (1.264)
Reb Troops 0.761 0.916∗ 0.796
(0.508) (0.452) (0.453)
Reb Cooperation 0.053 −0.190 −0.152
(0.151) (0.135) (0.135)
Reb Territory 0.284∗ 0.041 0.007
(0.119) (0.106) (0.106)
Reb Weapons 0.156 0.017 0.056
(0.165) (0.146) (0.148)
Reb Materiel 0.359 0.233 0.251
(0.199) (0.179) (0.179)
Reb Training −0.218 −0.275∗ −0.306∗
(0.143) (0.128) (0.129)
Reb Funding 0.960∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.113) (0.115)
Reb Intelligence 1.284∗∗ 1.021∗∗ 1.127∗∗
(0.409) (0.363) (0.366)
Reb Other 0.624∗ −0.087 −0.089
(0.271) (0.243) (0.243)
Reb Unknown 0.014 0.520 0.481
(0.493) (0.438) (0.438)
ln(Gov Forces) −0.071∗∗ −0.103
(0.027) (0.061)








Constant 5.691∗∗∗ 1.773∗∗∗ 1.348
(0.067) (0.418) (0.773)
Observations 861 861 861
Log Likelihood −5,963.472 −5,821.462 −5,819.644
θ 0.602∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.766∗∗∗ (0.032) 0.768∗∗∗ (0.032)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 11,968.940 11,688.920 11,691.290
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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militaries is significant, the effect of external support that increases capabilities
is reflected in the troop level variable. The effect of materiel support and the
effect of government troops levels are both negative, indicating that more
capable government armies decrease the intensity of conflict.
For rebel groups the findings are very different. Troops as a secondary
warring party is only significant in the second model in Table 3.10, and co-
operation is insignificant in all models. The provision of territory in a foreign
state to a rebel group is significant in the first model, but is not robust to
controls for rebel capabilities. The variables that do have a significant effect
are training, funding, and intelligence. None of these were significant for gov-
ernments, indicating that the determinants of conflict intensity operate very
differently for rebels and governments.
Surprisingly, when a foreign state trains rebel troops it results in a decrease
in battle deaths. This could possibly indicate a short term decline, as troops
are removed from the battle field, and the rebel group alters their strategy to
take a long-term view of the conflict, as training requires a longer time scale
to affect the outcome of the conflict than other more direct effects.
Funding and intelligence provided to rebel groups are highly significant in
all models, and have large positive effects on intensity. Funding more than dou-
bles the intensity of a conflict, while providing intelligence to a rebel group can
triple conflict intensity. The provision of money to rebel groups likely allows
those groups to fund increased operations, which increases the effectiveness of
the troops that they have under their control, as well as incentivizing them
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to take action in order to demonstrate effectiveness to their supporter, in an
effort to ensure continued funding.
Providing intelligence to a rebel group increases intensity by filling a need
that that group faces, and improving their ability to fight, as well as through
political interactions between the rebels and the external supporter. The prac-
tical effects of intelligence are especially large given that most rebel groups are
much weaker than the states they are fighting, and this weakness requires them
to rely on guerrilla tactics. Intelligence assistance will greatly improve their
ability to locate exploitable targets, providing them with more, and better,
opportunities to fight the government on terms that are favorable to them.
The large effect of intelligence on rebels is also likely the result of political
effects from the interaction of the rebels and the government. The external
actor has an interest in helping that rebel group, and often that interest is
really an interest in inflicting harm on the government. The outside actor
will provide information to the rebels that allows the rebels to do damage to
the state in such a way that the supporting state benefits. The rebels must
exploit this intelligence, by launching attacks, or they risk loosing the support
of their benefactor. This encourages a rebel group to take action against
the government, to demonstrate their effectiveness and value to the foreign
state that is supporting them. Support in the form of intelligence therefore
incentivizes a rebel group to take more action in order to demonstrate their
effectiveness, while also making them more effective when they do take action.
These factors combine to result in a tripling of intensity when outside actors
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support rebels.
3.6.5 Separate Analysis for Rebels and Governments
Although the total number of battle deaths in a conflict is the result of the
interaction of rebel and government strategies, external support given to one
actor only affects the capabilities of that particular actor. To be sure that the
external support to an actor is altering their behavior, the battle deaths from
a conflict can be divided into deaths suffered by the government and by the
rebels. This allows for estimation of the effect of support on the lethality of
the actor the support is given to.
Because we cannot directly observe the behavior of individual actors in a
conflict, but instead only see the deaths resulting from combat between actors,
the best measure of the capability of a particular actor is the number of battle
deaths sustained by the opposing side in the conflict. This means that support
to rebels should alter rebel behavior, which in turn should result in a change in
the number of battle deaths sustained by the government. Conversely, support
to the government should affect the number of battle deaths inflicted on the
rebels.
In order to model the effect of external support to one side on the battle
deaths of the other side while also accounting for both actors’ strategic deci-
sions, it is important to take into account the actions of both sides. To do this,
I include the number of battle deaths sustained by the side receiving the sup-
port, such that deaths for both actors are included in the equation, with one
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as the dependent variable, and the other as one of the independent variables.
This technique allows for the battle deaths of one side to be estimated based
on the capabilities of both actors, as well as the behavior of their opponent.
An additional benefit is the ability to estimate the response in lethality of one
side as a reaction to a change in the lethality of the other.
Including the number of battle deaths for the opposing side brings into
the analysis a measure of overall intensity, as well as the reciprocity that is
inherent in the strategic behavior of war, while allowing for an understanding
of how support to a single actor affects their capabilities.
Table 3.11 shows the effect that support to rebel groups has on the number
of government deaths. The earlier finding, that training rebels decreases total
battle deaths, while funding and intelligence increases total battle deaths holds
true when looking only at government battle deaths. This supports the theory,
since the increase in total deaths due to intelligence and funding, is shown
to be the result of the rebels increase in capabilities causing an increase in
government deaths.
Looking only at government deaths, the variable for cooperation between
rebels and foreign supporters becomes significant and negative. When rebel
armies are integrated into the military and intelligence infrastructure of an
external supporter the number of government troops killed declines. This
is possibly the result of the political influence of the external supporter re-
straining the rebels, causing them to launch fewer, or less deadly, attacks. It
could also be the result of external supporters choosing to cooperate with rebel
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Reb Troops −0.259 0.675
(0.554) (0.498)
Reb Cooperation −0.493∗∗ −0.423∗∗
(0.175) (0.158)
Reb Territory −0.029 0.021
(0.137) (0.124)
Reb Weapons 0.341 0.350∗
(0.193) (0.174)
Reb Materiel 0.195 −0.023
(0.231) (0.208)
Reb Training −0.308 −0.349∗
(0.167) (0.151)
Reb Funding 0.738∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗
(0.148) (0.133)
Reb Intelligence 3.261∗∗∗ 4.525∗∗∗
(0.465) (0.421)
Reb Other −1.264∗∗∗ −1.095∗∗∗
(0.310) (0.279)




ln(Gov Forces) −0.076 −0.016
(0.075) (0.068)











Log Likelihood −4,437.084 −4,328.628
θ 0.450∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.559∗∗∗ (0.026)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 8,906.169 8,691.256
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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groups who are less deadly. The regression includes controls for the size of the
rebel army, so if this finding results from selection, it would be because the
external supporter was selecting rebel groups that kill relatively few govern-
ment soldiers given the size of the rebel force. Most cases of integration of
rebel forces with external supporters consist of cases of cooperation between
rebel groups in neighboring states. The cross-border nature of this cooper-
ation could indicate that rebels are operating in border areas, and spending
time interacting with their rebel-allies rather than focusing on direct combat
operations.
Even after accounting for external support, the size of the rebel groups
remains significant, with larger rebel groups killing more government forces.
Interestingly, the size of the government army is not significant, despite it
defining the upper limit of the dependent variable. This demonstrates that the
rate of government deaths is not simply based on the number of government
soldiers available to be killed, but instead based on the strategic relationship
between the rebels and government forces.
Table 3.12 shows how external support to governments affects the number
of rebel soldiers who die in a dyad-year. Funding from an external supporter
has a very large effect, increasing the number of rebel battle deaths by 2.5
times. Other and unknown support have slightly significant, but very large
negative effects. The size of the government army does not have a significant
effect on the number of rebel deaths, however the size of the rebel army does.
This supports the theory that rebel capabilities are the primary determinant of
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Gov Troops 0.423 0.048
(0.406) (0.360)
Gov Cooperation 0.250 0.091
(0.237) (0.211)
Gov Territory 0.923 0.185
(0.587) (0.520)
Gov Weapons −0.280 −0.216
(0.275) (0.244)
Gov Materiel −0.539∗ −0.282
(0.266) (0.236)
Gov Training 0.175 −0.172
(0.164) (0.146)
Gov Funding 0.485∗ 0.928∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.181)
Gov Intelligence −0.008 −0.104
(0.249) (0.221)
Gov Other −2.320 −2.315∗
(1.216) (1.063)




ln(Gov Forces) −0.161 −0.070
(0.087) (0.078)











Log Likelihood −4,826.414 −4,697.439
θ 0.359∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.459∗∗∗ (0.020)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 9,684.828 9,428.877
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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both rebel and government strategy. Absent strategic decisions, large govern-
ment armies should be able to kill large numbers of rebels. However, instead
we see that the size of the rebel force is responsible for increasing the intensity
with which the government pursues the rebels.
Figure 3.6: Predicted Effect of Increased Deaths for One Actor on Battle
Deaths of the Other
In both sets of regression above, the number of battle deaths for one side is
a significant and positive predictor of the number of battle deaths for the other.
In both cases the coefficient is below one, indicating that for every additional
soldier on that side who dies in combat, there are fewer than one additional
battle deaths from the other side. This estimate is made while holding the
size of the rebel and government forces constant, and accounting for the level
of external support. This situation models a change in the tactics used by
an actor, while holding the capabilities constant, and indicates that there are
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diminishing returns to aggressive tactics.
Figure 3.6 shows the predicted number of deaths for one side given any
number of deaths by the other. The two graphs are the results of the models
in Tables 3.11 and 3.12. In both cases, the lines have positive slopes that are
less than one, indicating that, when holding the size of the two forces constant,
increasing the number of deaths from one side does not increase the number
of deaths from the other side by an equal amount. Holding capabilities of one
actor constant and increasing the number of deaths that that side experiences
models a change in tactics. At low levels of battle deaths the actor whose
capabilities are being modeled has an advantage in terms of the ratio of their
deaths to those of their opponent. However, as the number of deaths increases,
the ratio changes, giving the advantage to their opponent.
This finding shows that a force, either rebel or government, that takes an
aggressive strategy, without increasing their capabilities, will face diminishing
returns in terms of the ratio of losses in combat. The effect is particularly
severe for rebels. Rebel groups that make aggressive tactical choices that result
in more deaths for their own forces, will not see a commensurate increase in
the number of government troops killed. This finding supports the argument
that rebel strategy is based largely on their capabilities, as adopting a more
aggressive strategy with fixed capabilities will deplete rebel force faster than
the government force. This dynamic is made even more dangerous given the
fact that rebel forces are usually much smaller than those of the government.
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3.6.6 Differential Effects by Actor Type
External support increases the capabilities of one actor, as well as encourag-
ing them to use their capabilities in an increasingly aggressive manner. The
combined effect should be to increase conflict intensity, however to be sure
that the increased capabilities are resulting in the supported actor fighting
harder, I test the effect of external support to one actor on the number of
battle deaths inflicted on the other actor. This helps to demonstrate more
effectively that the effect of the support is to increase the lethality of the actor
that receives the support, by showing that that actor kills a larger number of
enemy combatants when they receive support.
Table 3.13 shows the results of regressions on the total number of battle
deaths, followed by the same regressions on the number of government deaths
and then rebel deaths. These regressions use the same specification as in Table
3.3, in the main text, with different dependent variables, as well as the addition
of the number of battle deaths on the side not measured in the dependent
variable. This allows for a comparison of the number of deaths caused by
external support on total battle deaths to the number of deaths inflicted on
the enemy, while also correcting for the overall intensity, by including the
number of deaths suffered by the supported side.
When looking at the presence or absence of support for rebels, the number
of government deaths does not increase when rebels receive support. However,
the number rebel deaths does increase. This indicates that contrary to the
idea that support will improve the rebels’ ability to fight and kill government
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soldiers, the support appears to be causing more rebel troops to die. This
could be the result of rebels increasing their efforts, in response to pressure
from their external sponsor, and selecting into more combat events, including
non-advantageous ones. The overall conflict intensity increases, however it
is largely the result of more rebels dying. For governments, the provision of
support appears to have no effect on either the number of rebels or government
soldiers who die.
To further disaggregate the effects of support to one actor on the number
of deaths suffered by their opponent, Figure 3.7 shows the result of a hierar-
chical model in which the effect of support to one actor, disaggregated into
six categories, predicts the number of deaths suffered by the opponent. Values
for variables in this analysis reflect the value for the labeled side, with the ex-
ception of the variable ’Opposing Troops,’ which reflects the number of troops
for the opponent. The dependent variable is the number of deaths inflicted on
the opposing side, such that the results labeled as ’Rebels’ are predicting the
number of government deaths.
The coefficients for the types of support show that giving weapons to rebels
increases the number of government soldiers killed, however the provision of
training decreases the number of government soldiers killed, as does direct
support, in the form of foreign troops or direct cooperation between rebels
and the external supporter. Larger rebel groups kill more government soldiers,
while the size of the government army reduces the number of government
soldiers that are expected to die.
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Table 3.13: OLS Regressions Using Deaths for Both Sides
Dependent variable:
ln(Total Deaths) ln(Government Deaths) ln(Rebel Deaths)





Gov Support 0.119 0.161 0.120 0.089 −0.002
(0.094) (0.124) (0.106) (0.137) (0.118)
Reb Support 0.446∗∗∗ 0.215 −0.021 0.511∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.123) (0.107) (0.137) (0.118)
ln(Gov Troops) −0.165∗ −0.225∗∗ −0.054 −0.370∗∗∗ −0.242∗∗
(0.065) (0.085) (0.074) (0.095) (0.082)
ln(Reb Troops) 0.511∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.110∗
(0.034) (0.045) (0.041) (0.050) (0.047)
Polity 0.008 0.018 −0.014 0.068∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012)
ln(Population) 0.094 0.301∗∗∗ 0.170∗ 0.282∗∗ 0.111
(0.067) (0.088) (0.076) (0.098) (0.085)
ln(GDP/capita) 0.066 0.122 −0.032 0.332∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.064) (0.056) (0.071) (0.061)
Constant 0.608 −5.071∗∗∗ −3.615∗∗∗ −3.145∗ −0.263
(0.878) (1.157) (0.997) (1.282) (1.113)
Observations 861 861 861 861 861
R2 0.258 0.193 0.405 0.177 0.393
Adjusted R2 0.252 0.187 0.400 0.170 0.388
Residual Std. Error 1.310 1.726 1.482 1.912 1.642
F Statistic 42.343∗∗∗ 29.196∗∗∗ 72.620∗∗∗ 26.163∗∗∗ 69.022∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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For the government, direct support from a foreign actor, as well as finan-
cial support, both increase the number of rebels killed, while all other support
reduces the number of rebels killed by the government. Larger government
armies kill fewer rebels, as is expected according to the deterrent theory of
government troop size, while governments fighting large rebel groups are ex-
pected to kill more rebels.




The Dynamics of Duration:




Civil war duration has been explained as a function of wealth, in-
equality, ethnic divisions, foreign intervention, relative strength of rebels
and governments, and even the presence of mountains. Existing studies
do not, however, account for the way that wars are fought. Conflict
intensity is a basic descriptor of conflict dynamics, and yet it is absent
from most studies of civil war duration. By estimating the effect of
conflict intensity on conflict duration, this paper improves the under-
standing of how the fighting within a conflict determines how long the
conflict will go on. The number of battle deaths in a particular year
has a strong negative effect on the likelihood of a conflict ending, with a
doubling of the number of deaths causing a 28% reduction in the prob-
ability of termination.
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Civil wars vary greatly in both intensity and duration. Some conflicts last
less than one year, while others drag on for decades. Some kill dozens of people
each year, while others kill tens of thousands. Although previous studies have
sought to explain the variation in conflict duration, and others have examined
the causes of intensity, there is no existing work on the effect of intensity
on duration. Early quantitative studies of civil conflict looked primarily at
structural variables of the country in which the conflict occurred. Newer work
on conflict duration has increasingly looked within conflicts to identify aspects
of rebel groups that affect how long conflicts last. This paper adds to this
effort by addressing the effect of conflict intensity on duration.
Studies of conflict duration have not fully addressed the dynamics of con-
flicts. There have been many studies of conflict duration, but in many, observa-
tions are considered equivalent over time, despite the fact that many conflicts
go through periods of both high and low intensity. Some conflicts start out at
a high level of intensity and then slowly decrease until ending at a low level,
while others start out small and gradually increase. Many conflicts see years
of low level conflict, with one or two spikes when the fighting rises to a higher
level, increasing the number of battle deaths. This variation is unaddressed in
the existing literature, and this paper will help to encourage further research
into the effect of conflict dynamics by demonstrating the effect of intensity on
conflict duration.
Quantitative studies of civil wars often fail to address the vast differences
between the many small civil conflicts that are ongoing throughout the world,
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and the few large civil wars. Datasets on civil conflict are dominated by
observations of small conflicts, although large wars are much more prominent
in examples and theories. Testing data that is primarily composed of small
conflicts, while discussing large wars presents a concern that our understanding
of the most important cases for policy decisions may in fact only be valid for
small conflicts. By addressing the effect of conflict intensity I seek to improve
the understanding of how conflicts of varying size differ, and what implications
this has for dealing with ongoing conflicts and wars.
The long duration of many civil conflicts is assumed to result from the fail-
ure of the two sides to reach an agreement on the distribution of the good in
contention. I argue that conflicts end when the rebels realize, through the ex-
perience of fighting, that they will be unable to defeat the state. During a high
intensity conflict both sides are unwilling to negotiate a settlement, because
they are hoping to win a military victory. When conflict intensity is lower it
becomes apparent to the rebels that they are unlikely to win militarily against
the government, prompting them to consider reaching a political agreement.
For the government, negotiating a settlement often requires giving amnesty to
rebel fighters and leaders, which is politically difficult in many high intensity
conflicts, when the public sees rebels as having blood on their hands. The
government must also worry about these highly-capable rebels returning to
conflict. In a low intensity conflict the government can avoid the cost of rout-
ing out the last elements of a hidden rebel group with fewer domestic political
obstacles, and less worry about the rebels returning to conflict.
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The nature of civil conflicts is such that the state is in power and has,
at least notionally, control over the country. Rebels seek to gain control over
territory, or to change the government itself. This puts the rebels in the
position of the aggressor, while the government is in a defensive position, and
seeks to prevent the rebels from taking power away from the government.
In addition to this asymmetry, rebel forces are usually much weaker, and
less numerous, than government armies. Governments have large numbers of
military personnel and facilities to defend, as well as potential civilian targets.
Many small rebel groups operate without any clearly identifiable locations for
the government to target, allowing them, if they wish, to stop fighting and
go into hiding, or return to civilian life. The government cannot simply stop
fighting, without giving up control to the rebels.
This paper finds that as the number of battle deaths in a conflict increases,
the probability of that conflict ending drops substantially. A conflict with an
intensity that produces 1000 battle deaths per year has only an 8% chance
of ending in any particular year. When the intensity drops to a level of 100
battle deaths per year the probability of termination more than doubles, to
18%. These results demonstrate that efforts to reduce the intensity of conflict
not only save lives while the war is going on, but also increase the likelihood
that a conflict will be brought to a conclusion.
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4.1 Literature
There is little existing research examining the effect of conflict intensity on
conflict duration. The literature has payed too much attention to how wars
start and end, and not enough to how they are fought. In particular, termi-
nation cannot be understood without understanding what happens during a
war. Wars are treated as homogeneous, especially in studies of conflict dura-
tion, where each additional year of conflict is seen as equivalent across conflicts,
despite substantial qualitative differences in how wars are fought.
The most notable investigation on this subject is by Balcells and Kalyvas
(2014), who evaluate the effect of different ’technologies of rebellion’ on conflict
duration. They define technologies of rebellion as conventional war, irregular
war, and symmetric nonconventional (SNC) war. Although these three types
of conflict are not expressly defined by the intensity of the fighting that they
produce, the average intensity of conventional wars was three times that of
irregular wars, which was in turn several times more than symmetrical non-
conventional conflicts (Balcells and Kalyvas, 2014). Additionally, they argue
that the relative balance of power between rebels and the government is what
determines the war fighting strategy of both sides, and therefore the type of
conflict (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010).
Technologies of rebellion are an understudied element of conflicts, and need
to be taken into account in order to understand how wars are fought. A better
understanding of how wars are fought will provide a better understanding of
how they can be ended. Irregular conflicts last longer than other conflicts and
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although they are less intense than conventional wars, Balcells and Kalyvas
(2014) find that they have higher levels of overall battlefield violence, in terms
of the total number of battle deaths and civilian deaths, due to their longer
durations. Conventional conflicts are shorter than irregular wars, and have
higher intensity, but fewer overall deaths. SNC wars are the shortest of all,
and the least intense, producing many fewer battle deaths.
Although Balcells and Kalyvas (2014) find that conventional conflicts are
more intense than insurgencies, and that they are shorter, they do not dif-
ferentiate between whether technology of rebellion causes a certain level of
intensity, which in turn determines the duration of conflict, or whether inten-
sity is the cause of both the technology adopted by the rebels as well as the
duration of the conflict. By modeling the effect of conflict intensity directly,
this paper will help to clarify this point.
The finding that irregular wars are the least deadly appears to indicate that
there is a nonlinear effect of conflict intensity on duration, with high intensity
conventional conflicts and low intensity symmetrical nonconventional conflicts
being the shortest, while irregular conflicts have a medium level of intensity as
well as the longest duration. This paper will test whether the effect of intensity
on duration, which is implied by Balcells and Kalyvas (2014), is found when
the effect of intensity on duration is tested directly.
Although conflict intensity is studied far less than onset and duration, there
are a number of studies that have evaluated why conflicts vary in intensity.
This paper will build on the existing literature on the causes of intensity by
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evaluating how intensity then affects duration. The first quantitative study
attempting to explain conflict intensity was Lacina and Gleditsch (2005). The
creation of a dataset with annual counts of battle deaths led to a number of
studies evaluating the effect of regime type (Lacina, 2006; Heger and Salehyan,
2007; Eck and Hultman, 2007), foreign intervention (Lacina, 2006; Lacina,
Gleditsch and Russett, 2006), sanctions, arms embargoes and peacekeepers
(Hultman and Peksen, 2015; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2014), lootable
resources (Wood, 2010; Lujala, 2009), and the type of rebellion (Heger and
Salehyan, 2007; Eck and Hultman, 2007). The findings produced by these
papers help to explain why some conflicts are more intense than others. The
next step is to see how intensity affects the length of conflicts.
Conflict duration has been modeled theoretically using the bargaining
model of war (Fearon, 2004). Some reasons that conflicts are thought to be
difficult to end, based on bargaining failures, include when the government has
an enduring economic or political interest in territory that rebels seek to gain
autonomy over, or when income from lootable resources reduces the cost of
conflict for rebels (Fearon, 2004). Civil wars with multiple actors are harder to
end because multiple veto players must all agree, increasing information prob-
lems, and shrinking the bargaining space (Cunningham, 2006). After a long
and costly war, states are less likely to go to war again, and any subsequent
wars are likely to be shorter (Smith and Stam, 2004)
Another viewpoint on conflict termination argues that actors are most
likely to end a conflict when they are engaged in a hurting stalemate. Actors
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are receptive to negotiated settlements only after their hope for a military
victory has passed, and they find themselves paying high costs to continue
fighting a war that they are unlikely to win (Zartman, 2000).
The literature on conflict duration has generated many findings which may
interact with conflict intensity, including the level of economic development,
economic inequality, and primary commodity prices. Additionally, levels of
ethnic division affect duration, and sons of the soil conflicts have been shown
to last longer than others (Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, 2004; Fearon, 2004).
Existing studies of conflict duration have examined the effect of numerous
variables, such as foreign intervention, without also including a measure of
conflict intensity. By not including conflict intensity their findings may be
suffering from omitted variable bias. External support to rebel groups has
been shown to increase conflict intensity in Chapter 3, and it is possible that
the effect of external support on duration may be working through the effect
of support on intensity.
There are mixed findings on the effect of intervention into civil wars. For-
eign interventions into civil conflicts have been shown to increase conflict du-
ration1 (Regan, 2002). It has also been shown that one-sided interventions
in support of the government increase conflict duration, and interventions in
support of both sides increase duration even more (Balch-Lindsay and En-
terline, 2000). External support for rebels has been shown to shorten civil
1This finding is commonly cited as showing that biased interventions shorten wars. It
actually shows that wars with biased interventions are shorter than wars with neutral inter-
ventions. There is no evidence that biased interventions shorten wars relative to wars with
no intervention.
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conflicts (Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, 2004).
External support can have different intentions. Parties to a conflict cannot
credibly commit to abide by a negotiated settlement, without outside enforce-
ment. In these cases an outside actor can help to end a conflict (Walter, 1997).
This theory helps explain why diplomatic interventions have been shown to
decrease duration, while military and economic interventions often increase
duration (Regan and Aydin, 2006). UN peace operations have been shown to
increase the success in peace building after a conflict ends (Doyle and Samba-
nis, 2000).
These studies evaluate the effect of foreign interventions on conflict dura-
tion, but do not take account of the intensity of the conflicts. As a result,
they are including both large wars and small conflicts which share little in
common, and assuming that the effect of intervention is constant across all
conflicts, regardless of intensity. In Chapter 3 I demonstrated that external
support increases conflict intensity, when the support is given to rebel groups.
Because support affects intensity, and intensity affects duration, the effect of
external support on duration cannot be properly estimated without including
a measure of conflict intensity.
Studies of relative strength between rebels and governments have a similar
problem. One effort to improve the study of how wars are fought comes from
the nonstate actor (NSA) dataset, which was created to allow for empirical
studies of how rebel group characteristics affect conflicts (Cunningham, Gled-
itsch and Salehyan, 2009). They include an ordinal measure of the relative
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strength of rebels, compared to the government, finding that civil wars fought
with relatively strong rebel groups tend to be shorter than wars with relatively
weak rebels (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009). The strength of
rebel groups has been shown to have a large effect on conflict intensity, rais-
ing the question of whether the effect of relative rebel strength on duration
is in fact finding that relative strength affects intensity, which in turn affects
duration.
Both the number of troops and the presence of external support are in-
cluded in Sawyer, Cunningham and Reed (2017). They show that fungible
sources of support, such as financial support and arms transfers increase the
duration of conflicts, while also controlling for the number of soldiers in both
the state and rebel armies. They find that larger rebel armies fight longer wars,
and that both external support and troop size are determinants of conflict du-
ration, however they do not include a measure of conflict intensity. This paper
will test the effect of support and troop size, as well as the effect of intensity.
Although there is no existing literature explicitly testing the effect of battle
deaths on conflict duration, intensity has been included as a control variable.
Cunningham (2010), while modeling how the intentions of foreign states inter-
vening in a conflict affects duration, found that as the number of battle deaths
in a conflict increases the likelihood of the conflict ending decreases. This mea-
sure of conflict intensity was included as a control variable, and was not explic-
itly theorized, beyond a baseline expectation that more intense conflicts were
expected to be shorter. That study was done at the conflict level, grouping
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multiple rebel groups together against a single state. Conflicts with multiple
actors appear more intense than conflicts at the dyadic level. When there are
multiple veto players in a civil war there are fewer acceptable agreements, more
information asymmetries, and shifting alliances and incentives to hold out for
a better deal make agreement more difficult to achieve (Cunningham, 2006).
This could cause multiparty wars to both be more intense and last longer.
Testing this effect at the dyadic level will provide another test of the effect of
conflict intensity on duration, and allow for a more granular estimate of how
individual rebel groups behave.
4.2 Theory
Conflicts end either through negotiated settlements, through a military victory
by one side or the other, or by a rebel group unilaterally ceasing to fight. A
military conclusion to a conflict is most likely when there is a dynamic military
interaction between the two sides, presenting opportunities for one side to
defeat the other with a decisive victory. Negotiated settlements are most likely
when both actors in the conflict see a military conclusion as unlikely. The other
possible conclusion to a conflict occurs when a rebel group slowly fades away,
launching fewer attacks, and killing fewer people, over a long period of time.
These conflicts end with low levels of battle deaths, after a period of several
years of low deaths.
Bargaining models have been used to explain conflict onset (Fearon, 1995),
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as well as duration (Fearon, 2004). According to bargaining model explana-
tions of conflict duration, more intense civil conflicts should have higher costs
for both the government and the rebels, which will increase the size of the
bargaining range, increasing the number of possible bargains that both sides
would prefer to continued fighting (Filson and Werner, 2002; Powell, 2004; Wal-
ter, 2009). Additionally, intense fighting should increased the amount of in-
formation both actors have about the capabilities of the other side, as well as
their own abilities. This is argued to reduce the information problem which
has been argued to contribute to bargaining failures.
I argue that high intensity does not solve the information problem, but
instead increases uncertainty. In a high intensity conflict the fortunes on the
battlefield can be hard to predict. A single battle can sometimes shift the
outlook of a war, such that actors are uncertain about what will happen if
they continue to fight. Even after a series of lost battles, the losing actor
may be able to succeed, and achieve victory. This uncertainty about their
probability of victory, combined with the problems associated with negotiating
settlements in a civil conflict, makes it more difficult for actors in an intense
civil war to reach an agreement to end a conflict.
Conversely, when conflict intensity is low, the information available to ac-
tors is much better. Small rebel groups that are fighting low intensity conflicts
know with a high level of confidence that they will not be able to defeat the
government, at least not without investing many years of effort into develop-
ing a larger military force. Small rebel groups therefore have higher levels of
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information about their poor military position, and have a clear view of the
high cost that they will have to bear, in the form of a multi-year effort to grow
their organization, before they will be able to present a credible challenge to
the government. Small rebel groups that understand their poor position will
therefore be more likely to accept a peace deal, or to unilaterally decide to give
up the fight rather than continue to struggle for a goal that is highly unlikely
to be attainable.
Dynamic military interactions leading to decisive victory are characterized
by situations of intense combat, producing large numbers of battle deaths. In
these cases, it is possible for both the rebels and the government to decide to
continue fighting based on a reasonable belief that they may be able to defeat
their opponent if the conflict continues.
Rebels who are fighting high intensity conflicts against the government can
hope that the military situation will change suddenly, through a surprise vic-
tory on the battlefield. If the conflict is attracting outside attention they can
hope for external support that will provide them with new capabilities. They
can also hope for a shift in public opinion among their potential supporters,
which could turn the tide in their favor. They can also hope that the govern-
ment will change. A new elected government, or a collapse of the government
due to some other factor, can change the willingness of the government to
continue paying the costs of conflict. In all of these cases a rebel group that
is involved in intense fighting will avoid making a settlement with the govern-
ment because their level of uncertainty regarding the outcome of the military
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contest is high. As long as there is hope that they could win outright, settling
for a partial victory is an unattractive prospect.
Similarly, the government has little incentive to settle with a rebel group
when conflict intensity is high. Governments often interpret high levels of
battle deaths as progress in the fight to eliminate rebels. Politically, the public
is often unwilling to accept a negotiated settlement with a rebel group if that
agreement involves amnesty for the rebels. If the agreement does not include
amnesty, it is unlikely that the rebels would be willing to agree to it.
When intensity is high the capability of the rebels to fight is clearly ap-
parent, and it is difficult for the rebels to credibly commit to not return to
conflict after reaching an agreement. Rebels that have high capabilities, and
have demonstrated their ability to use them to wage costly combat against the
government, will be unwilling to disarm, and the government, and the public
they represent, will be unlikely to allow a dangerous armed group to remain
armed.
Actors are unlikely to agree to a negotiated bargain to a conflict that they
believe they could win outright. If, on the other hand, they have been fighting
for a long period of time, and recognize that there is little chance for an outright
victory, they are more likely to settle for a negotiated bargain. High intensity
therefore prevents conflicts from ending, by allowing for a belief that victory
is possible. Conversely, when intensity is low, the rebels have little hope of a
military breakthrough, and can therefore make a bargain to end the conflict.
Although small-scale insurgencies are unlikely to overthrow governments, they
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are also very difficult for many governments to defeat completely. The cost
for a government of settling a low-intensity conflict with a small rebel group
is often much lower than continuing to fight.
Rebel groups that are involved in a low intensity conflict may also decide
to stop fighting without reaching an agreement with the government. When
the probability of the rebels winning becomes too low, they are unable to
make any agreement with the government, as the bargaining range goes into
the negative range. Ceasing to fight, without an agreement with the state,
is equivalent to a bargain where the government receives the entire good in
question. This situation equates to a corner solution to the bargaining model
(Cunningham, 2016).
Hypothesis 9 High levels of conflict intensity make conflict termination less
likely
Are low intensity conflicts more likely to end quickly, or are conflicts with
small rebel groups more likely to end quickly? It has been argued that con-
ventional conflicts, with rebels who are capable of directly confronting the
government are likely to be shorter (Balcells and Kalyvas, 2014). It has also
been argued that relative strength between rebels and governments decreases
conflict duration (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009). However, in
Chapter 2 I showed that the size of rebel groups affects conflict intensity,
which opens the possibility that these previous studies conflated the strength
of rebels with the intensity of conflict. Larger rebel armies should increase
the intensity of a conflict, reducing the probability of conflict termination.
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Conversely, when the government army is large, it should decrease intensity,
making conflict termination more likely.
Hypothesis 10 Larger rebel armies makes conflict termination less likely
Hypothesis 11 Larger government armies makes conflict termination more
likely
Another factor commonly associated with increased conflict duration is ex-
ternal support. Previous studies have looked at the effect of external support
outside of the mechanism through which the support affects conflict inten-
sity, and have shown that external support to rebel groups increases conflict
duration (Regan, 2002; Cunningham, 2010). Chapter 3 shows that external
support increases the intensity of conflicts, which will decrease the probability
of termination, and in turn lead to longer conflicts.
Hypothesis 12 External support to rebel groups makes conflict termination
less likely
4.3 Data
To test the effect of conflict on external support I use data from the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program (UCDP). UCDP records data on the use of armed
force, including both small and large conflicts. This allows for a comparison of
high intensity dyads, such as the Government of Ethiopia fighting the Eritrean
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People’s Liberation Front, which killed 30,633 people in 1990, with low inten-
sity dyads, such as the Government of Ethiopia fighting the Ogaden National
Liberation Front, which has averaged only 53 deaths per year, over 23 years
of fighting. To be included in UCDP a dyad must produce at least 25 bat-
tle deaths within a calendar year, and must include an organized opposition
group fighting against a government, with the goal of altering the government
or gaining control over territory (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2001).
In order to have the most precise conflict intensity data available at the
dyadic level, I used the UCDP Georeferenced Event Data (GED), which records
individual conflict events, including the location and date of an event, as well
as the number of people killed. GED records deaths in one of three categories:
battle deaths, one-sided violence, and non-state violence. Of primary interest
to this analysis is battle deaths, which are deaths resulting from armed combat
between two actors. Battle deaths includes combatants who die in fighting, as
well as civilians who are killed as a byproduct of fighting between actors. De-
spite the detailed temporal data, because all the control variables are recorded
annually, I have aggregated the GED data to the yearly level. GED begins in
1989, and ends in 2016, with global coverage (Sundberg and Melander, 2013).
UCDP GED only includes dyads that at some point produce more than
25 deaths in a calendar year. If they reach this threshold, deaths are recorded
in other years, even if they are below the 25 death threshold. This allows for
an improved duration analysis, as very low intensity periods are still coded
as active conflict periods, rather than as termination. This avoids conflating
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conflicts that have fallen below an arbitrary threshold, and may flare up again
in subsequent years, with conflicts which have ended completely.
To ensure that including dyad-years with fewer than 25 deaths are not
determining the results, I have also run the analysis including only years listed
in the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz, 2010). The termination
dataset codes a dyad as terminating whenever the following year does not
produce at least 25 battle deaths. Because it ignores dyad-years with less
than 25 battle deaths, it codes more observations as conflict termination, and
includes fewer observations of non-termination.
The number of annual battle deaths is highly skewed. Some dyad-years
have extremely large battle death counts, with a maximum of 30,633, however
the mean is only 445 battle deaths, and over half of all observations are less
than 100. Because of the highly skewed nature of battle deaths, the variable
is logged in all analyses.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Battle Deaths 1,946 441.091 1,465.832 1 30,633
Gov Support 1,497 0.530 0.499 0.000 1.000
Reb Support 1,497 0.317 0.465 0.000 1.000
Gov Troops 1,882 576,274.900 816,424.500 0.000 3,047,000.000
Rebel Troops 1,807 6,247.049 11,099.390 30.000 97,000.000
Polity 1,946 2.091 5.852 −9 10
Population 1,946 198,771,476.000 379,577,547.000 390,643 1,324,655,000
GDP/capita 1,946 4,417.160 8,370.420 57.477 51,722.100
In order to determine whether the effects of conflict intensity on duration
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are direct effects, or if the effect of intensity is actually the result of underlying
factors, I also include controls for the size of the rebel and government forces,
as well as for external support. Additionally, I include regime type, population,
and GDP per capita, as they have all been shown to be significant in other
studies.
Data on the size of the rebel forces comes from Aronson and Huth (2017).
The data consists of dyad-year observations of the number of soldiers on each
side. The distribution of both variables is skewed, with rebel groups averaging
7,711 fighters, despite a maximum 97,000, while governments average 619,686,
with a maximum 3,047,000. The troop size variables for both government and
rebels are logged in all analyses.
In the observed data, troop levels are relatively stable for most governments
and rebel groups. When troop numbers change, they usually make incremental
changes over several years. In many cases troop levels remain stable for many
years. There also was a high degree of missing values, accounting for 40% of
all cases for rebels and 23% for government forces. The predictability, and
slow rate of change in troop levels allows for a high level of confidence in
imputed values. Missing observations are estimated by linear interpolation
from the previous value to the next value. Missing observations before the
first observation, or after the last observation, are assumed to be equal to the
first or last observation, respectively. The only missing values that remain
for troop numbers are for seven governments and 39 rebel groups, who have
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no non-missing observations2. Government troop values were imputed for 389
observations, while rebel forces were imputed for 642 observations
To control for assistance given to the rebels or the government I use the
UCDP External Support Dataset. It provides data on whether the government
or rebels received external support in a particular year, from 1975 to 2009
(Høgbladh, Pettersson and Themnér, 2011). Rebel groups receive external
support in 32% of the observations, while governments receive external support
in 53% of the observations
The data covers the years 1989 to 2016, with the exception of regressions
including external support, which ends in 2009. In total there are 343 dyads
in the dataset, consisting of 316 rebel groups, and 83 governments.
There is large variation in the duration of conflicts. There are 68 dyads
that only include a single year, while 5 dyads experience conflict throughout
the entire time span of this study. In the first year of the dataset there are 68
dyads, many of which are left-censored cases that began before 1989, and were
ongoing when this dataset began. Additionally, there are 76 right-censored
dyads that are ongoing in 2016, and therefore do not experience termination.
Additionally, there are 230 dyads that last 5 years or less, which accounts for
548 of the observations in the dataset. There are only 39 dyads that last at
least 15 years, however these long conflicts account for 830 dyad-years.
2The seven countries are Comoros, DR Congo, Jordan, Kenya, Romania, Serbia, Solomon
Islands, and Yemen. The 39 rebel groups account for 195 observations.
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4.4 Analysis
The central focus of this analysis is the effect of conflict intensity on conflict
termination, however, a secondary focus is determining whether intensity itself
it causing some wars to be long, and others to be short, or if the underlying
causes of intensity are also determining the length of conflicts. The size of
the rebel and government armies, which has been shown to determine conflict
intensity in Chapter 2, as well as the presence of external support, which is
discussed in Chapter 3, have been included in order to test this.
To estimate the effect of conflict intensity on conflict termination, while
also accounting for the effect of time, I have used logistic regressions with
linear, squared and cubic time variables included. The time variables count the
number of years since the beginning of the conflict, and by squaring and cubing
time, it allows for an estimate of the effect of intensity on termination while
also controlling for the effect of time itself. This corrects for the possibility
of correlation between intensity and time. Intensity often changes over time,
with many conflicts starting out large, and then slowly decreasing in intensity
over time. The probability of termination has been shown to decrease over
time (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009), which could lead to a
spurious finding that low-intensity conflicts are less likely to end, when really
that finding would be determined by the fact that longer conflicts have many
low-intensity years.
Table 4.2 shows the results of logistic regressions predicting the probability
of conflict termination by dyad-year. Model 1 shows that the logged count
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of battle deaths has a statistically significant effect on termination, with a
negative effect, supporting Hypothesis 9. The odds ratio from the coefficient
is 0.76, meaning that a one unit increase in logged battle deaths reduces the
probability of conflict termination by 24%, however, because battle deaths are
logged, the effect of each additional death on the probability of termination is
hard to estimate from the odds ratio itself.
This analysis was repeated using the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset,
which uses a higher threshold for conflict termination of 25 battle deaths,
resulting in more conflict terminations, and shorter durations. The results of
this analysis are shown in the appendix, in Table 4.4, and show similar results.
Battle deaths remain highly significant, and the only meaningful difference
is an increased significance for the number of rebel troops, which becomes
significant in all models.
To better illustrate the substantive effect, figure 4.1 shows the predicted
probability of conflict termination at all levels of conflict intensity observed
in the data, using the estimates from model five, which includes all variables
except those for external support, which were omitted because they limit the
time frame of the analysis. Battle deaths are graphed on a logarithmic scale,
but labeled with actual counts. Very low numbers of battle deaths are highly
correlated with termination. Dyad-years with 25 deaths have a 0.27 probability
of terminating that year. At 100 battle deaths the probability drops to 0.18,
at 1,000 it is 0.08, and for the highest dyad-years, at 10,000 battle deaths the
probability of termination is only 0.03. The differences between all of those
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Table 4.2: Logit Models of Conflict Termination
Dependent variable:
Termination
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Battle Deaths) −0.273∗∗∗ −0.296∗∗∗ −0.321∗∗∗ −0.332∗∗∗ −0.394∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046) (0.038)
ln(Gov Troops) −0.294∗∗∗ −0.044 −0.028 −0.052
(0.042) (0.088) (0.089) (0.056)
ln(Reb Troops) 0.044 −0.047 −0.034 −0.025
(0.049) (0.053) (0.053) (0.045)
Gov Support −0.102 −0.058 −0.057
(0.134) (0.140) (0.141)
Reb Support −0.294 −0.341∗ −0.355∗
(0.169) (0.172) (0.173)
Polity −0.018 −0.015 −0.014
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
ln(GDP/capita) −0.231∗ −0.222∗ −0.176∗∗
(0.093) (0.093) (0.066)








Constant −0.074 3.320∗∗∗ 7.211∗∗∗ 6.815∗∗∗ 6.225∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.632) (1.314) (1.332) (1.085)
Observations 1,946 1,411 1,411 1,411 1,785
Log Likelihood −1,036.448 −713.045 −694.419 −691.314 −888.853
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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estimates are statistically significant. These results indicate that the intensity
of fighting in a particular dyad-year has a very large impact on the probability
that a conflict will in fact end that year. When the two actors in a dyad fight
intensely, the probability of termination is low, in that particular year. It is
unlikely that actors will go from intense combat directly to peace, and far more
likely that an intense year of combat will be followed by more combat, and the
conflict will end after combat has been reduced to a lower level of intensity.
Figure 4.1: Estimated Probability of Conflict Termination by Conflict Inten-
sity
The number of annual battle deaths negatively affects the probability of
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conflict termination, so that larger conflicts are less likely to end even when
controlling for lagged battle deaths. In unreported regressions, when con-
trolling for lagged battle deaths, with up to 5 lags, only the present year is
significant at predicting the end of a conflict. When the current year is omit-
ted from the regression, the first lag is significant, indicating that the most
recent information available about conflict intensity is the most meaningful
for predicting conflict termination, rather than the level of intensity at earlier
points.
To further investigate the time dependence within conflicts, a nonlinear
effect of duration on termination can be estimated. Many conflicts last just
one or two years, while those that go beyond that point often have much
longer durations. This creates a duration effect on the probability of conflict
termination. The probability of termination in the first year of a conflict is
0.26, while a conflict that has been ongoing for 20 years has a probability of
termination of 0.17. The effect of time is statistically significant (p=0.019),
as estimated from an asymptotic likelihood ratio test comparing model five to
an otherwise identical model that omitted the time polynomial terms. The
effect of duration on the probability of a conflict ending in a given year, as
estimated by the time polynomial in model five, is shown in figure 4.2. The
graph shows that although decreasing over time, the effect is relatively modest,
and the statistically significant finding is limited to comparing conflicts that
are one or two years old to conflicts that have been ongoing for more than a
decade. There is no discernible difference in the probability of termination for
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conflicts that have been ongoing for more than a few years. By including a
control for time in the regression of intensity on termination the possibility of
a spurious finding resulting from a correlation between the age of a conflict
and the intensity of the fighting is avoided.
Figure 4.2: Predicted Probability of Conflict Termination Over Time
In order to determine whether conflict intensity is directly affecting termi-
nation, or whether it is a spurious relationship caused by the determinants of
intensity, I have included variables for troop size and external support. Con-
flict intensity is highly related to the number of soldiers involved in the conflict,
and in particular to the number of rebel soldiers. External support has also
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been shown to increase conflict intensity. By including the number of soldiers
in both the rebel and government armies, as well as a binary variable indi-
cating whether either side received external support, I have controlled for the
primary determinants of conflict intensity. The remaining effect of intensity
on termination shows that the number of battle deaths is still significant.
The size of rebel forces has been shown to have a large effect on the number
of battle deaths in a dyad, as discussed in Chapter 2, and external support to
rebel groups also increases intensity, as shown in Chapter 3. Regressing the
size of the government and rebel armies against conflict termination, without
other independent variables, shows that large government armies make con-
flict termination less likely, while the size of rebel armies is only significant at
the 0.1 level, although also negative. This indicates that without controlling
for other factors, larger militaries should fight longer wars. When these vari-
ables are included, along with the number of battle deaths, in a regression on
conflict termination, both battle deaths and the number of government troops
are significant, although the effect of government troops is not robust to the
inclusion of other control variables, and appears to be picking up the effect
of the population of the state, since the size of the government army and the
population of the country are closely related. This result appears to indicate
that the intensity of the fighting is what matters, rather than the size of the
armies. Therefore, it should be equally likely for two large armies fighting at a
relatively low intensity, given their size, to reach a resolution to their conflict
as it is for two smaller forces that are at the same absolute intensity, even
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though they are at a higher intensity relative to the size of their forces.
External support to rebel groups is significant in most models, with the
exception of the restricted model only including battle deaths, troops size,
and support. It is negative across all models. Battle deaths are also signifi-
cant in all models, indicating that external support may prolong conflicts both
by increasing conflict intensity, as well as through a separate mechanism. In-
cluding external support to rebels does not weaken the effect of intensity on
duration, but does provide another significant indicator of why some conflicts
are so hard to end. In model four the effect of external support to a rebel
group reduces the probability of termination by 30%, in addition to the effect
of conflict intensity.
The control variables, for regime type, GDP per capita, and population of
the country, do not appear to have any effect on the effect of battle deaths
on termination. Although GDP per capita and population are both signifi-
cant, the only discernible effect of including these controls is that the effect
of government troops falls out of significance. In unreported regressions, the
inclusion of both population and GDP per capita is necessary to cause the
effect of government troops to fall out of significance. Government troops is
robust to the inclusion of either of those variables individually.
In a regression of control variables on conflict termination, without other in-
dependent variables, logged population and logged GDP per capita are highly
significant and negative, indicating that larger countries, and richer countries,
are less likely to experience conflict termination, and should therefore experi-
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ence longer wars. Regime type is only significant in unreported models that
omit GDP per capita. The two variables for external support are not signifi-
cant predictors of conflict termination, when tested without other independent
variables.
4.4.1 Cox Duration Analysis
Cox models examine the effect of independent variables on duration directly,
rather than analyzing the effect of variables on the probability of termination
in a given year. The Cox model is a proportional hazards model, meaning
that it estimates a baseline hazard rate, as well as how that hazard rate varies
as a result of covariates. At each value of time the model estimates the effect
of covariates on conflict termination, comparing dyads that are at the same
duration. Hence, the effect of conflict intensity on termination is estimated for
all conflicts in their first year, as well as all conflicts in their second year, and
so on. Values of covariates cause proportionate scaling of the baseline hazard
rate (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004).
Table 4.3 reports the results of cox regressions. The results are similar to
those for the previously reported logistic regressions. Battle deaths are a highly
significant predictor of conflict duration in all models. Government troops
remain significant in model 7, but not in models that include country-level
control variables. The cox models do show significant results for the number
of rebel troops, which were not significant in the logistic models. Rebel troop
size continues to have a negative value, indicating that larger rebel armies do
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lead to longer conflicts, even when accounting for the intensity of the con-
flict, which is in large part a function of rebel troop size. Regime type shows
marginal significance, when accounting for external support, with more demo-
cratic countries experiencing longer wars. GDP per capita and population size
continue to be significant negative predictors of conflict termination.
The reported coefficients can be substantively interpreted by converting
them to hazard ratios. A hazard ratio is the ratio of hazards for two obser-
vations which differ by a one unit difference on that variable, when all other
covariates are held constant, and is calculated by exponentiating the Cox co-
efficient. Battle deaths in model 9 have a hazard ratio of 0.81, indicating
that a one unit increase in the logged number of battle deaths decreases the
probability of termination in any particular year by 19%.
The cumulative effect of this annual effect can be seen in Figure 4.3, which
shows the probability of a conflict continuing for a given number of years. The
graph shows the different probabilities over time for low intensity conflicts and
high intensity conflicts. The low intensity predictions are estimates of conflict
survival with a conflict intensity at the first quartile, with 34 deaths per year3,
while the high intensity predictions are based on conflicts at the third quartile
of average conflict intensity, with 330 deaths per year4.
The predictions for low intensity conflicts are consistently lower than for
3Conflicts with an average of 34 deaths per year include the government of Iran fighting
the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (DPIK), or the Government of Papua New
Guinea against the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA).
4This level of intensity corresponds to the conflict between the Government of Algeria
and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), or between the Government of Uganda and
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).
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Table 4.3: Cox Survival Model of Conflict Duration
Dependent variable:
Termination
(6) (7) (8) (9)
ln(Battle Deaths) −0.137∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.205∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.038) (0.039) (0.030)
ln(Gov Troops) −0.371∗∗∗ −0.102 −0.079
(0.036) (0.073) (0.058)
ln(Reb Troops) −0.010 −0.110∗ −0.080∗
(0.041) (0.044) (0.038)
Gov Support −0.124 −0.021
(0.113) (0.115)








Observations 1,946 1,411 1,411 1,785
R2 0.016 0.092 0.139 0.120
Max. Possible R2 0.964 0.953 0.953 0.960
Log Likelihood −3,214.102 −2,085.400 −2,048.209 −2,767.674
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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high intensity conflicts, and statistically significant in all but the first year and
the last two years of the period, when the confidence intervals increase. The
lower probability of conflict termination for low intensity conflicts means that
after ten years 80% of high intensity conflicts are ongoing, while only 74% of
low intensity conflict continue past ten years. 56% of high intensity conflicts
last for 25 years, while only 45% of smaller conflicts will last 25 years.
Figure 4.3: Probability of Survival, by Conflict Intensity
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4.5 Examples
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) terrorized much of Uganda for over two
decades, starting in 1987. Although much of the violence of the LRA was
targeted towards civilians, they also fought against the Ugandan government,
with battle deaths routinely passing 1000 deaths per year. There was a first
attempt at negotiations in 1994, and then a short unilateral ceasefire declared
by the LRA in 1996 around an election that they were hoping would unseat
President Museveni. Conflict intensity peaked in 2004, at 1610 battle deaths.
The next year it fell to 695, and the next it fell to 221. That year the LRA,
which had largely been pushed out of Uganda and increasingly realized they
would not be able to defeat the government, agreed to enter negotiations.
From 2006 to 2008 there were several meetings between the government and
the LRA, meeting in what is now South Sudan. A truce was established,
and the LRA moved their forces to two bases in DRC, as a preliminary step
towards a peace agreement and eventual demobilization. The negotiations
failed however, and the governments of Uganda, DRC, and South Sudan later
attacked those camps in late 2008.
By 2012 the LRA had fallen to just a few hundred fighters, and the Ugan-
dan government led an African Union force of 5,000 troops to search for the
remnants of the LRA over the territory of four countries. From 2010 to 2016
the fighting between the government and the LRA averaged only 33.8 battle
deaths per year. In 2017 the Government of Uganda declared that they were
no longer looking for the LRA. Although Joseph Kony was still at large, the
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Figure 4.4: Examples of Conflict Deescalation Leading to Termination
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LRA was no longer operating in Uganda, and had grown so small and weak
that the government of Uganda considered the conflict over. This example
serves to show that a conflict like that between Uganda and the LRA could
not end over the decades when the LRA was a capable fighting force, but in-
stead ended after several years of very low intensity conflict, when the LRA
decided to flee to safe havens in the DRC and Central African Republic rather
than attempt to fight the government of Uganda directly.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) present an example
of a powerful rebel group that only made peace with the government after the
intensity of the conflict fell to a low level. Although the FARC had operated
for over 50 years in Colombia, with battle deaths frequently passing 1000 per
year, in the last 10 years it averaged only 200, and fell steadily from 468 in
2006 to just 84 in 2015. This steady decline in their military fortunes forced
the FARC to accept that they no longer had the capability to confront the
state militarily, and instead had to negotiate an end to the conflict. In 2016
the FARC agreed to a ceasefire, and in 2017 they officially ended their armed
struggle against the government and engaged in legal political activity
In Afghanistan, the conflict with the Taliban has gradually increased over
time. In the early years after the Taliban was removed from power there were
hundreds of deaths per year attributed to fighting between the government and
the Taliban. That number increased steadily until by 2015 it had passed 15,000
battle deaths per year. The Taliban today continues to control large portions
of Afghanistan and maintains a large fighting force capable of engaging in large
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scale combat against the government. There have been attempts to negotiate
an end to the conflict. In 2009 President Hamid Karzai called for negotiations,
and in 2013 the Taliban established an office in Qatar to facilitate negotiations
with the Afghan government, as well as the United States. There is, however,
no evidence that a negotiated settlement will be reached while the Taliban is
still strong enough to pose a real threat to the government in Kabul.
4.6 Conclusion
Conflict intensity has a strong effect on conflict duration. When intensity
doubles, the probability of a conflict ending decreases by 28%. Small conflicts,
with less than 100 battle deaths per year have high probabilities of ending, of
over 20% per year. Large conflicts, with more than 1000 annual deaths are very
unlikely to end, with an annual likelihood of less than 8%. This is an important
finding for quantitative research on conflict duration, as the effect of conflict
intensity has been understudied, and many studies are reaching conclusions
about conflicts generally, when the research may be more correctly framed as
a discussion of either small conflicts or large wars.
Omitting conflict intensity, and thereby comparing many qualitatively dif-
ferent conflicts to each other, may have prevented many studies of conflict
duration from producing important results. Many effects may be predicted
to have different effects for small conflicts and large wars. A theory that is
constructed with large civil wars in mind, but tested on a dataset of primarily
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small conflicts, may reach incorrect conclusions, or fail to find any signifi-
cant results. By including conflict intensity in both theoretical and empirical
efforts, future studies of conflict duration will be improved.
This paper also has important substantive findings. Conflicts do not go
from intense combat directly to peace. Efforts to reduce the intensity of fight-
ing will help to reduce the death toll of war in the short term, but will also
reduce the length of conflicts. By reducing the harm of a conflict, and bringing
it to peace more quickly, the overall harm caused by conflicts can be reduced.
Peacekeeping and other conflict mitigation techniques are therefore not only




The results shown in the main analysis are repeated here, using the UCDP
Conflict Termination Dataset to define when a conflict ends. This analysis
produces similar results to the analysis reported in the body of the paper.
UCDP defines termination as a dyad-year with at least 25 battle deaths that
is followed by a dyad-year with less than 25 battle deaths. This contrasts with
the definition used in the body of the paper, where termination was defined as
a dyad-year with a positive number of battle deaths, followed by a year with
zero battle deaths.
Table 4.4 shows that the effect of battle deaths on termination remains
significant and negative for all models, as shown in the body of the paper.
The magnitude of the effect increases slightly for all models. The effect of
government troops remains significant for model two, but not for the models
that include population. A notable difference using the UCDP termination
data is that the size of the rebel forces has a significant effect across all models,
whereas it is not significant in any of the models using zero deaths to indicate
termination. This presents the possibility that, although battle deaths have a
large effect, the size of the rebel army may also matter, with the least likely
case for termination being a high intensity conflict with a large rebel army.
When compared with the main analysis, this means that small rebel groups
that fight intense conflicts are more likely to reach termination than a larger
group that produces the same number of deaths from combat.
External support to rebel groups is significant across all models, while gov-
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ernment support remains insignificant in all models. This is largely consistent
with the findings in the original analysis, with the exception of increased sig-
nificance in model two. This shows that while conflict intensity is a strong
factor in determining the duration of a conflict, the characteristics of the rebel
group that have been shown to affect intensity also have a separate effect on
duration, outside of their effect on intensity.
Figure 4.5 shows the predicted probability of termination given varying
levels of battle deaths. The results are largely consistent with the results
shown in Figure 4.1, with the noticeable difference that Figure 4.5 starts at
25 battle deaths, due to the restriction from the UCDP termination dataset.
Additionally, the predicted probabilities reported here are slightly higher than
the original predictions, at all values, do to the increased number of termi-
nations in the UCDP termination dataset, which reports a higher number of
conflict periods, as a result of their higher threshold for the number of deaths
necessary for a conflict period to continue.
Model 5 predicts that a dyad-year with 25 battle deaths has a 46% prob-
ability of ending that year, which drops to 33% at 100 battle deaths, 16% at
1,000 battle deaths, and just 7% for dyad-years with 10,000 battle deaths. The
estimates at each of these levels are statistically significant when compared to
each other.
Figure 4.6 presents similar results to those shown in the main analysis in
Figure 4.2, however with a somewhat larger effect. The predicted probability
of termination for the first 4 years is significantly higher than the probability of
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Table 4.4: Logit models of conflict termination, using UCDP termination
Dependent variable:
UCDP Termination
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Battle Deaths) −0.431∗∗∗ −0.349∗∗∗ −0.340∗∗∗ −0.335∗∗∗ −0.404∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.057)
ln(Gov Troops) −0.225∗∗∗ 0.017 0.029 −0.067
(0.047) (0.099) (0.100) (0.074)
ln(Reb Troops) −0.176∗∗ −0.235∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗ −0.171∗∗
(0.058) (0.061) (0.063) (0.057)
Gov Support −0.130 −0.142 −0.111
(0.150) (0.153) (0.155)
Reb Support −0.312∗ −0.338∗ −0.357∗
(0.152) (0.153) (0.155)
Polity −0.0003 0.006 −0.003
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
ln(GDP/capita) −0.256∗ −0.227∗ −0.120
(0.103) (0.104) (0.084)








Constant 1.398∗∗∗ 5.222∗∗∗ 8.181∗∗∗ 7.332∗∗∗ 6.367∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.749) (1.439) (1.465) (1.296)
Observations 1,219 985 985 985 1,137
Log Likelihood −721.981 −559.555 −554.701 −546.268 −635.827
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Figure 4.5: Estimated Probability of Conflict Termination by Conflict Inten-
sity, using UCDP termination
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Figure 4.6: Predicted Probability of Conflict Termination Over Time, using
UCDP termination
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termination for conflicts which have been ongoing for more than 10 years. The
UCDP termination data results in many conflicts being coded as shorter than
they were in the original analysis, resulting in fewer cases of long duration. It
also reduces the sample size considerably. These two factors together result in




Understanding how civil wars are fought is a fundamental aspect of conflict
studies. Without an understanding of what is going on within wars, it is
difficult to explain why and how they begin and end. Rebels thinking of
starting a war make their decision about whether or not to fight based on how
they think the conflict will progress. During a war, rebels and governments
both look at the military progress of a conflict when they make decisions about
whether to continue to fight, and how to fight. In any peace negotiations, a
major part of the decision of whether to negotiate, and what settlement actors
are willing to accept, is based on their understanding of the military progress
that is being made in the conflict. The fundamental role of fighting in civil
wars makes understanding the determinants of conflict intensity a necessity. If
we are to understand how wars end, we must understand how they are fought.
Conflict intensity is a key indicator of how a war is being fought. Most
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civil conflicts are fought at very low levels of intensity, while a few reach high
levels of intensity. The types of fighting observed in conflicts at different levels
of intensity are qualitatively different, with many small insurgencies relying on
guerrilla tactics to launch occasional attacks against government targets, while
large rebel armies fight against government armies using conventional military
tactics. In a guerrilla war the rebels rely on concealment and surprise, and only
attack government forces when they can identify a particularly advantageous
target. In a conventional war rebels and governments adopt the same tactics,
and both sides are capable of launching large scale offensives against each
other. These two types of conflict represent two extremes on a spectrum,
with many conflicts falling in between, when rebels adopt a mixture of tactics
appropriate to the situation.
5.0.1 Results
The choice of tactics adopted by the actors in a civil conflict affects how
deadly the conflict will be, and the choice is based on the capabilities of the
two sides. Weak rebels facing large government armies must adopt guerrilla
tactics, and be very careful to avoid most combat situations. Strong rebels
attempting to overthrow a weak government can be much more forceful and
direct in their efforts, resulting in a substantially higher death toll from the
conflict. I demonstrated this effect in Chapter 2, showing that the effect of
rebel force size is large and positive, with a doubling of the number of rebel
troops increasing the number of annual battle deaths by more than 50%. Given
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the small number of fighters in many rebel groups a doubling (or halving) of
the number of troops is feasible, and happens in most conflicts that last more
than one year.
Although rebel troop levels appear to be the primary determinant of con-
flict intensity, the government also plays a role. Large government armies are
able to deter rebels, and suppress violence. Government armies are almost
always much larger than rebel forces, and although rebel tactics can give the
rebels an asymmetric advantage, increasing the size of the government army
can reduce the number of battle deaths in a conflict. Government armies vary
in size much less than rebel forces, and are rarely doubled in size, however a
10% increase in the size of a government force will, on average, reduce battle
deaths by about 1.4%.
In Chapter 3, the theory of conflict intensity is expanded to include the
effect of foreign intervention. Foreign powers often intervene in conflicts, pro-
viding support to one side in order to help them win, or to increase the harm
to their opponent. By helping one of the actors, the external supporter not
only increases the capabilities of that actor, but also alters how the supported
actor uses the resources available to them. Without a behavioral change, the
increased capabilities would be expected to increase conflict intensity when
given to the rebels, and decrease intensity when provided to the government.
This is altered by the behavioral changes resulting from pressure from the ex-
ternal supporter on the supported party. A foreign power providing support
wants to see those new resources put to good use, and the receiving party has
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an interest in demonstrating that they are using those resources by increasing
their combat efforts beyond the level that they would choose if the capabili-
ties were unattached to an external party. This leads to external support to
rebels having a large positive impact on conflict intensity, and, on average,
external support to rebels increases conflict intensity by over 60%, even when
accounting for the size of the rebel force.
External support to governments has a smaller effect, and is only significant
when the support is in the form of foreign troops directly assisting the state,
or when a foreign state provides the supported state with direct access to
military and intelligence infrastructure. Close cooperation and integration
of the military forces of two governments can increase the conflict intensity
considerably, with an average increase of over 80%. Examples of this type
of government cooperation include foreign troops from 31 different countries
which fought alongside the government of Iraq in Iraq’s conflicts with four
different rebel groups, as well as cooperation given by Turkey to Iran to fight
the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), which was in turn allied with the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey.
Understanding how capabilities and external support affect conflict inten-
sity allows for a better understanding of how conflict intensity affects conflict
duration. Chapter 4 tests the effect of conflict intensity on the probability
of conflict termination, and shows that intense fighting reduces the likelihood
of a conflict ending in a particular year. The effect of battle deaths on the
probability of conflict termination is drastic, in part because of the large range
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of intensity. Conflicts with only 100 annual battle deaths have an 18% prob-
ability of ending each year, while conflicts with 1000 battle deaths have only
an 8% probability of termination. Further increases in intensity make it even
less likely that a conflict will end, with conflicts over 10,000 deaths per year
having only a 3% probability of ending in a given year.
The effect of intensity on termination is robust to the inclusion of variables
for the number of troops on both sides. The capabilities of the actors in a
conflict are therefore less important than how those capabilities are used, as
expressed in the number of combatants who are killed in combat. Hence, a war
that is particularly violent, given a small number of fighters, will be harder to
end than a war with the same number of troops, but a lower level of intensity.
External support to rebels, which has already been shown to increase in-
tensity, has an effect on termination in addition to the effect of intensity.
Support to rebels reduces the probability of conflict termination by 30%, after
controlling for conflict intensity, indicating that support does not just make
wars hard to end because of changes to the dynamics within the conflict, but
that the party providing the external support plays a role in preventing peace
between the two warring parties, separate from the effect of the support they
are giving.
5.0.2 Additions to the Existing Literature
The results from this paper expand the limited existing literature on conflict
intensity, and help tie this new knowledge about conflict dynamics to the
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existing literature on external support and conflict duration. The existing
literature on conflict duration does not account for conflict intensity, and lacks
a good understanding of how the fighting within a civil conflict affects the
length of a conflict. Because of this, the existing literature on the effect of
external support on conflict termination does not correctly reflect the effect of
support on how actors act within a conflict.
The existing literature on conflict intensity is limited, and has primarily
focused on structural variables, such as regime type and the nature of the
dispute between the rebels and the government, and the effect of lootable
resources (Heger and Salehyan, 2007; Eck and Hultman, 2007; Lujala, 2009;
Weinstein, 2007; Wood, 2010). The only attempt to link the capabilities of
the actors to the intensity of a conflict was limited to examining government
capabilities, and failed to find a relationship between government strength
and conflict intensity (Lacina, 2006). I have added to the emerging literature
on conflict intensity by examining a fundamental determinant of intensity,
and providing a theoretical framework and empirical results explaining much
of the variation in conflict intensity. After accounting for actor capabilities,
future studies can incorporate further aspects of conflict that will improve our
understanding of how warring parties choose to fight.
The effect of foreign intervention on conflict intensity has received only a
cursory examination in previous studies. External support has been argued to
increase intensity, although tests of its effect have been limited to comparing
the intensity of conflicts during the Cold War to conflicts after the Cold War
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ended, and have not distinguished between support to rebels and support to
governments (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2014; Hultman and Peksen,
2015; Lacina, 2006; Lacina, Gleditsch and Russett, 2006; Balcells and Kalyvas,
2014). By adding the effect of external support to the theoretical framework
of the effect of capabilities on intensity, and then testing that theory on more
precise data than previous work, I have added to the literature by showing
that support has different effects when given to rebels and governments, and
that the effect also varies with the type of support that is given.
My findings on the effect of rebel and government troop levels adds to the
existing literature on the relative strength of rebels and governments. Some
research has theorized about and measured the relative strength of rebels and
governments (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009), and discussed the
effects of the balance of power between rebels and governments on the tac-
tics used in the conflict (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010). Relative strength is an
important part of my theory of conflict intensity, and therefore also has an
effect of duration, however I have gone further than using the ratio of rebel to
government forces, and my analysis, using the total size of both rebels and gov-
ernments, has created a better understanding of how rebels and governments
fight than more limited studies that look only at relative strength.
The effect of external support on duration has been studied extensively.
Many of the existing studies have looked at the interests of the foreign party,
with diplomatic interventions, and interventions meant to help one side defeat
the other, both reducing conflict duration (Regan, 2002; Regan and Aydin,
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2006). The number of actors in a conflict, and the interests of outside actors,
have also been shown to affect duration (Cunningham, 2006; Cunningham,
2010). My theory of external support is based around the decisions of the
actors within the conflict, and how those actors respond to the new capabilities
provided to them, as well as how they respond to the political influence of the
group providing the support.
My research also goes into more detail than existing studies on the effect of
different types of support, and the different effects of support to the rebels and
governments. Most studies of external support look simply at whether there
is an external party providing support to either of the actors in the conflict.
Some studies have looked at the difference between support to rebels and
support to governments (Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, 2004; Balch-Lindsay
and Enterline, 2000). Newer research on the effect of external support has
begun to look at the effect of different types of support on duration (Sawyer,
Cunningham and Reed, 2017). By examining the effect of support on intensity
I have created the possibility for future research on the effects of external
support to better understand how support affects conflict dynamics.
Sawyer, Cunningham and Reed (2017) find that the number of rebel troops,
and whether the rebels receive external support, both affect conflict duration.
I have expanded on this finding by showing that troop levels and support are
determinants of conflict intensity, and that intensity increases duration. Once
intensity is included in the analysis, troop levels are no longer significant, and
the effect of external support is reduced. My research adds to the findings
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in Sawyer, Cunningham and Reed (2017), by demonstrating that the means
by which the number of rebel troops affects duration is through its effect on
intensity.
5.0.3 Policy Implications
Efforts to reduce the harm caused by civil wars can focus on ending conflicts,
and on mitigating the amount of harm done while those conflicts are ongoing.
Reducing conflict intensity reduces the number of people who die in war, and
by improving our understanding of why some conflicts are more intense than
others, I have helped to identify how to reduce the number of deaths in conflict.
The number of troops in a rebel army is an important determinant of the
number of people killed in a conflict. Efforts to reduce the size of rebel groups
should help to reduce the number of deaths from conflict.
Although reducing the size of a group may be difficult, my findings can also
be used to encourage outside actors to not intervene in a way that will increase
the size and capabilities of rebels. External support to rebel groups can have
disastrous effects on the intensity of conflict. Although outside actors often
are intervening for purely self interested reasons, in which case the intervenor
may be unconcerned with the effect of their actions on the combatants, some
interventions in support of rebels are justified by a desire to end conflicts. My
results make me skeptical of claims that supporting a rebel group will lead to
a reduction in violence.
Supporting rebels will also cause the increased death toll to accumulate
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over a longer time period. Any actor interested in ending wars should seek to
reduce the intensity of a conflict, in order to make it easier for the actors to see
that a military victory is unlikely, and encourage them to reach an agreement
to end the fighting. By reducing the size of rebel groups, and denying them
external support, conflicts should be less deadly in the short term, and they
should end sooner.
The qualities of the government appear to have less effect on conflict dy-
namics than factors related to the rebels. I do however provide some evidence
that strong governments are able to reduce conflict intensity, and that lower
intensity in turn reduces duration. Efforts to strengthen governments may
therefore help to mitigate conflict, depending on the nature of the interven-
tion. When foreign governments directly intervene in conflicts, to support
governments with troops and direct cooperation and assistance, it increases
conflict intensity. Other forms of support appear to be less significant in af-
fecting conflict.
International efforts to reduce conflict intensity should be promoted in an
effort to resolve conflicts. There is some indication in the existing literature
that arms embargoes and peacekeepers can reduce intensity (Hultman, Kath-
man and Shannon, 2014; Hultman and Peksen, 2015). This is encouraging not
only because it reduces the number of people dying in the short term, but also
in light of my finding that reducing intensity also makes it more likely that a
conflict will end quickly. Outside efforts to reduce intensity should be further




My findings could be further improved by investigating several additional as-
pects of conflict dynamics. To better understand the causes of intensity, more
research could be done to identify the capabilities of rebel groups, beyond
simply the number of fighters they possess, as well as to better understand
the link between the capabilities of conflict actors and the tactics they use.
To better understand conflict duration, additional work could look at how
wars end, as well as looking further into patterns of intensity, and theorizing
more specifically about how the factors which change intensity also affect the
likelihood of termination.
I have found a relationship between the number of fighters in rebel groups
and the level of intensity of conflicts. The number of people fighting is a major
factor determining the strength of a group, however it is a simplification to
assume that all fighters are equally capable. The productivity of soldiers, in
terms of their ability to fight, varies greatly, and is likely to be determined by
both material and organizational factors. Organizations that are well equipped
and organized, and capable of training their troops well, are likely to make
much more use out of each individual than a less well organized group will.
Studies of state armies have identified some organizational determinants
of military capabilities. Traditional military tactics changed greatly with the
advent of modern weaponry, creating a distinction between traditional and
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modern forces. Modern forces consist of specialized units that rely on mecha-
nized transportation and modern communication to conduct coordinated ma-
neuvers (Biddle, 2004). Organizational factors within a fighting force affect
command and control, the effective use of intelligence, and the skill and level
of training of forces (Talmadge, 2013). These concepts have been developed to
describe state armies, but can potentially provide insight into the capabilities
and organization of rebel forces as well.
Future work could also provide more insight into the tactics used by rebels,
as well as by states. I have theorized that the capabilities of rebel groups and
the governments they oppose determine the choice of tactics by rebels, and
that the rebels choose a mix of tactics somewhere between guerrilla warfare,
and conventional warfare. Existing work by Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) also
uses those two categories, as well as the third category of symmetric noncon-
ventional warfare. A more detailed study of the full range of tactics used by
rebels, as well as the factors that drive them to choose certain tactics, would
improve the fundamental understanding of why some conflicts are more intense
than others.
My findings on conflict termination show that intense conflicts are longer,
however more work could be done to explore why that is. Work to examine
how wars ends would allow for a better understanding of how intensity is
affecting them. I argue that intense conflicts make negotiation harder, whereas
low-intensity conflicts are easier to end through negotiation. Not all wars
end with a negotiated settlement however. In some cases one side is able to
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achieve a military victory over the other. In other cases intensity drops to the
point where the rebels simply stop fighting, without a negotiated ending. In
particular, high intensity conflicts would seem to increase the probability of a
decisive victory by one side or the other. Further work could evaluate whether
intensity makes different types of conflict termination more or less likely.
Another aspect of termination that could be explored would look at changes
in intensity over time, to see if the patterns in intensity over time are linked
to termination. Some conflicts start off at low levels of intensity, and then
grow more intense over time, before eventually ending. Other conflicts start
off at a high intensity and then slowly decrease in intensity over time, until
they finally fizzle out. A better understanding of what causes these patterns
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